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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika

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[Article synthesizing and developing ideas formulated by M. Gorbachev in several of his recent statements. (PRAVDA, 26 November 1989)]

[Text] I. Where Are We Going? Meaning and Purpose of Perestroika

Perestroika is approaching its fifth anniversary. The process of revolutionary reorganization of society, initiated with the April 1985 resolutions, is advancing, assuming a new and broader scale and a new depth. As perestroika has begun to affect ever more closely the "dense strata" of our economic and social reality, we have begun to see a great deal of things differently.

Step-by-step we gained a fuller and more comprehensive awareness of what we have built and what we are restructuring, the type of society toward which we are marching and, consequently, a sufficiently clear understanding of the meaning of what we are doing. Whereas initially we assumed that it would be only essentially a question of correcting certain distortions in the social organism and improving the overall established system which had taken shape in previous decades, now we are speaking of the need for a radical reconstruction of our entire social building, from the economic foundations to the superstructure. We are not only talking about but also taking practical steps to reform relations of ownership, the economic mechanism and the political system and change the spiritual and moral climate in society.

However, having taken the path of such revolutionary changes, we must correlate them with the long-range future and think of the essential theoretical foundations of our entire work. No progress is possible without such strategic approaches, without constantly keeping the basic problems in our sights.

After April 1985 the theoretical work of the party concentrated on the levels of knowledge of ourselves and on reaching a proper understanding of the actual and strategic objectives of perestroika. The interpretation of the past and the renovation of our understanding of socialism, defining the fundamental parameters of its new aspect and the ways of achieving a qualitatively new condition in Soviet society, along with all the other essential theoretical problems were formulated by the party for broad discussion. Scientists and practical workers have done a tremendous amount of work in the course of perestroika.

It neither was nor is or can be a question of inventing an alluring image of the future and then imposing it in real life. The future will develop not on the basis of dreams about it but of the present, of its current contradictions and trends of development, and our common efforts. To forget this means to develop a penchant for hare-brained schemes.

There are those who try to accuse us of lacking a clear and detailed plan for the implementation of the perestroika concept. One can hardly agree with such a view on the matter. I believe that we would be making a theoretical error by undertaking, once again, to impose upon society ready-made systems, and tried to make life, actual reality, fit the Procrustean bed of such designs. This was what distinguished Stalinism, which we reject. We act according to Lenin, and acting according to Lenin means studying the way the future grows out of present reality and accordingly build our plans.

That is precisely what we are doing. Look at our approaches, even those of 2 years ago and those of today. Any unprejudiced person would see the dynamics of the views, our progress. We have learned a great deal during that time. We have realized a great deal and we have seen our own errors. Today radically, step-by-step, we are changing the forms of organization of social life. We realize that a faster acceleration is necessary. However, this must not be done to the detriment of the content and the quality of the reform, whether in economics and politics or in regulating national relations.

What are our various options? As such, they do not exist. One can only speak of two viewpoints which are expressed most clearly today: the preservation of the command-administrative system, rigid planning and command, in both economics and culture. The other is based on the fact that the past has allegedly totally rejected the choice of the October Revolution, suggesting the capitalizing of society. Could we follow these two ways? No, we reject both. The arguments on this score are known. The way we contemplate is different: it is a way leading to social progress.

Today we are faced with the difficult task of reviving the authority of Marxist thinking and the Marxist approach to reality. In our further development of the concept and policy of perestroika and in understanding the problems of developing socialism we need the entire wealth of Marxist methodology, world outlook and value concepts of this, one of the most influential, global ideologies.

Socialism has as yet to become suitably aware of itself, in accordance with the profound meaning which was inherent in it as an idea and, naturally, within the context of the contemporary stage in the development of human civilization, for the seven post-October decades are, in terms of the historical scale, a short time for the real establishment of the new society which marks the beginning of a new age in the progress of mankind. We consider perestroika as well a lengthy stage in the historical path of socialism, in the course of which we are

rejecting the authoritarian-bureaucratic system and establishing a truly democratic self-governing social organism.

In this transitional period, which is revolutionary in its very essence, a variety of heterogeneous elements and factors are combined, become interwoven and interact. In the course of the competition among different economic and social forms and institutions and ideological trends, a new quality of social life, a new aspect of socialism has crystallized. The renovation of developing socialism is a process which will take us beyond this decade and into the 21st century.

We must look at the future daringly and openly. In restructuring our society, we are relying on the gigantic intellectual and moral potential of the socialist idea of building a humane, free and sensible society which we link to the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

II. Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of Socialism

History urgently raised the question of the viability of the idea of socialism itself. It is no longer sufficient to claim that it is consistent with the logic of historical progress and the age-old expectations of the working people. With increasing frequency we hear today voices claiming that the socialist idea is an artificial speculative elaboration for which reason it has no future, that the theory of Marxism, which expressed and substantiated it, allegedly did not justify itself for it is responsible for the crisis in which our society finds itself.

This theme, bearing in mind its essential theoretical and practical significance, demands a profound analysis.

The idea of socialism has a long tradition. It inspired a number of social movements, some of which revolutionary, in the course of centuries. Marx and Engels plunged profoundly into the socialist idea, relieving it of its utopian illusions and impractical schemes, presenting scientific socialism as the legitimate product of the progress of civilization and historical creativity of the working class and the toiling masses. At the same time, they clearly separated it from the coarse equalizing "barracks" (Marx) communism, linking the establishment of the new society to the high development of material production, democracy and the individual.

Such an interpretation of the socialist idea is of the greatest social and spiritual value. It is focused on man with his comprehensive material, intellectual and moral development in society, and his freedom from exploitation and oppression. We believe that during the elapsed time social thinking did not refute its essential and main features and did not go beyond Marx's idea of building the "kingdom of freedom," based on the people's mastering of material production and their own social relations.

The founders of Marxism never engaged in inventing specific forms and mechanisms of development of the new society. They developed the socialist idea based on

real social life and the practices of the revolutionary labor movement of their time. They proved the historically transient nature of capitalism and the historical need to convert to a new stage of social development. They tried to equip revolutionary socialism with the power of the theoretically substantiated "slogan of the struggle" for socialism. The classics provided only a general theoretical model of the trends of social development, which is a reliable guideline in the study and reorganization of social practices. As to the structure of the future society which would replace capitalism, they spoke of it only in a most general manner and essentially from the viewpoint of its basic principles.

It is clear that the founders of Marxism and the theory they created could not be held responsible for the deformation of socialism during the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation and for the wrong actions committed by various political leaders, not only because 100 years separated their theory from these events but also because of the essence of the matter.

This applies, in particular, to some popular interpretations of Marxism. It is believed, for example, that the negative attitude toward commodity production, which had been instilled in our country for decades, stems directly from Marx, who believed that the law of value loses its ability of acting as a production regulator with the conversion from private to public ownership. Yet Marx linked the elimination of commodity production not only to public ownership but also to the highest level of development of production forces, when a "self-reproducing production process" develops between man and nature, as a result of which man will no longer be a direct participant in material production.

This is based on the development of science and technology, to an extent which has not been reached to this day anywhere in the world. This level of development of production forces characterizes, naturally, not the early stages of the new system, which we have now reached, but its distant future. If the rejection of commodity-monetary relations is imposed on a destitute and ruined country and if under the conditions of a general scarcity of even most necessary goods we convert to straight barter, as was the case during the period of war communism, could responsibility for such an application of theory be ascribed to the creator of the theory and to the theory itself? We are as yet to study why the assessment made by V.I. Lenin, who considered as an error the initial attempts during the period of war communism to establish socialism by converting to direct bartering of products, was ignored (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, pp 157-158, 194, and 204-205).

Today we can say that Marx underestimated the possibility of self-development of capitalism, which was able to assimilate the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and develop the type of socioeconomic structures which ensured its viability and created in the developed capitalist countries a relatively high

standard of well-being for the majority of the population which, naturally, does not eliminate its profound inner contradictions.

Although Marx was the first to see the tremendous potential for development of scientific and technical progress and the conversion of science to a direct production and social force, he did not predict that the future scientific and technical revolution could become a new source of development of capitalism. This can be easily understood if we bear in mind that Marx prognosticated only the development possibility of the 19th century capitalism he knew. He could not presume the lengthy coexistence between the two social systems in large groups of countries, which was what motivated capitalism to engage in self-improvement and to borrow significant elements of the socialist experience in the socioeconomic area and the democratization of the political system which, put together, is what enabled capitalism to gain additional strength and to adapt to the challenges of our time.

Furthermore, in our time there urgently appeared new problems which did not exist in the past, for which reason they could not be topics of study of the classics, for they existed only in their embryonic stage. The nature of capitalist ownership changed seriously. Its structure changed, particularly now, in connection with the internationalization of the production process and the internationalization of the capitalist economy as a whole. The global problems have become aggravated to such an extent that without their present consideration it is impossible to acquire a realistic concept of the contemporary trends of social development and the future of mankind.

Finally, there is the global socialist experience on which we can rely in defining the objectives of our development. Today we understand socialism more broadly, more profoundly and realistically than in the recent past. We understand it as a global process in which, along with the socialist countries which have reached different levels of socioeconomic and political development, various trends of socialist thinking are being followed in the remaining part of the world, along with social movements different in terms of structure and motivations.

Socialism is as varied in its manifestations as is life itself, for it is the live creativity of millions of people. That is why the multivariant nature of socialist development is inevitable, even within each separately taken society. This applies to an even greater extent on the scale of the entire global community. The multivariance is determined by the various levels of development of social production forces and the characteristics of the historical, national and cultural traditions of each nation.

It is from this viewpoint that we are approaching also the experience of the social democratic movement. We see and properly evaluate its centennial contribution to the development of the values of socialism and the implementation of social reforms which contributed to

upgrading the well-being and social protection of the working people in many capitalist countries in the West. The rich and comprehensive experience gained by the social democrats, although not all of it of equal value, is being studied with interest by us. We are trying to take from it that which is suitable under the conditions of our own society.

The fact in developing the ideas of socialism Marxism presented it as the legitimate product of the progress of civilization and the historical creativity of the people is of permanent significance. This proved its scientific approach to the substantiation of the new society. However, in order to preserve this approach it is important to take into consideration that it is not given once and for all.

III. The Idea of Socialism and Socialist Practice

1. Lenin: "Change of Our Entire Viewpoint on Socialism"

As we speak of the future we invariably turn to the past as well. The question of the path our further development must follow is inseparably related to the way we assess the October Revolution. No revolution can be made on the basis of a predrafted plan; no revolution yields the exact results expected by its participants, as confirmed by the entire history of mankind. This applies to the socialist revolution as well, as frequently mentioned by the classics of Marxism. "Views formulated in advance on the detailed organization of a future society? You will not find even a hint of them in our writings," F. Engels said (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 22, p 563). V.I. Lenin wrote of the movement toward the implementation of the rule of "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs:" "We neither know nor could know the stages and the ways of practical implementation which will be followed by mankind advancing toward this superior objective" (op. cit., vol 33, p 99). All this was said already after February and on the eve of the October Revolution, in Lenin's "*The State and Revolution*," a book which contains the most detailed of all descriptions of the socialist future he allowed himself before the start of practical revolutionary activities.

Naturally, this does not mean that the real results of the revolution, both immediate and more distant, are not subject to political and scientific evaluation and reevaluation. As we gain experience, such a reassessment is continually taking place. If we link to the October Revolution the greatest progressive changes made in the country and throughout the world for the past 72 years—something which we can do with full justification—we cannot avoid the question of the reasons for and the extent to which violations of socialist legality were committed, the democratic rights of the citizens were violated, and other negative phenomena became possible under the conditions of the new social system.

Yes, our past is complex. It combines victories and failures, discoveries and errors, bright and tragic aspects,

revolutionary enthusiasm, heroic labor and sacrifices, and great hopes and disappointments. We cannot deny our history, for it is precisely in the past that we find the origins of many of our present problems. The entire experience of socialism—both heroic and tragic—belongs to mankind. All of it must be profoundly studied and interpreted. In this case not only our victories but also our defeats will be of use. We will be able better to understand the dangers which await us in the future and how to avoid them.

Today, as we study our own history more profoundly, it is becoming increasingly clear that the October Revolution was not an error, not only because a bourgeois democratic republic was not at all its real alternative, as some people in our country are claiming, but an anarchic rebellion and a bloody military dictatorship, and the establishment of a reactionary antipeople's regime.

Nor is there any doubt that the October Revolution was not an accident but a great universal-historical thrust into the future, a proclamation that social problems were to be solved in the interest of the people and that social conditions would be created for higher material and spiritual progress and for the involvement of all working people in conscious social creativity.

The post-October years became the first practical test of the socialist idea. An intensive search was launched for specific forms of organization of society. This is confirmed above all by V.I. Lenin's works, starting with the familiar "Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System." Under the influence of the dogmatic concepts implanted by Stalin, concepts which lasted for many long years, the investigative nature of V.I. Lenin's post-October works was underestimated; changes in his views on the building of socialism were suppressed, under the pretext that such changes could allegedly be considered a weakness. Actually, the Leninist study indicated not weakness but strength. In the thick of the events and the tempestuous cataclysms Lenin could learn from life and sensitively sense the needs of the masses, sum up the facts and draw theoretical conclusions from the social processes.

Another widespread view is that Lenin allegedly had a complete program for the building of socialism in our country. Actually, he had no such complete program. We know that during the first years of the revolution the emphasis was on direct distribution, mandatory labor, and strict accountability and control—steps which became organic elements of the policy of war communism. However, with the end of the Civil War it became clear to Lenin that this policy had exhausted its usefulness. To lead the masses to socialism, while relying exclusively on the enthusiasm triggered by the revolution was impossible. It was necessary to include material incentive and related economic mechanisms of commodity production and trade. It was on this basis that the fundamental trends in the dynamics of society were redefined, the main among which was the courageously

proclaimed NEP—a policy which conflicted with the dogmatic concepts and with the opinion which had developed in party circles.

Equally dramatic was the following problem: during the period of preparations for and making of the October Revolution, V.I. Lenin and the bolsheviks relied on the support of the proletariat of the more developed countries, for they realized that Russia had not reached the level of economic development considered necessary for a transition to socialism. However, by the time that the Civil War ended no victorious proletarian revolution had occurred elsewhere. Did this mean that we should not have assumed power in October or that we should have surrendered it after the Civil War? Lenin's clear answer to this was that we must make use of the power of the proletariat in order to ensure the fastest possible creation of the economic and cultural prerequisites for a transition to socialism, i.e., the creation of a modern industry, and a revolution in the field of culture. In other words, we had to do what had capitalism and bourgeois democracy would have accomplished. However, this was to be done under a Soviet system.

Toward the end of his life V.I. Lenin charted the initial outlines of his cooperative plan, closely linking the idea of a cultural revolution with the cooperativization of the petty producer and with changes in all aspects of life. Therefore, developed his program for a conversion to socialism which was to lead us to change, as he clearly realized, "of our entire viewpoint on socialism."

The study of all of Lenin's post-October works provides an indication of the direction along which this change was to take place. This is most clearly described in his article "On the Cooperative," from which I quoted. From the idea of the "single factory," of a type of monopoly under the management of the worker state, repeatedly mentioned in 1917-1918, he came to the idea that the "system of civilized members of cooperatives" was also a socialist system.

The manner in which all of this was to be implemented and through what type of organizational and other social forms were problems which V.I. Lenin was unable to develop. All he did was to create an outline and note the approaches to it. Unfortunately, they were subsequently ignored or else grossly distorted in the course of Stalinist industrialization and collectivization.

Why was Stalin able to impose upon the party and the entire society his own program and methods? This is the most important question in evaluating our history.

2. Bureaucratic Deformations of the Socialist Idea

The search of ways and means of building the new society, which became historically necessary after Lenin, developed into a fierce ideological and political struggle. Stalin skillfully used the revolutionary intolerance of the masses and the utopian and equalization trends inherent in any mass movement, along with the aspiration of the vanguard to attain the desired objective as soon as

possible. All of this greatly limited the possibility of having a creative discussion of the problems which arose, and of the various options. It led to a standardization which no longer provided any opportunity for a variety of views and opinions based on Marxist theory and within the framework of the party program. The idea of socialism was increasingly brought closer to the model of an authoritarian command-bureaucratic administrative system.

Another consequence of this process was the increasingly widening gap separating the theory of Marxism from reality, and humanistic ideals from practical experience. The bureaucratic and rigidly centralized economic and political system functioned in accordance with its own laws. The purpose of theory was to perform a distorted ideological function, to create the illusion of the "accuracy" of such actions, and to justify practices, depicting in the social mind the definitive model of socialism as allegedly consistent with the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

For the sake of achieving the "great objective" even the most inhuman means were being justified. Officially, "political expediency" was put above "formal legality," which deprived politics of its moral principle. Having violated the norms and principles of human morality and justice, the authoritarian-bureaucratic system tried to strengthen its position by persistently instilling in the social mind standards of community life and behavior which were "special," and distinct from universal human values.

Nonetheless, despite all deformations, deep within their minds the people preserved the humanistic understanding of socialism and whenever possible tried to apply it.

The 20th CPSU Congress and the phenomena which were exposed at it and described as the "cult of personality," the debunking of Stalin and the condemnation of his methods were of tremendous importance. This necessitated taking a new look at the distance covered by the country and the party.

However, having rejected and condemned the sinister aspects of the Stalinist regime and its extremes, generally speaking the 20th Congress left the bureaucratic system unchanged. The system was able to survive, helped by the new illusion that it sufficed to eliminate the extremes of the Stalinist regime for the thus released energy of socialism to be able in the immediate future to lead our society to the higher phase of communism.

The assessment of the status reached by society as being one of "developed socialism" contained elements of pragmatism. However, it also contained a rather high share of utopianism and exaggeration. Most importantly, it preserved that same bureaucratic system.

The Stalinist distortions resulted in the loss of the main aspects of the Marxian and Leninist concepts of socialism: the view that man was not the means but the

objective. Instead of the idea that the free development of each was a prerequisite for the free development of all the concept which developed was of man as a "cog" of the party-state machinery and of the organization of the working people as the "transmission belts" of this machinery. Subsequently as well, the existing mechanism was basically retained. Furthermore, essentially the administrative-bureaucratic system gathered increasing strength. This had extremely adverse consequences for society which, in the final account, was brought to a condition of stagnation and to the brink of a crisis.

These years are usually referred to as the "period of stagnation." Clearly, however, this characterization can no longer be considered adequate. This was a time of lost opportunities, which caused serious harm to the cause of socialism. At that time the significance of the revolution which was taking place in science and technology was underestimated and no practical steps were taken in that area, although a great deal was being said about the need to combine the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution—its latest stage—with the advantages of socialism. Consequently, on the overall level of civilization, in a number of important areas and trends we remained somehow in the past technological age, while the Western countries moved to a different one, an age of high technology and essentially new interconnections between science and industry and new ways of security for the people, including their daily life.

Today many are those who try to find the roots of our current difficulties and troubles in the choice of socialism itself; not in the ways of the revolution but in its origins, its principles. The CPSU as well is turning to the sources and principles of the revolution but not for the sake of debunking the "insanity of the brave" but for the sake of making full use of the responsibility assumed for the cause of the revolution and for its promises, accomplishments and debts. As the organizer of the revolution, the party must remember these debts. Any further advance toward socialism is impossible without it. That which was not carried out, which was not accomplished, must be carried out and accomplished.

Marxist theory anticipated the possibility that in the course of building the new society it may become necessary repeatedly to start from scratch.

3. Perestroika and the New Vision of Socialism

Revolutionary perestroika was started on the initiative of the party and its leadership. On this basis, occasionally, views have been expressed in our press of it as being a "revolution from above," and various historical parallels and comparisons have been drawn.

I believe, however, that the concept of "revolution from above" is unacceptable for it divides our society into leading "upper strata" and the "lower strata" which execute their ideas, instructions and orders. To Stalin, who used this concept in his collectivization concept, this was natural, for it reflected his idea of the pyramid

of power, with the "lower strata" as the foundations and the leadership as the peak. Was such a concept a patch on the authoritarian-bureaucratic system which we reject? It is a manifestation of the antidemocratic ideology of Stalinism, i.e., not of the new but of the old way of thinking.

Perestroika is an overall revolutionary process carried out through democratic methods by the people and for the people toward whom the party acts as their political vanguard. A manifestation of its activeness and historical initiative are natural manifestations of its vanguard role. The party does not hold a monopoly on the right to investigate. Any useful initiative, whatever its origin, is needed by perestroika, for its vital tone politically depends on the development of democracy, the function of which, in particular, consists of stimulating popular initiative.

It is more than ever important today to answer the question of the new approaches to socialism and the new vision concerning its basic features.

Perestroika takes the basic principles of the revolution to the level of the real principles, for in the past most of them were merely simply proclaimed. Nonetheless, today it has become absolutely clear that these principles and the criteria of socialization based on them must be concretized in accordance with the experience of global socialism and the development processes in the capitalist countries.

Above all, we must eliminate from them the confrontational, the absolutist, the metaphysical pitting of one contemporary social systems against another. Life itself and its dialectics and the global problems and dangers facing mankind demand a conversion from confrontation to cooperation among nations and countries regardless of their social system.

The elimination of the confrontational approach was helped by the view that we are part of human civilization for the preservation of which we are responsible. However, in the heat of our direct opposition to capitalism, we clearly undervalued the significance of a great deal of what had been achieved by mankind over the centuries. Such achievements of civilization include not only the simple standards of morality and justice but also the principles of formal law, i.e., the equality of everyone in the eyes of the law, the rights and freedoms of the individual, the principles of commodity production and equivalent trade based on the effect of the law of value. Today the idea is increasingly making its way in the social awareness that commodity production and economic methods of management are inseparable elements at the present level of development of socialism.

We must also take a new look at the familiar Leninist concept according to which there are no intermediary "structures" between the level known as monopoly capitalism and the one known as socialism. It is obvious that Lenin brought to light the similarity of forms of organization and levels of socialization of production of these

systems, not fully realized by us so far, confirming that in this case not the purely structuring but the general civilization mechanisms begin to function. We must amend our understanding of the nature of the economic competition between capitalism and socialism. Not quantitative growth of output or the amount of products per capita (although in some economic sectors this has not been eliminated from the agenda such as, for example, in agriculture), but the economy of resources, the level of technology and information support assume a decisive significance. We must change our economic criteria and make them consistent with contemporaneity, with the economic reality of today. This is quite essential in order to define the objectives of economic policy.

Thus, we hold a leading position in the world in the volume of output of steel, chemical fertilizers and some other commodities. What specifically "socialist" features do such accomplishments give us? Clearly, as of a given point these tons, pieces, meters, and so on turn into excessively coarse and primitive indicators of economic and social development. The socialist criterion in such circumstances should be better correlated with the interests and needs of man. As to the area of production of material goods, we should follow not the confrontational slogan of "catching up and outstripping" but an orientation toward a closer inclusion in the global process of economic development. Economically we shall benefit if we do not oppose others in this area but instead try, together with them, to solve our own economic problems.

It is equally clear that processes quite similar in terms of content occur equally under socialism and capitalism for, in the final account, they are triggered by the development of contemporary production forces and scientific and technical progress. Specifically, this applies to integration processes. Naturally, we must not copy the West. However, we must make fuller use of the benefits of integration processes than we have so far within the framework of the global socialist system.

What do we see as the nature and content of the criteria of socialism and what values are we trying carefully to preserve and to enrich with new dimensions?

The idea of socialism, in our present understanding is, above all, that of freedom. The main motif of the social revolution—the liberation of the working class—was inseparably linked by the founders of scientific socialism to the liberation of "all mankind" from any form of oppression and exploitation (see K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 19, p 246). It was a question of freedom based on reason, on the humanistic concepts of the rights of the individual living among other individuals, and of freedom which has nothing in common with anarchy or self-seeking and destructive arbitrariness. That is why the socialist understanding of freedom is organically linked to the idea of the community, of collectivism. However, this is not a barracks collectivism which equalizes the individual but the one which Marx and Engels

described as the true collectivism through which "the individuals acquire freedom in the course of and through association" (ibid., vol 3, p 75).

Unfortunately, it was precisely this aspect of the socialist idea that was distorted the most. For the sake of this view of collectivism human individuality was ignored and the development of the individual was blocked; the sensible limits of freedom were drastically curtailed under the pretext that the collective had priority over the individual; the humane nature of the socialist social system was emasculated. In other words, the main feature—man himself with his needs, interests and active life—was eliminated from the socialist ideal.

The familiar poetic formula that "socialism means the free labor of freely united people" was born immediately after the revolution. Life and practical experience concretized this formula: "not directly but through the enthusiasm born of the great revolution, on the basis of personal interests, personal incentive and cost accounting;" such were, according to Lenin, the principles on which the building of socialism was to be based. This truth remained forgotten for a long time under the domination of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system.

It is thus that in a distorted and primitive fashion the most important principle of socialism—the principle of actual socialization of production—was interpreted. It was precisely action that was replaced by form, by declarations, by fictitious well-being based on diktat and administration and, frequently, on coercion, as during the time of accelerated collectivization of the countryside. Today we must look at public property in more specific terms, taking into consideration both positive and negative experience. It is a question above all of not reducing socialization to statification, against which Lenin cautioned us but which we subsequently ignored.

We are not abandoning and shall not abandon the very idea of socialization and the priority of public ownership, which remains an organic structural part of the socialist ideal. United and free labor was and remains the essential feature of socialism. Nonetheless, we reject the formal socialization. We are promoting in practice the variety of forms of ownership which have not exhausted their potential and which can lead the socialist economy on the path of increased efficiency.

The power of the socialist ideal also resides in the fact that within it the problems of efficiency, and labor productivity are inseparable from those of humanism and social justice. This is the center of gravity of the socialist idea, its specific distinction. It is precisely this that is the strength and not the weakness of the socialist social system, as is sometimes thought. We must not confuse humanism with encouraging dependency, or justice with total equalization and the absence of any differentiation whatsoever.

Unfortunately, in public opinion as well gross equalization concepts, which Marx criticized, are still quite

popular. To this day many people still share such feelings. The justice of socialism is closely related to the problem of distribution according to labor which, in turn, cannot be solved without a profound study of the problems of labor productivity in general, the actual correlation between simple and complex labor and the combination between current and long-term social interests. This is a task for the present and, at the same time, for the strategic future. It is this contradiction of socialism which is one of the powerful motive forces of its development.

The practice of true democracy is an essential feature of socialism. Throughout our history no one has ever denied this. Involving the masses in management has always been considered the most important feature of socialist democracy, the development of which, according to Lenin, should be such that with the progress of culture and the enhanced level of awareness of the masses, from a democracy for the working people it should develop into a democracy exercised by the working people themselves. The proclamation of our socialist state as being a state of the whole people, by the turn of the 1960s, was obviously to be the landmark indicative of this transition. Unfortunately, for several decades theoretical innovations were not accompanied by any changes whatsoever in the political mechanisms. Therefore, in terms of ownership relations as well, socialist democracy must be interpreted not abstractly but combined with mechanisms for the implementation of its essential principles, the purpose of which is to ensure socialist self-management by the people and a law-governed state. The systematic implementation of these principles is a guarantee not only of the democratic but also the truly socialist development of our political system. This is one of the lessons of the past and a task dictated to us by life, by the reality of perestroika.

Socialism is the bearer and defender of general democratic and universal human ideals and values. In this connection, the question of the nature of the class approach under conditions governed by the priority of universal human values asserted by our own age assumes exceptional importance. From the very beginning of the establishment of the proletarian movement, Marx emphasized the fact that "the struggle for the liberation of the working class means a struggle not for class privileges and monopolies but for equal rights and obligations and for the elimination of any class domination" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 16, p 12). It is thus that the vector of the class principle coincided with the progress of civilization along the way of freedom and peace.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the true class analysis of the realities of life, the present condition of society and its motive forces and contradictions. It is only by thoroughly taking into consideration the interests and needs of the classes and groups within our society that we can formulate a realistic policy in the course of perestroika, the purpose of which will be to correct the deformations in socialism and to improve its quality.

IV. The New Image of Socialism

We now come to the basic question which was raised at the beginning: Where are we going? What meaning should be invested in the concept of the new quality of society, the new image of socialism? Here as well the approach to the matter itself, and the methodology of its analysis are important.

In his time K. Marx wrote that communism is not an ideal but a real movement of society, which changes its previous condition. Nonetheless, in our country the efforts were focused on presenting some kind of ideal "model" of the future within which the changes taking place in society would fit. An abstract design was being imposed upon reality not only in theory but in practice. Life, however, frequently followed a different path, consistent with objectively developing conditions. The efforts to force it to follow a predrafted plan led to dogmatism, ideological cruelty, secrecy, self-deception and coercion applied to both people and history.

The people became tired of waiting. There were all too many empty appeals and promises to be trusted indiscriminately. A number of statements were made about the interests of man but were given little support with material resources and real accomplishments. As a result, having become a great and mighty power, the country did not create for the people's masses the type of living conditions which are natural in any civilized state. It is perestroika that must eliminate this paradox of one-sided development as we create a qualitatively new condition within society, oriented toward the humanistic values of socialism. By creating conditions for the rich life of the present generations we are also ensuring the future of our country, the future of socialism.

Thus formulated, the idea of the new aspect of socialism takes shape naturally, in the course of the identification and theoretical interpretation of the basic needs and interests of today's generation. It is on this basis that we can formulate objectives and programs which are consistent with today's reality but are also aimed at the future.

The new image of socialism is its human face, which is entirely consistent with Marx's ideas, according to which the society of the future is a real, a practically attainable humanism. Since the creation of such a society is the main objective of perestroika, we can say with full justification that we are building a *humane socialism*.

Naturally, our task is not simply to proclaim this concept. It is important to renovate socialism in practice, by creating the type of socioeconomic and political structures which become a means while man becomes the target, and which in fact ensure that the entire social system is facing man. Such a humanizing of social structures is consistent not only with the requirements of the love of man or moral imperatives. Today, in our society, it becomes an economic and social necessity and a requirement for its development.

Perestroika proved that it is only the actual involvement of man in all governmental and social affairs as a responsible participant in its activities that would enable us to surmount his alienation, close the gap between social and personal interests, and upgrade the activeness of the individual in all areas of social life.

On the other hand, the social structures can be humanized only if we increase our investments in man. We must fully realize that society will develop the more intensively the more developed, competent and conscientious man becomes in his labor. Therefore, investing in man is the most profitable use of capital. In this respect we have fallen greatly behind the developed countries where the share of financing of public education, health care and other human services is much higher in proportion to the national income compared to our country. In this case we need a radical change and the rejection, not in words but in fact, of the residual principle of financing such areas, for it is the only approach that is consistent with the basic values of socialism. That is what perestroika dictates to us and, as we define the future and the new image of socialism, we must fully implement the principle of the priority of the human dimension in all areas of our social life.

In the *economic area* the changes of our viewpoint on socialism gave us the understanding that in order to ensure the progress of contemporary production forces and the growth of social labor productivity we must develop a variety of forms of socialist ownership and create new economic mechanisms for its implementation, which would effectively organize and stimulate human labor activities.

In the course of such changes we do not have to abandon the universally known advantages of centralism and large-scale planning. We are abandoning bureaucratic centralism in favor of democratic centralism and thereby the formal and essentially helpless centralism in favor of the true, the effective centralism. Departmental pseudo-centralism would be replaced by reliable management mechanisms based on voluntary associations of labor collectives.

The economic mechanisms shaped by perestroika will yield the necessary results if the working people become the true owners; if the worker becomes the owner of the labor tools and the peasant becomes the master of the land, while the mechanisms themselves are represented not only by the social but, in harmony with them, the personal interests of the working person, so that the people can see the connection between the results of their toil and the reward for their efforts.

Unquestionably, a profound structural reorientation of the economy will take place in the course of this transformation, above all by converting the enterprises in the defense industry, the road to which is opened by the processes of strengthening international security, disarmament, a conversion to a nuclear-free world and,

second, by significantly increasing the share of consumer goods in the overall volume of output.

Yet another most important aspect of structural perestroika exists and, in this case, our tasks are consistent with the search in which all mankind is engaged. The futility of the old models of industrialization, which absorb huge natural resources and consume an ever greater amount of raw materials, materials and energy, became obvious in the second half of the 20th century. Such a wasteful economic structure could function for a limited period of time and in a limited part of the world. It is unsuitable in the long term and for all mankind, for it is simply beyond nature's capacity.

Unfortunately, socialism was unable to assume the position of leadership in the structural perestroika. Today this role is played by the industrially developed capitalist countries. Although pleased that we were able to avoid the social upheavals related to the energy crisis of the 1970s in the capitalist world, we noted all too late the fact that the social upheaval in those countries was followed by an energetic structural reorganization based on high technology and the conservation of energy and raw materials. Today we are paying for our slowness and complacency, including with social costs as well. Reality forces us to assert the advantages of our system in the area of structural reorganization.

This is a task of no lesser scope and difficulty than industrialization, which took place within a very short time, or the organization of a victory industry during the war. It is a no less important task, for it is a question of the vital interests, of the fate of the country.

Perestroika will win if it can win economically, i.e., if it can ensure the economic stability and the necessary growth of labor productivity and the acceleration of the pace of scientific and technical progress. Such are the characteristics which must mark the new economic aspect of socialism.

Politically the renovation of socialism leads to ensuring true popular rule by setting up the mechanisms of a civil society and a law-governed state.

In our country the very term "democratic socialism" triggered a negative reaction, being identified with the reformist, the opportunistic line within the socialist movement. Today it is a question of the democratization not only of the governmental system but of all social life, a democratization which provides a powerful incentive for upgrading the social activeness and activity of the masses and creates conditions for their manifestation.

Organically related to the development of democracy is the idea of building a socialist law-governed state, which means the supremacy of the law, and granting every individual a wide range of social and political rights and freedoms, combined with high responsibility and discipline, and the creation of efficiently operating management mechanisms.

Democracy and freedom are the great values of human civilization which we are inheriting and to which we are giving a socialist content. The pitting of real versus formal democracy, which was practiced in our country naturally had a certain theoretical content. We favor real democracy but oppose the rejection, on this basis, of the formal principles of democracy, for a law-governed state must necessarily include such principles and for our own experience indicates how important it is in the life of society to ensure the strict observance of all legal principles. Therefore, we fully justifiably claim that we are building not only a humane but also a *democratic socialism*.

The leading trend in the development of the state and other political institutions is the dialectical combination of the ideas and practices of socialist self-management by the people (with advantages, such as the use of the opportunities provided by direct democracy, active citizen participation in the administration of all social affairs through a variety of channels for the direct manifestation of their will) with the tried and long experience of the mechanism of representative parliamentary democracy, which ensure the clear separation between the executive and legislative powers and the independence of the courts.

Socialist self-government by the people also presumes a sensible demarcation among "spheres of influence" between governmental and various social structures and civil society institutions and, at the same time, the "growth" of self-management principles within Soviet statehood, which will be helped by the development of the entire system of soviets of people's deputies.

The Communist Party plays a special role in the new social organism. It is called upon to be the political vanguard of Soviet society. The fate of perestroika and, therefore, attaining a qualitatively new condition by society, and a new image of socialism, depend to a tremendous, if not decisive, extent on its activities.

Perestroika faced the party with a dual task: to define its place under the conditions of a radical democratization of the political system, the structuring of a civil society, and a conversion to cost accounting and economic management methods in the national economy, on the one hand, and the restructuring within the party itself, on the other. All of these are new and difficult problems. To develop the autonomous activities of the masses and the processes of democratization of all social life within the framework of a one-party system is the party's noble and difficult mission. A great many things will be determined by the way we implement it.

Today, getting rid of the command management functions, the party is turning into a center for the formulation of political and ideological platforms which it recommends to society and to the state, represented by its elected authorities. The objective of the party is to interpret the occurring processes and to define and suggest a policy and carry out forecasting activities by

expanding theoretical work on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist principles and values, and the analysis of the realities of our life and global experience. Through its influence on the processes occurring in society, the CPSU engages in a variety of practical activities among the masses, acting through the party organizations and the party members. The work of the party is to head the implementation of the task bequeathed by Lenin in the struggle against bureaucracy in the management apparatus, and to systematically carry out such struggle throughout all the stages of perestroika.

Such changes in the party functions also redefine its place in the political system as the ideological, political and moral vanguard of the people. On the organizational level, the party, without "issuing orders" to governmental and social structures, must preserve its independence and act within the framework of the Constitution and the other Soviet laws. At the present difficult stage the interests of the consolidation of the society and the concentration of all of its healthy forces on solving the difficult problems of perestroika dictate the expediency of preserving a one-party system. However, the party will contribute to the development of pluralism and the competition among different opinions in society and the broadening of glasnost in the interests of democracy and the people. In the struggle for the renovation of socialism the party cannot surrender the initiative either to any populist demagoguery or to nationalistic or chauvinistic trends or to elements of group interests.

The party as well has taken the path of its own perestroika. Its internal structure and work style and methods are changing. Unfortunately, however, for the time being perestroika within the party is taking place more slowly than in society as a whole. This creates substantial difficulties in ensuring its vanguard role. The party is fully resolved to take the path of radical renovation so that it can become in fact an example of democratization, within which new forms and procedures for self-management will be developed and so will the principles of collectivism and comradeship and in which the rights of the members of the organization, based on conscious discipline, will be exercised. The structure and functions of the party apparatus must be made consistent with the new conditions; the activities of all party units must be restructured and conservatism and dogmatism must be eliminated.

The process of renovation of socialism in the *social area* is becoming increasingly deeper and more thorough. In the broad meaning of the term this is an area of social production by man himself, with his interests and their manifestation through various forms of intercourse. It includes daily life, services, education, health care, social insurance and recreation, i.e., the totality of all social institutions aimed at serving the needs of man.

Having concentrated on a superficially conceived management of material production, the command system led the social area into a condition of neglect and even partial degradation. Today we directly feel the fact that

the attitude toward the social sphere was another reason for stagnation and for the growth of social tension, the results of which we are now harvesting.

Although today social programs are the focal point of the policy of perestroika, we are only beginning to make them consistent with the needs of man and the principles of socialism. We are as yet to get rid of the dependency of individual groups on the state and of imposing on the people bureaucratic concepts of the socialist way of life. We must, therefore, make qualitative changes which are becoming an organic part of our concepts of the present and the future of socialist society and its revolutionary renovation through perestroika.

Perestroika reformulates the question of the *dynamics of the social structure of society*. Obviously, the previous concept of the growing social homogeneousness of society, with the development of socialism, was one-sided. The variety of socialist forms of ownership, which appear together with the single governmental form, means that the growth of social homogeneity in one respect will be paralleled by increased differentiation in another.

In our views concerning the socialist society of the present and the future we must, obviously, take more thoroughly into consideration the specific nature of peasant labor as work with the land, with animate nature, work which can never fully become a variety of industrial labor. That is why the process of surmounting the old social division of labor between town and country and the elimination of disparities between the working class and the peasantry turns out to be not all that simple, straightforward and immediate, as it seemed in the past.

Today it is actually a question not of eliminating but of reviving the countryside and bringing it closer to the town from the viewpoint of cultural and living conditions, and the extensive building of roads, the development of transportation facilities which will make the rural population mobile and able to maintain permanent contacts with the cities. We must study the processes of interconnection between town and country which are taking place under the influence of progressive economic and cultural factors.

Perestroika literally brought to the surface of social life a mass of problems and contradictions in the *sphere of interethnic relations*. These problems did not appear yesterday. They developed during a time when the national principle was being suppressed, and the "national problem" was officially proclaimed as being solved. These problems reached their greatest tension when it was deemed possible to punish entire ethnic groups for mysterious transgressions. Under the conditions of today's democracy and glasnost, such conflicts merely emerged on the surface. They must be considered soberly for, without having identified the real problems, we cannot solve them. All that matters is to see to it that ethnic movements in defense of sovereignty, economy

and culture do not develop to the detriment of other nations, to the detriment of our entire Union, to the detriment of perestroika.

Frequently, phenomena which are not of national but of general social origin appear as conflicts among nationalities. This includes departmentalism, which complicates the development of the economy in all areas, bureaucratism, which violates the basic rights of the people, and the opposition of corrupt elements to perestroika. However, the painful and complex clashes which, by the fault of extremists sometimes assume even a tragic nature, indicate that in this area substantial changes must be made in the spirit of the true values of socialism.

Based on a contemporary understanding of the dialectics of the national and the international, in its national policy platform the CPSU has tried maximally to reflect everything valuable which emerged in the course of the public debates, and to present a new image of the Soviet Federation, harmoniously combining the interests of national sovereignty with the development of the common interests of the union of the peoples in the country. Within its framework, relations among nationalities are bound to be based on the principles of democracy and equality, reciprocal respect and the free development of nations.

Perhaps the most radical changes leading to the renovation of socialism should take place in the *area of ideology, culture and education*. Perestroika provides broad scope for the spiritual development of man himself and the society in which he lives and for changes in the psychological concepts. This includes the establishment of an attitude toward labor consistent with the contemporary tasks of society, and upgrading the level of professionalism and competence, as well as the moral cleansing and healing of society.

Our concepts of the future assign an important role to the intelligentsia and its various detachments and to the members of the mass intellectual profession (teachers, physicians, engineers, scientific workers) and their creative activities in culture and science. In order to correct the distortions of previous decades it is extremely important, above all, decisively to upgrade the social rating of intellectual labor, knowledge and high level professionalism.

Socialism will have no intellectual and moral attractiveness whatsoever in the eyes of mankind if it operates somewhere in the tail end of the advanced detachments of global science and culture. However, this is not all. In general, socialism will have no future whatsoever unless we create conditions for the realization of the creative, the spiritual forces of every individual and the entire nation, and for the manifestation of talent, capability and enterprise in all fields of life. Let us have fewer departmental institutions and offices of all kind; let us have less centralization and hierarchical official pyramids and more truly creative and scientific associations of like-minded people. We have no right to go on wasting

fresh and original ideas, inventions and discoveries. The competition among schools and trends and international contacts must become ordinary phenomena in our scientific and cultural life. It is only thus, by becoming part of the system of the global exchange of experience, that we ourselves will become richer and will make our own contribution to global progress.

However, even the best "foreign universities" will be useless to us unless we are able, in the immediate future, to comprehensively open—in town and country—modern schools, staffed with skilled teachers. Without such schools and teachers, who will once again assume their rightful social status, the distance to which is still great, even the best spiritual potential of the people risks to remain unused. The future belongs to knowledge, culture and intellect.

Therefore, the socialism toward which we are advancing in the course of perestroika is one of a society based on an efficient economy, higher achievements of science and technology and culture, and humanized social structures which will have democratized all aspects of social life and created conditions for the active and creative life and activities of the people.

Along with these, many processes in the renovation of socialism are essentially general civilization processes which are occurring, in one aspect or another, on different social foundations. Increasingly, global problems, shared by all, are assuming a greater place in the life of mankind. All of this leads us to believe that, while retaining their own features, the different social systems are developing within a framework increasingly limited by the priority of universal human values, such as peace, security, freedom and the possibility of each nation to define its own fate. The socialist world is progressing toward objectives which are common to all mankind, within the framework of a single civilization, without abandoning its own values and priorities, while increasingly developing and improving them through the revolutionary perestroika and the building of a truly humane society based on the principles of reason and humanism.

That is how we see at the present stage the problems which affect the purposes of perestroika and the renovation of socialism in the contemporary world, consistent with the task of proper implementation of the essence of the ideas of socialism. Let us reemphasize at this point that we are not following some kind of abstractly formulated dogma imposed from the outside, but are analyzing and summing up that which is developing as part of life itself, as a result of the creative work of millions of people. That is why there is a great deal that we still do not know but hope to find out in the course of the study of the processes of life in our society which has entered a historically transitional period of perestroika. We must comprehensively support the active involvement of social scientists and the artistic intelligentsia in this work which is important to the country. I believe that we have all the proper reasons to hope for its successful outcome and the fact that through

joint efforts we shall have to define the basic structures of the new aspect of socialism and thus formulate for the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress a theoretically substantiated program for long-term action.

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RENOVATION OF SOCIETY— RENOVATION OF THE PARTY

Democratic Centralism: Opinions and Suggestions

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[Text] V. Skvirskiy, docent, Moscow Automotive Highways Institute: Rejection of Stereotypes

The CPSU Statutes describe democratic centralism as the electiveness of all leading party authorities from top to bottom; periodical accountability by party authorities to their party organizations and to superior authorities; strict party discipline and obedience of the minority to the majority; strict mandatory implementation of the resolutions of superior authorities; collective management of all organizations and leading agencies and personal responsibility of every party member for the implementation of his obligations and party instructions.

As we know, until the Great October Socialist Revolution and during the first years of the Soviet system the principle of democratic centralism applied only to internal party life. Subsequently the area of application of this principle was broadened to encompass not only the party but the state as well. Thus, the entry "Democratic Centralism" in the Abridged Soviet Encyclopedia, 1929 Edition, after providing an expanded definition of the concept, states that "The same principle of organizational structure is being applied in trade union organizations in the USSR." The 1953 "Encyclopedic Dictionary," considers democratic centralism as "the guiding principle of the organizational structure of the CPSU and the fraternal communist and worker parties and the state authorities and public organizations of working people in the USSR and the people's democracies."

Nonetheless, under Stalinism, increasingly democracy was replaced by centralism, which was consistent with Stalin's aspiration to turn the party into a closed organization, in the nature of an "order of knights." For the sake of fairness let us note that certain faults in the interpretation and application of the principle of democratic centralism had been realized during the very first years of the Soviet system. Thus, in 1920-1921 an opposition group known as "Democratic Centralism" was formed (T. Sapronov, N. Osinskiy, A. Bubnov and others), which called for merciless struggle against

bureaucratism. However, the conversion from democratic to bureaucratic centralism, against the threat of which V.I. Lenin cautioned, nonetheless took place. As M. Ryutin wrote, in a document drafted for discussion by the party members, by 1932 democratic centralism had been replaced by Stalin's personal opinion and collective leadership by a system of trusted people.

To a certain extent this situation was preserved until the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which noted the need to reject any attempts at replacing democratic with bureaucratic centralism. The conference also noted the vital need to restore the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, according to which freedom of discussion at the stage of the discussion of problems, and unity of action once a decisions had been made by the majority, were vitally necessary. It is important to take fully into consideration the fact that the purpose of the discussions was not to allow the minority to "let off steam," but to determine the actual views held by the various sides, thus contributing to knowledgeable decision-making and defining "where precisely, in what area and on which specific side one could notice any inconsistency" (V.I. Lenin "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 8, p 94). Naturally, we must not ignore the fact that identifying the inaccuracy or accuracy of various viewpoints is not always possible at the discussion stage. Practice is the criterion of truth and circumstances, as we know, could change even in 24 hours.

As to the second part of the formula, on the unity of action after a decision has been made by the majority, however customary it may appear, in the light of the ideas of democratization and the acquired experience in perestroika, it requires, in my view, a thorough discussion. Despite its great superficial attractiveness, the demand of unity of action has a negative aspect as well. Practical experience has already repeatedly confirmed the inaccuracy of the widespread view that the majority is always right. Furthermore, when new ideas, some of which progressive, appear, it is precisely the majority that, as a rule, finds itself unable to accept them quickly. Examples of this are so numerous in history that even their simple enumeration would be impossible. Whether we acknowledge it or not, under such circumstances the majority objectively acts as an obstructing force. Therefore, a sharpest possible contradiction arises between the main idea which is embedded in the principle of democratic centralism and the results of its application.

Furthermore, it is unquestionable that true democracy does not mean having a party member act in conflicts with his personal convictions (even if such actions have been approved by the majority) but, especially, the right openly to express his disagreement with one view or another. By exercising this right, the party member assumes responsibility for the decision he has made personally and does not share responsibility with others for actions which he would have committed in violation of his own convictions.

What is the result of a forced subordination of the minority to the majority, which is inevitably related to coercing the representatives of this minority, which is the basis of the principle under consideration as it was previously interpreted, already familiar to us on the basis of bitter and long experience which should hardly be continued under contemporary conditions. One could confidently claim that the passive attitude of a significant number of party members, the formalized nature of many procedures in party life, and other negative phenomena are, precisely, the consequences of the implementation of the principle of democratic centralism in its Stalinist-Brezhnevian understanding. We have to agree with the view expressed in the press according to which democratic centralism, which defines the organizational foundations of party activities, is no longer democratic and that the primary party organizations and the rank-and-file party members have largely lost the real opportunity to influence party activities.

I believe, therefore, that the establishment of real pluralism of opinion, as proclaimed at the 19th Party Conference, and the open comparison among ideas and interests are possible only by rejecting the mandatory subordination of the minority to the majority, in all cases. I am speaking not of a factional struggle which, indeed, must not be allowed within a single party, but of the creation of mechanisms which would enable us, on the one hand, to defend the ideas which prevail in the party and, on the other, to take into consideration the opinion held by the minority. Practice alone will determine who is right: those who were in the majority or those who became the minority. Naturally, at all stages total glasnost must be observed, which Lenin considered one of the main prerequisites for the implementation of the "broad democratic principle." The results of the implementation of ideas must be made public for comparison purposes, in precisely the same way as the views themselves. It is only the usefulness and the results that must be taken into consideration in determining the quality of ideas. They alone can determine the extent of the subsequent trust in the supporters of given opinions or interests.

This approach, I believe, agrees with the aspiration to restore to the fullest extent the atmosphere of openness, discussion, criticism, self-criticism, party comradeship and discipline, collectivism and personal responsibility as expressed at the 19th Party Conference. In my view, the party will not be weakened by granting every party member the freedom of action. Conversely, it would create prerequisites for the elimination of the still existing disparity between words and actions.

The study of Lenin's works which describe the nature of democratic centralism proves that these considerations are not conflicting with Lenin's views. This is confirmed by Vladimir Ilich's actions whenever he found himself in the minority (let us recall the struggle for holding the Third Party Congress, and the events surrounding the Brest Peace Treaty). Or else the following: at the 20th CPSU Congress, N.S. Khrushchev discussed, as we

know, the question of the cult of Stalin's personality, against the views held by many other party leaders. One could claim that this daring act laid, to a certain extent, the foundations for the present perestroyka. However, the principle of democratic centralism in its traditional understanding did not prescribe such a step at all but, conversely, called for abandoning it, for the opposite view was held at that time by the majority in the leadership!

Naturally, this does not mean that we must abandon the passing of resolutions mandatory for all, based on majority vote, for in frequent cases a majority resolution proves to be the most accurate and, furthermore, no alternative may be possible. Such situations include, for example, elections for leading party authorities, problems related to accepting or expelling members, rewards or penalties. A common feature of these and other similar situations is the fact that in each one of them the resolution reflects not only (and exclusively) the depth of understanding of a given idea but the existence of a variety of interests, needs, preferences, and so on. However, even in such cases it is possible, unfortunately, to witness the "triumph" of group interests and the use of pressure by the majority and, consequently, the violation of democracy. Examples supporting this are obviously familiar to many. Therefore, whatever situation we may consider, an orientation toward the majority has its limitations.

In discussing the principle of democratic centralism, we must not ignore yet another important feature. Many substantial changes have taken place in the political atmosphere in the country ever since this principle, in its traditional understanding, began to define the standards of party life. A particularly large number of such changes took and are taking place under the conditions of perestroyka. For example, the elimination of bureaucratic administration in the economy, greater support of the principle that "anything not prohibited by the law is allowed" in the juridical area, and many other.

Understandably, if such changes take place in all basic areas of social activities, as its vanguard, the party is bound to become more democratic. The radical renovation of society inevitably leads to the need for such, if not greater, changes in the nature of the party's guiding principles.

Let us emphasize that refining the principles of party building should result in the strengthening and by no means the weakening of its vanguard role. Legitimate, in this connection, is the following question: What guarantees are there that any given alternative in determining the nature of the principle of democratic centralism, discussed in the course of the general party debate, will not increase, if adopted, the danger of the appearance of factions which, in my view, would lead to a split within the party? The answer is found in the broader principle—the principle of target setting. Democratic centralism, in our understanding, can "function" only if there is a single final objective, allowing freedom not

only of debate as to the ways of advancing toward this objective but also the choice of intermediary objectives and ways and means of attaining them.

I believe that it is precisely this type of understanding that is consistent with the new historical stage in the life of our society and party. At the same time, we must clearly realize that the implementation of this principle, providing that we abandon the mandatory unity of action, becomes more difficult, for it requires a clearer definition of the end target of our movement and the existence of reliable criteria with which to assess both actions and end results. This precisely is a prerequisite for a conversion from the method of "trial and error" to a scientifically substantiated policy.

**A. Butakov, senior instructor, Omsk State University:
Needed Conversion to Self-Management**

It is general knowledge that the renovation of our country, which began in April 1985, is, so to say, a revolution from above: the new party leadership changed the political course, something for which initially all party workers and rank-and-file CPSU members were by no means ready. Obviously, we cannot claim that today the situation has changed radically. In my view, this is largely explained by the fact that for the time being no effective internal party democracy mechanisms have been created, such as to ensure the redistribution of power in favor of the base and, above all, the primary organizations. Such a redistribution would be one of the guarantees for the active involvement of the party's "lower strata" with perestroika processes both within the party and society at large.

Really, today this is being acknowledged by everyone. Nonetheless, the situation has not changed radically. Why? In my view, the main reason is that the majority of the suggested decisions do not exceed the main principle of the organizational structure of the party—democratic centralism. Naturally, the comrades who claim that, so far, the interpretation of this principle is almost Stalinist and that definite results can be achieved only by giving it a truly democratic content are right. Such is probably the case. Nonetheless, as the basic function of the party's organization and the functioning of its internal structures, however perfect they may become, democratic centralism cannot, I believe, give it a new quality, that of a self-governing system.

This, in my view, is the main shortcoming of the suggestions concerning perestroika in internal party life within the framework of the principle of democratic centralism: we are trying to give society as a whole the quality of a self-governing system, while attempting to reorganize the party on the basis of an essentially less democratic principle. Yet can the party become the "storage battery" and the motive force of society structured on the basis of self-management if the party itself is not self-managing?

In my view, the answer is obvious: it cannot. Actually, what is it that makes the principle of democratic centralism "bad?" Perhaps the fact that, having combined within itself two principles—centralism and representative democracy—it not only became part, as is sometimes claimed, of a command-administrative system but, to a certain extent, this even determined its appearance. Having declared today a "holy war" on this system, we cautiously bypass the main principle on which it is based. Indeed, was it strictly objective circumstances and subjective reasons that led one and all to an excessive centralization in our society and within the party? I believe that the principle of democratic centralism played its role as well. In particular, it did not stipulate an efficient feedback between the "upper levels" and the broad party membership strata. Inevitably, this led to the fact that the higher authorities escaped control by the masses. Furthermore, the familiar halfway nature of the principle (semicentralism-semidemocracy) virtually eliminates the distinction between its different aspects and also inevitably leads to unlimited concentration of power. However, as we know, every person has his own ideas, for which reason any change in leadership makes our domestic and foreign policy virtually unpredictable, resulting in a campaign work style. In short, without becoming a self-governing system, objectively the party cannot, in my view, play a vanguard role in a society functioning on the basis of self-management.

Conventionally, we can single out within society three basic principles of organization of management: centralism, democratic centralism and self-management. Each one of them is based on a specific management style. The radical distinction separating them is the type of mechanism of interaction in vertical and horizontal power relations and subordination used. Thus, the idea of centralism is at the roots of one-man management; democratic centralism forms a system of collective (representative) management; finally, decentralization defines the existence of a collective (direct) management, i.e., self-management. Naturally, not one of these social structures can be found functioning simultaneously with another, or in its "pure" aspect. Furthermore, there are social institutions (such as the armed forces) which cannot function on a principle other than centralism. The party organizations in the army, in turn, are now being structured on the basis of the other principle—that of democratic centralism.

In my view, the following are the specific features of self-management: first, it is collective, for its subject is not an individual or part of a collective, but the collective itself (the community, the organization) as a whole, acting as a single social entity. Second, it is a type of direct management in which the subject coincides with the object of management. In other words, management becomes the task of the entire collective, the organization as a whole, as a result of which its division into "managers" and "managed" is eliminated. The feature of alienation from power by the rank-and-file membership disappears. Third, this type of management ensures

the priority of collective forms of action for its implementation (meeting, referendum, etc.), compared to other forms of management. This is achieved both by defining the range of the most important problems pertaining to the exclusive competence of the collective as well as its possibility of invalidating any decision made by a command or representative management authority if it is deemed inconsistent with the interests of the given collective or organization.

Under contemporary conditions, the principle of self-management could, in my view, ensure the consolidation of the broad party masses and strengthen control over the activities of the apparatus by the "lower strata." Furthermore, this principle will help to intensify the participation of the Soviet people in party life and affairs and will also narrow the social base for the founding of various movements as alternate to socialism. In short, it is precisely this principle that can ensure a qualitatively new standard of party organization and its efficient functioning under the conditions of the further democratization of our society.

The party's conversion to the principles of self-management urgently demands the extensive use in its daily activities of forms of work, such as discussions, referenda and ratification of decisions made by authorized party members on behalf of the primary party organizations, albeit on a limited range of problems such as, for instance, those related to the budget or the number of people to be laid off. Under the new circumstances the problem of accountability becomes particularly important, as one of the most important aspects in party activities. We know that in accordance with the current CPSU statutes, the party authorities periodically report to the organizations which have elected them and to their superior authority. The accountability of the party authority to the organizations which have elected it will make it possible to assess its work and influence its activities. Such a form of accountability is natural and organic. No one can assess the activities of a party authority than the organization which has elected it more profoundly and with greater interest. The accountability of the party body to the superior authority is equally necessary but, in my view, within certain limits. At the present time this range is arbitrary and is largely defined on the basis of the subjective concepts of the previous party leaders. This is first. Second, this type of accountability has become a mechanism for "pacification" of individual party committees and their leaders, whose behavior, for a variety of reasons, does not fit the existing system of mental stereotypes. Third, by virtue of centralist trends, this type of accountability imperceptibly became basic in the party, reducing accountability to the party organizations, the primary in particular, virtually to naught.

Under contemporary conditions, I believe, it is necessary to formulate and adopt a regulation on the status of the party committees, from the primary party organization to the CPSU Central Committee, which would clearly define the competences of each one of them and stipulate

the range of problems (above all of a statistical-information nature) about which the party authority is accountable to the superior one. It would be useful for this document to codify the exclusive right of the party organization which has elected the corresponding authority to determine its fate and to apply to its members measures of party and disciplinary influence, including the ahead-of-time disbanding of that body or the recall of individual members. Consequently, the superior agency, should the activities of a specific party authority or of its secretariat be deemed unsatisfactory, would not have the right to discipline them. It could only raise the question with the organization which has elected the authority and which, in turn, would have the right to resolve the matter.

**A. Gorenkov, candidate of historical sciences, Moscow:
Centralism as the Foundation of Democracy?**

In the course of building socialism, albeit in words only, democratic centralism officially became the universal principle governing the functioning of virtually all governmental and social organizations in our country. Let us recall, for example, the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) and remember that this principle is codified as fundamental in the statutes of virtually all social organizations. Its rules, such as the fact that the minority must mandatorily obey the majority, and that the decisions of superior authorities are mandatory to their subordinates, for they are the main legal instruments of the command-administrative system and, interpreted in a mythological fashion by the party-state and economic apparatus, were used to manipulate the masses within the party and society and to strengthen hierarchical structures within both. In frequent cases, this was the precise reason for which the principle of democratic centralism, which V.I. Lenin asked us to guard and strengthen, that is being subjected today to a harsh and sometimes not entirely fair criticism.

In the course of the current discussions, a variety of interpretations of its content have been suggested and its future is being projected differently ranging from minor corrections to total elimination. It is claimed, for instance, that the absence in the party statutes, from 1907 to 1934, of a definition of the standard of this principle made its subjective interpretation possible. Furthermore, it is sometimes believed that its interpretation, as given by Stalin at the 17th VKP(b) Congress, helped to legitimize the priority of centralism in party life. In support of this idea mathematical computations have been used, according to which three out of the five "Stalinist features" lean toward centralism. It has been suggested to broaden its content with the help of standards, such as glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, socialist pluralism, etc.

Without denying as a whole the need to strengthen these important concepts in the CPSU statutes, I would nonetheless like to emphasize their relatively independent significance in terms of the principle of democratic centralism. As we know, this principle was codified, for

the first time, in the party documents in 1906. According to Lenin, its main purpose was to regulate relations between the "upper" and the "lower" strata, and between the center and the local organizations, in the struggle against cliquishness and group discord, and to strengthen conscious discipline and ideological and organizational unity. Lenin's understanding of democratic centralism was aimed at enhancing the activities of the party masses and giving them the power to formulate party policy and to ensure its practical implementation. Furthermore, this codified the right of control by the masses over all party functionaries, including the Central Committee, and direct participation of worker rank-and-file party members in the activities of the leading authorities. Taking into consideration the Leninist assessment of the proletariat, to which the ideas of combining centralism with democracy, collectivism and discipline in responsibility were close and understandable, in my view, the assertion of this principle as a leading one in the course of the development of the CPSU as the party of the working class under contemporary conditions as well is entirely justified.

Contradictions in the functioning and understanding of democratic centralism appeared, in my view (let us set aside its deliberate and purposeful deformation during the years of Stalinism) in 1961, when the CPSU was proclaimed to be the party of the whole people, when, correspondingly, the methods for structuring its ranks in particular were changed and the principles for building and functioning of the party were unjustifiably applied to all sociopolitical and economic structures of the "state of the whole people." I believe that the extension of the democratic principle to the nonparty area was premature although its purpose was to emphasize the democratic nature of the party's leadership of society. Let us consider the following example: Let us assume that a soviet has 100 deputies, 52 of them members of the CPSU. At a meeting of the faction, the majority of the party members, let us say 27 of them, have voted in favor of a specific resolution. What is the result? The result is that, using the principle of democratic centralism, deputies who are party members one could pass a soviet resolution by minority vote. Is this fair?

In short, democratic centralism must be based on the realities of sociopolitical life. It must take into consideration the existence of other, sometimes conflicting, political forces. Consequently, it must be directed essentially within the party to problems of regulating the interaction among the party authorities and organizations and to its relations with society. This should not be considered an attempt to establish a "border strip" separating the CPSU from society but only the aspiration to formulate efficient principles governing the functioning of the party in the renovated power system without imposing on the state authorities and public organizations principles which specifically apply to party building.

What is both possible and necessary today to ensure the development of the basic principle of party life—democratic centralism?

Let us consider the rule governing the election of all leading authorities from top to bottom, the purpose of which is to be one of the important steps against the bureaucratization of party life. At the present time, in practice party elections depend essentially on the structure of the electors—delegates to conferences and congresses—and participants in the plenums, which are quite persistently nominated by the party apparatus on different levels. For the time being, this system is trailing behind the truly democratic methods for the structuring of soviet authorities. The essential democratization of the process of structuring leading party authorities will provide the rank-and-file party members with the opportunity directly to participate in the formulation and implementation of the party's cadre policy, and properly acquaint them with their future leaders and their programs. In other words, it will help to implement the Leninist behest according to which the masses should be familiar with each step taken by the leaders, their weak and strong sides, and their successes and defeats (see op. cit., vol 8, p 96).

I believe that the rule on periodical accountability by the "higher" and "lower" strata, as stipulated in the statutes, should be supplemented with a mechanism for its submission, and backed by a stipulation that the leading personnel on all levels must belong to a primary organizations in production collectives. The direct and constant contact between the party masses and the political leaders and organizers will help the rank-and-file party members to obtain information about each one of them, which is necessary in holding elections within the party.

The statutory requirement on the observance of party discipline as well should not create doubts in the minds of the members of a political organization who have consciously joined it, and who supports the party program and the statutes, and works in a party organizations. Yet the stipulation that the minority must be subordinate to the majority triggers today, as we know, a great deal of controversy and requires, in my view, a certain correction. In order for a political party (a ruling party even more so) or its individual organizations to be able to make efficient decisions and execute them, such a mechanism is unquestionably necessary without becoming a "small diet." The minority, however, should have the right to defend at congresses, conferences, meetings, and the mass information media its own views and to explain them not only before resolutions have been passed but also after that, naturally providing that such views do not clash with basic party policy. It is precisely thus, in my view, that V.I. Lenin understood democratic centralism (see op. cit., vol 9, p 14; vol 13, p 129; and vol 14, p 125). Most frequently, progressive ideas are born precisely within the "minority," ideas which initially cannot be unanimously accepted by all.

Closely related to this standard is the right of every party member (or, rather, the absence of this right in the current statutes) to criticize party documents. The constructive criticism of formulated documents should become a normal condition of party life, contributing to

the search for optimal ways of solving arising problems. The fact that by criticizing one party resolution or another the party member does not have the right to undermine the unity of action in the implementation of a collectively adopted resolution is a different matter.

In my view, today the statutory stipulation that the implementation of resolutions is absolutely mandatory, once adopted by superior authorities, in terms of their subordinate agencies, is particularly important for two basic reasons. To begin with, the process of decentralization of economic life and strengthening regional autonomy objectively contributes to the appearance of and even to clashes among different interests. Under those circumstances, the CPSU must combine and consolidate the interests of the different social groups and administrative and economic units in the separate regions and throughout the country, and struggle against parochialism, departmentalism and other negative phenomena. Second, in addition to the positive influence which mass autonomous movements have on the political climate, their influence on various processes could also be destructive. This can be countered only through the unity of action of all party members.

The statutory stipulation concerning the collective nature of the work of agencies and organizations and the personal responsibility of leaders should be supplemented, in my view, with the collective responsibility of the elected authority. In cases of improper work by such an authority it should be removed from its leadership position. In discussing the countering of bureaucratic centralism and authoritarianism, V.I. Lenin emphasized that "the means against it are not provided by any statute. They can be provided only by measures of 'comradely influence'... ending (in the worst case) with the overthrow of a totally incompetent authority" (op. cit., vol 7, pp 14-15). Perhaps now is the right time to seek such "means" and to include them in the statutes rather than rely on measures of "comradely influence" which, as practical experience indicates, are by no means always efficient.

As to the occasionally suggested broadening of the principle of democratic centralism with standards such as glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, and so on, I believe that they should have their autonomous place in the statutes because of their determining importance to the entire process of democratization of internal party life. Therefore, I consider it inexpedient to lump together the 19th paragraph of the current statutes with other stipulations.

Let us take the example of the principle of glasnost. Naturally, it should apply to all aspects of democratic centralism. However, it must also perform another, a more general function: it must define all areas and manifestations of party activities. Therefore, perhaps the statutes should stipulate that the CPSU conducts all of its activities in the open, openly submitting to the people its programmatic objectives, long-term plans and practical steps for the implementation of its policies. On the

other hand, we must acknowledge that each political organization has the right to protect its party secrets. By accepting glasnost as a standard of democratic centralism we seem to be depriving the party of the right to secrecy and of the protection of it. This would take us to another extreme, for glasnost, like democracy, cannot be "unlimited." Therefore, glasnost, as a principle of internal party democracy, must be codified through the right of every party member to obtain adequate information concerning all party resolutions, their authors, the conditions for their adoption, and so on, so that he may participate in their formulation, adoption and execution knowledgeably and responsibly....

As to the answer to the question asked in the heading of these notes, in my view, the only possible one is yes!

Excerpts From Letters

L. Komzyuk, postgraduate student, CPSU History Department, Kiev State University:

It has become the rule for a party committee, which has elected at its plenum a party committee secretary, to ask the superior party authority to ratify this resolution. Actually, why should this be necessary? Why is an additional ratification needed? Decisions made by party committee plenums must be final. If they have no such right, there could be no question whatsoever of any autonomy.

V. Zemtsev, fitter, Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast:

An open party meeting was held in our motors plant in Yartsevo, at which the party bureau of the casting facility submitted a report. I, as a nonparty member, attended the meeting, for today's stormy events in social life make it mandatory to know what is going on. Here is what I saw:

For whatever reasons, 40 percent of the party members did not show up at the meeting. The meeting was not attended by shop chiefs or the plant's deputy director. The people discussed how to rate the work of the bureau, whether "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory." They decided not to pass any kind of resolution but to raise this question at the next meeting. Then there was an election of delegates to the plant party conference. However, not a word about their assignments was mentioned. Why then did the party members meet? The result is that if there is no "leading nucleus," i.e., an administration, the work of the entire party organization is paralyzed.

D. Tokman, CPSU member since 1943, Gorkiy:

As we know, decisions in the party organizations are passed by majority vote. Obviously, no other method is possible. However, frequently the irresponsibility of a number of party members hides behind such a majority. Therefore, I believe that at plenums, conferences and congresses, in the discussion of the most pressing and basic problems, a voice vote should become the standard. Let the people not only raise their hand but be

personally answerable for the consequences of the decisions which have been made. As it is, no one can ever be blamed for anything.

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DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

KOMMUNIST Roundtable Meeting: Life Cannot be Outsmarted

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[Text] Solving the main problem of perestroika in the economy—the alienation of the worker from the means of production and the results of his labor—demands radical changes in the type of ownership relations which were created by the administrative-command system. It is a question of making the working people the real owners, destatifying ownership, and asserting and developing the variety and equality of forms of ownership.

The passing of the Law on Ownership in the USSR, the draft of which has been submitted for nationwide discussion, will create the legal conditions which will stimulate the accelerated development of these processes. The planned changes will affect the interests of millions of people. That is why in the present debate it is so important once again comprehensively to analyze the basic stipulations included in the draft bill. It is precisely on the basis of these positions that scientists-economists and jurists—who are people's deputies of the USSR, tried to approach this problem at the roundtable meeting.

The roundtable materials were prepared for publication by A. Vasilyev, N. Golovnin and A. Ulyukayev, KOMMUNIST associates.

S. Alekseyev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

The attention with which this draft bill was received by the public and the heated debates which took place in our parliament are explained by the fact that the problem of ownership is at the base of all economic and political reforms being made in the country and is closely related to the long-range development of our system. The fact that the law has generated and is generating such strong opposition is entirely understandable, for so far the public awareness had been strongly influenced by primitive equalization and a vulgar understanding of social justice. The adoption of the Law on Ownership in the USSR will mark the triumph of the new approach to the very idea of socialism which, while safeguarding its ideals and guidelines must, I deeply believe, also embodies the universal human values and the achievements of civilization, and takes our society to the high

road of the development of mankind. From this viewpoint, the law we are discussing must become the tuning fork which will set the tone for all changes in social relations.

Today two approaches are apparent. There are those who believe that it makes no sense for us to undertake profound changes in ownership for allegedly state ownership has essentially justified its existence. A few things could be patched up, a few other could be changed, such as, for example, making the state the owner of the enterprise. Naturally, however, this change will not be accomplished with a change of labels. The collective must be the real participants in ownership relations. Only then could we expect any kind of change.

There are some who believe that the only thing that could save us is private ownership. This matter, however, is not so simple as it may appear. It contains not only economic but also ideological and general cultural aspects. It would be ridiculous to deny that private ownership has its constructive side: the spirit of enterprise, unfettered economic creativity, and competition. However, nor should we forget the fact that it has become the symbol of certain ways of social development which do not agree with the socialist choice. Given this situation, an effort must be made to find the "golden middle" which will combine the positive potential of private ownership with the values developed in the course of building socialism. That is precisely why the law includes a broad range of forms of ownership, ranging from individual to that by associations of working people.

The main idea is that the working people must become the masters of the means of production, at which point the feeling of ownership will develop naturally and it will become unnecessary to instill it through slogans and exhortations. This does not imply any denationalization, which would mean the transfer of public property to private individuals. It is a question of destatifying ownership which, as I understand it, means the abolition of state monopoly. This does not make ownership private, for the basic means of production remain in the hands of the working people.

The popular formula today is that "an owner does not strike." Let me add that in a market-oriented economy the owner himself cannot work poorly. This is the basis for the solution of many sharp political problems. For some reason, it is thought that all this takes would be to transfer the power to the soviets, which will automatically solve all problems. My view is that this would change nothing. One bureaucratic apparatus would be replaced with another. The new forms of power must be supported by an economic mechanism which will no longer depend as much on the system. Only then can we speak of truly serious changes.

In order to lay the foundations of such an economic mechanism, the law stipulates a five-step economic system: full economic control of state property by the

state enterprise, which could include ownership of the enterprise by the labor collective, ownership based on leasing, ownership based on associations of working people (a collective or people's enterprise), cooperative ownership and, finally, the private citizens' ownership of means of production, including the ownership of peasant farms and ownership by shareholders which, to a certain extent, would include all other forms. Each one of them should be thoroughly studied and its future development properly projected. These are the questions which I am posing at this roundtable discussion.

Ownership and Power

V. Yakovlev, USSR Minister of Justice, doctor of juridical sciences:

The destiny of our country is being decided now, with the drafting and adoption of the Law on Ownership, and there can be no question about that. In the final account, everything will depend on the way relations among the different forms of ownership will develop in society and the way they will be regulated. That is precisely why it is necessary to make use of our possibilities in the search for accurate solutions. We must use the entire potential of science, which will enable us to formulate a great variety of options. Naturally, nor should we forget public opinion and the feelings and views of the citizens. The contradictions which exist in our country today, the ideological and political approaches which have taken shape, and the economic realities which we encounter must, in short, be taken into consideration. Therefore, this is unquestionably an extremely complex problem which, naturally, we cannot resolve immediately. We can only earmark the main course. Subsequently, practical experience will indicate what to do and will make its corrections. Our own bitter experience has convinced us that one cannot outsmart life.

V. Rutgayzer, deputy director of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Problems of the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor, doctor of economic sciences:

I believe that in this connection we shall find interesting the results of a study we conducted recently. It indicated that the idea of destatifying ownership has entered the mass consciousness. The majority of the population supports it. However, the different forms of ownership are being given quite different ratings. For example, the answers we received to the question of the forms of economic management to which the people would like to link their future were the following: the highest percentage would prefer to work in joint enterprises—29 percent; 21 percent of the people chose a state-owned cost accounting enterprise; 13 percent would like to work in leasing enterprises, and 10 percent would like to work in cooperatives. Respectively, nine and four percent of those surveyed would like to open their own coffee shop, workshop or store or lease them; 10 percent showed no

preference, and 12 percent were unable to answer. Fifteen percent honestly said that, in general, they would rather not work anywhere.

Naturally, these figures must be analyzed but a great deal can be seen with the naked eye. The clear preference for joint enterprises can be explained, above all, by the people's lack of confidence in the ruble and their wish for real "convertibility" of their labor, i.e., to earn from it not worthless pieces of paper but a truly "universal equivalent." We are worried by the high percentage of people who are unwilling to work. This is hardly the consequence of the notorious laziness of our people. This could be an indication of lack of faith in the possibility of radical change and in surmounting the alienation from ownership regardless of its form.

How to evaluate the 21 percent who prefer state enterprises? Is this figure high? I believe that it is high, for this form is quite familiar to our people. State enterprises were chosen essentially by people over 40 (36 percent); no more than 13 percent of those under 30 chose this category.

An essentially different picture appears in the matter of owning one's business. Such a wish was expressed by 19 percent of people under 25 and no more than 2 percent by people 55 and older, i.e., the latter were fewer by a factor of almost 10. A similar situation prevailed concerning employment in joint enterprises.

Naturally, one of the central problems on which opinions clashed more than anywhere else, not only in the Supreme Soviet but also at "informal" fora, was that of private ownership. I shall avoid unnecessary details but merely mention one fact: approximately 25 percent of the urban population, as the survey indicated, considers enterprises belonging to private individuals a form of economic management entirely acceptable in our country. However, the number of opponents of this form is quite large as well. Their number was twice that of its supporters.

Finally, the cooperatives. Today they are approved by no more than 25 percent and disapproved by 49 percent. Yet as late as April the correlation was entirely different. In 6 months this ratio was virtually reversed. I believe that this shows the influence of the mass information media: in the summer and, particularly, in the autumn a number of them took a critical look at the cooperatives. An important role was also played by the debates at the USSR Supreme Soviet Session, and the position taken by the trade unions.

Naturally, this is not the final picture. A great deal depends on the extent to which the laws passed by our parliament, including, naturally, the Law on Ownership, will prove their viability.

V. Chernyak, USSR People's Deputy, doctor of economic sciences:

Possibly, I may be breaking somewhat the sequence of our discussion but I would like to object to Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev. He believes that denationalization means no more than a transfer of public property to private hands. What to do with cooperatives, stockholding companies and people's enterprises, purchased from the state? In my view, private property is anything that is not state property. From this viewpoint, destatification and denationalization are one and the same. Therefore, in my presentation I shall nonetheless use this term. Today the following is exceptionally important: first, the denationalization of some means of production, i.e., their destatification; second, the decentralization of property management; third, deideologization of ownership and a changed attitude toward private ownership.

In connection with the new political thinking there is a deideologization of international relations. Has the time not come to take the same path at home, to abolish in the economy as well the "image of the enemy?" The result of such a course will be the elimination of the economics of the absurd and the creation of a mixed economy—rational, flexible, efficient and competitive. We are facing the need to eliminate the monopoly on ownership and on power and truth.

The crisis situation in which our economy found itself is a manifestation of a crisis in the governmental system of ownership, a depersonalized and ownerless one, the virtual ownership of various departments or, more accurately, of the class of bureaucratic property managers. There has never been any kolkhoz-cooperative ownership in our country. The kolkhoz collective was unable economically to exercise the right of ownership. The myth of the two forms of social ownership was passed on from one political economy textbook to another and became part of the constitution.

The purpose of the Law on Ownership is to ensure the pluralism of forms of ownership and the principles of their equality and equal status and competitiveness. Without the creation of a competitive mechanism among the different forms of ownership and within them we shall be unable to pull the economy out of this deep pit in which it has found itself.

M. Gavrilov, expert, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of the Economic Reform, candidate of economic sciences:

Whatever we may be discussing, we keep coming to the question of private ownership. I would compare it to a thorn in the flesh, which bothers the social organism the most. However, we must clearly determine its nature and realize that it is not a scarecrow or, even less so, any kind of panacea but merely one of the elements of true economic pluralism.

In my view, the data reported to us by Valeriy Maksovich Rutgayzer quite clearly indicate that a substantial group of supporters has rallied around each form of ownership and, therefore, that each one of these forms

has the right to life. The law should guarantee this right, for our society is sufficiently mature to accept it.

M. Bronshteyn, USSR Supreme Soviet member, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences member:

You said a thorn in the flesh. I find this comparison accurate. However, I would make it even stronger. Frequently, this thorn is dipped into the poison of ignorance. Ignorance—and let us not forget this—is a truly demonic force. For a long time to come it will feed the social demagogues. In no case should we indulge ignorance although, naturally, some durable stereotypes exist within society, which must mandatorily be taken into consideration. However, the law must be based not on these ordinary economic "categories" but on what global and domestic scientific experience points to us.

The expressions we use show a confusion among the concepts of individual, family and private property. Private property remains private. Based on contemporary scientific data and the level of production forces, in a number of areas private ownership not only has the right to exist but is more efficient than any other. In my view, this applies to petty trade, repairs and population consumer services. However, it would be unreasonable artificially to encourage it if no conditions to this effect exist, such as, let us say, in the power industry, railroad transportation and communications. In these areas public ownership enjoys objective advantages and the purpose of the law is, precisely, to highlight the potential of any specific form of ownership.

We must proceed on the basis of real life, on the basis of the laws of economics and not the "carrion" which our propagandists drilled in our heads for decades. In other words, the approach to each new form of ownership must be different and differentiated. This includes the regional level as well. For example in my country, in Estonia, there is a special attitude toward leasing. We do not use the word "lessee" but "tenant." This term appeared at the turn of the 19th century, when serfdom was abolished, but in such a way that the peasant was forced to work the land of the German baron to whom he gave half of the crop. Now the Estonian peasant is being told: convert to leasing, i.e., actually become a tenant. This idea is rejected by the entire historical memory. The peasant finds it much more acceptable to become the owner of the farm even if he has to pay a redemption fee.

S. Alekseyev: I entirely agree with your statement on historical memory. Naturally, this must be taken into consideration. In the course of the discussions in the Supreme Soviet it was suggested to include in the law a stipulation on lifetime possession. In my view, this could be used in some areas as an alternative to leasing.

V. Rutgayzer: Yes, the historical aspect is unquestionably important. On this level as well I would like to argue with you, Sergey Sergeyevich. You wrote in PRAVDA that the historical term "private property" appeared only so that we may distinguish between what was strictly state or official property and all other types of property. I

believe that the concept of private property appeared much earlier than either that of the treasury or state property. It was an economic prerequisite for preserving the family at the stage where the clan-tribal regime began to break down. In that sense as well private property rejected the primitive form of communal ownership.

V. Yakovlev: Generally speaking, views on private ownership, indicate a great deal of confusion. Many people are trapped simply by euphoric ideas. The private ownership about which people think so light-heartedly exists only in their imagination. Modern capitalism has traveled far from private property as Marx described it. Returning to it would be a mistake perhaps for the reason alone that this is a stage already covered by mankind.

Today one of the most important problems facing our society is the incentive to work. The ownership system is most closely related to precisely this. History proves that each consecutive system is more progressive than the preceding one, for it has developed more advanced labor incentive methods. Despite all of its obvious advantages, socialism unfortunately was unable to provide them. It seems to me that the strategic problem which we must now solve is not to turn public into private property but to establish a system of economic incentive in the true meaning of the term, i.e., incentive through ownership. Anything which will work in favor of this idea is useful. In this sense as well the orientation toward a variety of forms of ownership and destatification without denationalization, leasing and cooperative and share holding forms, as stipulated in the law, will all help us to develop truly progressive economic incentives.

Let me point out something else. We must be cautious in our use of terminology. It would be inappropriate to use the term "private ownership," which in some cases has no economic meaning whatsoever and which could lead not only to a polarization within our society but also to major social upheavals. Private ownership on a large scale could become, in the final account, a means of exploitation. Naturally, this is inadmissible. Yet individual (labor) ownership we accept whatever its size.

B. Rakitskiy, head of laboratory, Central Economic-Mathematical Institute, doctor of economic sciences:

At this point we could raise the following slogan: "We shall not prevent anyone from working but we shall not allow anyone to exploit!" Incidentally, this applies to the state as well. In my view, our society cannot be considered socialist if any exploitation exists, even committed by the state. The meaning of the current economic innovations, in my view, is precisely for this exploitation not to be so fierce and monstrous as it was during the period of the Stalinist system.

V. Yakovlev: When we speak of fundamental matters, such as socialism, ownership and state, it would be useful to look at history. For example, the book by the great jurist Professor Pokrovskiy on topical problems of civil law came out during the crucial year of 1917. Therefore,

in this monograph Pokrovskiy, who is by no means a Marxist, writes, among others, about the possibilities of a socialist type of development, singling out private ownership as the foundation of social injustice. However, he then immediately cautions also against the danger of a socialist system. If the abolition of private property is such that no property whatsoever is left to the citizens or, at best, they have only the right to manage and use property, the way the soldier used his ammunition or a prisoner uses his shirt, society will be threatened with economic degradation. In other words, the foundations of the economic incentive for production will be lost.

V. Shkredov, professor at the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy, doctor of economic sciences:

Today the idea of the incompatibility of private property and socialism has become widespread. As a rule, private property is identified with capitalist exploitation. Yet historical experience proves that under certain circumstances private property not only excludes the appropriation of the results of someone else's labor but could also be economically efficient in some areas of the national economy. The main problem is that of radically to reorganize the form of the existent state ownership on the basis of the real enterprise (association) autonomy and the development of the various forms of collective ownership. As to private (individual) ownership, due to the objective conditions of public reproduction it cannot assume a dominant position, which is not found even in highly industrialized bourgeois societies. However, by establishing a direct link between individual labor and the material conditions of the individual's life, it can satisfy the need for goods and services faster. The principle of the variety of forms of ownership, as reflected in the draft law, will contribute to rescuing the Soviet economy from its crisis.

B. Rakitskiy: The point is that socialism does not exist in our country as a system of relations. The people have a feeling about socialism as something just, good and progressive. It is true that of late the shoots of social and economic innovations have begun to appear. The purpose of the law is, in any case, not to eliminate them but rather to encourage initiative and enterprise.

The second point I would like to mention on the question of ownership is the following: not everything should be reduced to property relations, for ownership means above all economic power, the concentrated expression of power relations in the economy. That precisely is what the law should express.

V. Kikot, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, candidate of juridical sciences:

The importance of the public's awareness of reality is very great. Public opinion can influence the content of the law and its future application. Such influence which could also be extremely negative. It is not a matter

exclusively of prejudices which are popular among the masses. Unfortunately, in our science as well in the course of decades a number of false stereotypes developed. To this day the prevalent opinion is that private ownership means the unlimited power of the owner over his property. Yet essentially such a situation has been largely eliminated in countries with a market-oriented economy. Our interpretation of state ownership frequently shifts to public ownership concepts of the unlimited power of private ownership as it prevailed at the start of the 19th century. However, we must not fall so far behind life, ignoring the contemporary processes of socialization of ownership, production and labor.

The Theory of the Problem

V. Shkredov: I would like to quote something which the writer Vasilii Rozanov said at the turn of the century. He pointed out that in Russia all ownership was based on whether something had been begged out of someone else, obtained as a gift or stolen. Consequently, we have developed an attitude toward ownership as something "illegitimate" and dishonorable. Furthermore, our entire subsequent history, based on the motto of "steal what was stolen!" in the implementation of which tens of millions of people participated through coercive collectivization and other actions, by no means contributed to strengthening the right of ownership and promoting respect for this right among the broad masses. Arbitrary behavior assumed the shape of law. Today we are facing mass disrespect for ownership, state ownership in particular. The right of ownership, in addition to everything else, also means "thou shall not steal." Since the right to ownership was weakened, there is nothing surprising in the fact that mass theft developed and corruption reached such a scale.

I was amazed at the statement of a noted jurist who said that legalizing private ownership would mean transferring the economic power to the mafia. Actually, state ownership, as established in our country, is a much more fertile ground for the growth of the mafia. The purpose of the law is to develop on the part of the citizens respect for ownership and, on the part of the state, responsibility for protecting it.

The fact that the law gives priority to citizen ownership is a very good thing, for essentially our people could be classified as poor or people with insignificant amounts of property and we must not forget that private property is the material, the physical foundation of the family. Citizen ownership, in one form or another, is the foundation of democracy and freedom of the individual. A lumpen, a person who has nothing, cannot be free. Materially, he depends too much on many people and many things.

In the Marxist understanding, ownership is frequently judged only on the basis of the "*Communist Manifesto*," which stipulates that the communists must reduce their requirements to one single thing: the elimination of private ownership. As the author of "*Das Kapital*"

however, Marx clearly distinguished between private property based on one's own labor (the property of free peasants, craftsmen, etc.) and private capitalist property, which is based on appropriating the results of someone else's hired labor. However, even hired labor should not be unconditionally considered an exclusively capitalist feature. Within our state economy as well labor is hired, not only from the legal viewpoint but also in terms of its economic content. The entire question is who gets the results of the hired labor or, rather, of the added labor. The state and the cooperatives have the right to hire labor. If the individual happens to own his own business and takes a student or an assistant, he is already considered an exploiter.

Let me point out in this connection that the main feature of socialism is not the form of ownership per se but to whose interest and under what production forces are these forms of ownership used. Private ownership can be used in the interest of the working people and, conversely, "national" ownership could serve, to one extent or another, the interests of narrow groups of people or individuals. The legal system cannot be above the existing economic situation. The law creates only juridical prerequisites for abandoning the economic crisis and the elements which regulate actual property relations. The qualitative change in material and socioeconomic conditions of public reproduction will be of decisive significance.

S. Khokhlov, docent, Sverdlovsk Juridical Institute, candidate of juridical sciences:

Let me discuss mainly the concept of the right of ownership. The traditional understanding is that this is an absolute right which establishes inviolable boundaries around the owner. A more modern interpretation presumes that these boundaries must be eroded and that absolutism in terms of the right of ownership must be respectively reduced to fit existing relations.

I categorically disagree with this approach and I believe that today we must precisely assert the absolute right of ownership. Every subject must firmly know that his right of ownership will not be violated by anyone. He must be under the protection of the law.

V. Kikot: This view seems to me excessively abstract. Ownership is always exercised through specific relations. On this level global experience gives us entirely different examples. Today in the developed capitalist countries the laws allow the owner to do whatever suits him but only if it is suitable to society as well. This progressive transformation appears to have been ignored by us. Yet it must be studied and the public must be made aware of it. According to the contemporary concept, partial ownership laws include all forms of sharing the power over the object of ownership. This object may belong to several private owners each one of whom owns a certain element, an aspect, a side of the object. Meanwhile, each

subject is precisely aware of the specific extent of his rights, something which, unquestionably, is very important.

A. Boyko, USSR People's Deputy, doctor of economic sciences:

I nonetheless remain confident that destatification should not bring about a rejection of nationwide ownership. We must preserve the nationwide nature of ownership despite the existing variety of forms. From the philosophical viewpoint, any given system is a structural-functional unity. If we break down the structure we must consider the functional mechanisms. I believe that on the basis of the preservation of certain functional mechanisms we can also preserve the nationwide nature of ownership.

Let me say a few words about private ownership. We must not allow the abstract expression "private ownership" reach a point at which there is a private labor and private capitalist ownership. If we distinguish among these aspects, if we clearly tell the people that it is a question precisely of private labor ownership, the thorn in the flesh which Mikhail Lazarevich Bronshteyn mentioned will not exist.

Furthermore, unquestionably, hired labor must be allowed. In my view, however, hired labor must not be identified with labor for hire. Hired labor is a twin category of capital and expresses entirely defined socioeconomic relations. In our country, the situation is entirely different: the owner of any given property could hire himself out to work for another owner. Again as an example, all of us are co-owners of the national property, if such is allowed to remain. Meanwhile, each one of us could hire himself out to work in a cooperative or anywhere else.

We have ignored yet another question: the appearance of collective ownership at state enterprises. We are being literally "shelled" for destroying state ownership. I am deeply convinced that the development of collective ownership, along with other types of ownership, is an entirely right way. It is a way which will enable us directly to link the immediate producers to the means of production. It must be encouraged.

M. Gavrilov: Indeed, the most important thing for us is to end the alienation of the working people from the means of production. The forming of ownership by the labor collective in the developing situation may not be the exclusive but nonetheless remains one of the most important ways of surmounting such alienation. We spoke of destatification. By establishing ownership by the labor collective, such destatification will occur most naturally. Of course there are also other means through which the working people can acquire property—through cooperatives, leasing, associations and various share holding forms. For the time being, there is a great deal of confusion on such matters in our country. The clear distinctions among share holding, cooperatives and associations have not been defined. Yet this would not

be difficult to accomplish. Participants in a cooperative have their shares but also equal votes. In an association as well there are shares but the votes are based on the amount of contributed capital. This is an entirely different type of participation in ownership. We also have share ownership. Here the votes are based on the number of shares but the fact of owning a share is not mandatorily related to the individual's labor participation.

There is a great deal of controversy also in the matter of hired labor. We are saying a great deal about hired slavery but we forget that the hiring system was the greatest accomplishment of mankind. In the period of transition from serfdom, hiring relations made it possible to eliminate relations of personal dependency. We have rejected this achievement and have triggered an unprecedented dependence on our superiors. Therefore, hiring relations must be "rehabilitated." The logic here is simple: if there is hiring there is no serfdom. If there is no hiring there is serfdom. Understandably, "serfdom" cannot be part of the variety of forms of ownership we are discussing here.

B. Rakitskiy: I agree with you that the most important matter today for us is the way in which man learns the functions of the socialist owner. What worries me is the following: the draft law describes only specific forms, i.e., ideologically, this is once again a law which allows us to do something. Yet we ourselves make the creative process substantially more difficult. We have included in the draft bill five forms. Meanwhile, the people may have already invented a sixth and would like to work accordingly. That is why I believe that in drafting the law we must proceed on the basis of freedom, on the basis of what is permitted, and include within it a formula such as "Any form of economic management is allowed if it does not conflict with Soviet laws."

Here is another matter. The problem of ownership triggers that of income from ownership. Let us consider above all its origin: is it based on labor or is it not? Can I, by purchasing stock, and earning a dividend, not directly participate in the production process? In my view, there should be social protection against ownership based not on labor but on exploitation.

The concept of destatification could hardly be considered fruitful. The result is some kind of governmental anarchy. We must either avoid the use of this term or interpret it accurately, for we do need a state but of a different kind. The precise slogan should be not destatification but democratization, so that no one hurl himself at the state pounding with his fists, as though it is an alien force. I need a state which will protect me, at which point I too will take up the defense of the state. This leads to another question: What would be the result of destatification? Would it be a multiplicity of systems or a pluralistic form of economic management? These concepts are frequently confused yet they are entirely different. A system is not a form of ownership but a set of forms which define the trajectory of the overall development of society. In that sense the purpose of

socialism is not a multiplicity of systems. The fact that the road to this objective could pass through the elimination of deformations is a different matter. This does not mean that we must strengthen once and for all the multiplicity of systems.

A. Boyko: I agree that the multiplicity of systems and the variety of forms of ownership are not one and the same. However, nor can I accept the fact that "destatification" is an unsuitable term. The term "democratization" means that state ownership is preserved and that it is only a question of the mechanism through which it is applied. "Destatification" is a much broader concept. It includes not only the democratization of state ownership but also its transformation, and the separation of the other forms of ownership from it.

We frequently hear that "one should not poke at ownership. Let us give state enterprises full independence and everything will naturally fall into place." Actually, I believe that this is really meaningless. What kind of independence could there be if the producer does not own his own product! Whether we wish it or not, one must deal with relations of ownership. If the enterprise is not the owner of the added product and if it is granted a development fund only by permission of the state, it becomes a perennial lessee. I believe that we must go beyond that, i.e., we must lay the legal foundations for converting the lessee into a collective owner providing, naturally, that we do not obstruct economic development.

Naturally, at this point an entire set of problems arises, including that of distribution not only according to labor but also according to ownership. However, without transforming the collective or, more accurately, without giving it the opportunity to become the collective owner, we shall be unable to solve the problem of social reproduction. Its main feature is that of accumulation. This is the function of the owner. According also to Marx, ownership stems precisely from accumulation. Without the implementation of this function the subject cannot become a true owner.

S. Alekseyev: All too frequently we become entangled in terminological disputes, although our task is to determine and clarify their essence. It is a question of true, of real ownership. As to the theoretical aspect of the matter, let us proceed from the basic concepts of Marxist science. Naturally, I mean by this true science and not the vulgar interpretation of Marxism, which flourished in our country for decades. The main Marxist feature is individual labor ownership as a rejection of exploitative ownership.

Ownership or Property?

S. Alekseyev: The question of the land and natural resources and, naturally, ownership of same, is triggering a number of arguments. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that today this is related to national problems. It is no accident that in the course of the

debates most dramatic situations arose in the consideration of this part of the draft bill. Everyone wanted to be the owner of the land, starting with Union republics, then autonomous republics and all the way down to national okrugs and even to rural soviets. The result is that several subjects are laying simultaneously a claim to each bit of land. You can well understand, this is fraught with chaos and confusion. In my view, the solution is, in general, to abandon the notion of state ownership of the land and natural resources. To abandon it in principle. This is consistent with both the Marxist concept and with the social and moral nature of ownership. Let me recall the words of William Petty, which Marx loved to quote: "Labor is the father of wealth and the land is its mother." This means that the people and the land are one and it is only the people who can protect the land. We must convert to categories (on which we are specifically working at present) according to which the land is the property of the entire nation and title to the land is granted to individuals or groups of individuals. In terms of its nature, this is close to ownership.

The farmer and anyone who wishes to work the land is given the land for life with the right of inheritance, i.e., he becomes the possessor of the land (and not the landowner). The only distinction is that he has no right to sell the land. However, this does not mean in the least that a person cannot manage his property on this land. The purchaser who buys a farm from its previous owner is also given a priority right to the respective piece of land by the local soviet. This right is protected by the law. In other words, no one obstructs the normal economic turnover but speculation is nipped in the bud.

M. Bronshteyn: I believe that the text of the law provides grounds for a dramatic situation such as the one described by Sergey Sergeyevich. For example, we are being offered the following formulation: the land and the other natural resources are the inalienable property of the Soviet citizens (which means all citizens of the USSR) and belong to the nation inhabiting a given territory, to the Soviet people as a whole. In other words, this means two housewives sharing an apartment with the Union being the tenant on record. In my view, this must be corrected. We must clearly stipulate that "the land is the property of the nation and is the full possession and at the disposal of the nation which inhabits a given territory."

One could object by asking, "and what about all-Union needs?" They must be taken into consideration in the following formulation: "All-Union needs are served through contractual relations." Understandably, in each new situation we must distinguish between what are truly all-Union and departmental needs. But here is something: nowhere else in the world have I seen such a wide strip of condemnation of property as the one practiced by the railroads. Normal contractual relations in which the amount of pay and compensation are stipulated would prevent such a scandalous attitude toward the land.

Here is another feature. Some areas are basically poor in natural resources or else have been brought to such a situation as a result of our economic management. That requires a certain mechanism for determining the portion of the rent to be paid by the regions and the center. In other words, areas with a greater natural potential must assume relatively greater obligations toward the Union budget. Conversely, republics such as Karakalpakiya or Kalmykiya should receive compensations from the Union.

Like the Law on Ownership, the Law on the Land should provide conditions for equal partnership. In such a case, I believe, we would have fewer problems among nationalities.

V. Lisitskiy, USSR People's Deputy:

It seems to me that the problems of natural resources are related not exclusively to Union or republic interests. They equally affect the interests of all mankind. We know that the Canadian and Siberian taygas and the tropical forests of Brazil account for the reproduction of the major portion of oxygen. If they are destroyed, we shall simply have no air to breathe. The result is that these are the property of all mankind, and it would be legitimate to raise the question of having all mankind pay for some of the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the Siberian tayga, fighting the pests, and protecting the tayga from fire.

M. Bronshteyn: Naturally, the situation is exactly as described. We must have common programs on the basis of which mankind will participate in the reproduction of various resources through financial and other types of contribution.

V. Rutgayzer: Let us begin perhaps by reaching an understanding as to relations among republics. Today the cost of maintaining 1 hectare in the tayga does not exceed 4 rubles, compared to 34 rubles per hectare in Estonia.

M. Bronshteyn: That is correct. The Estonian must realize that the air he breathes is "produced" not only on the territory of his own republic. Otherwise, by proclaiming the republic's ownership of its air space, in the future we shall be deprived of air altogether.

V. Yakovlev: Today everyone is concerned with the allocation of natural resources. It was already mentioned here that various national-territorial formations are claiming their "age-old" rights on the land. Furthermore, the enterprises as well have their own interpretation of the term "owner." If we extract coal it means that we are the owners and that it is up to us to determine how to extract it and to whom to sell it. The timber farms have the exact same idea about the trees and the petroleum workers about the oil. This is a terrible trend. Under the present circumstances, when it is more advantageous to sell our goods on the foreign market, within a short time

we could become a raw material appendage to industrially developed countries. As long as there are resources, we shall trade in them. But then what?

For that reason, I believe that we must think not about how to divide the resources but how to use them efficiently. It is precisely on this basis that we must proceed in structuring ownership relations. Throughout the world such relations are regulated by laws which limit arbitrariness. In Switzerland, for example, there is both municipal and private land ownership. This does not mean that a Swiss citizen who owns a bit of land by right of private property can do with it anything he wants. If he decides to build an industrial enterprise on hereditary agricultural land, no one would allow him to do so. But neither does anyone rebel, for everyone realizes that any legal control of ownership is in the common interest. Consequently, proclaiming the land and natural resources as the property of the people is merely the first step. Subsequently we must thoroughly stipulate the rights of the USSR Supreme Soviet and those of the supreme soviets of republics, of cities and enterprises. As to departments, they should have no rights whatsoever in this respect. If we take the path of contractual regulation, as suggested by Mikhail Lazarevich, we shall simply never be able to agree on a number of things. For example, where would we locate a testing ground or a nuclear power plant? In a civilized society, and I would like to believe that we are aspiring to become one, such relations are regulated not by contract but by law.

V. Kikot: As a jurist I would like to remind you that global practical experience is familiar with a great variety of systems of land ownership. However, it is not a question of the forms but of an efficient legal and economic organization. In our own aspiration to assert the state monopoly of natural resources we are reaching a point of absurdity by creating one juridical case after another. If wild animals, as part of natural resources, are owned by the USSR, who should pay for the damage they cause to crops? Logically, if a "state" rabbit gnaws at my apple tree the state should pay. However, the state does not do that! Or what will happen if schools of fish migrate from one territorial water to another? How will ownership rights be transferred in that case from one water to another?

By proclaiming that the subsoil belongs to the state, we thus proclaim its ownership over still undiscovered mineral deposits. There can be no social relationship related to objects as yet unknown and by proclaiming many objects as included in ownership rights we thus reject this thesis with out laws.

V. Shkredov: Sergey Sergeyevich accurately noted that we must not confuse two concepts: sovereign and personal. In my view, we are not acting very logically by considering the question of ownership before that of the federation. If Union republics are indeed acknowledged as being politically sovereign, this would resolve the problem of the ownership of the land, for they respectively would have to define the type of forms of land

ownership they will allow on their own territory: state, public, private, etc. However, I consider groundless the idea that the land is not an object of ownership but merely the property of the people. This offers a certain opportunity to reduce the sharp conflicts between the center and the republics in solving the land problem. However, this is only a verbal resolution of a real contradiction. Even in contemporary bourgeois societies some of the land is owned by the state and it is even more difficult to imagine that in our country the land will, in general, no longer be the object of state ownership. The "property" category itself is too vague. It is essentially synonymous with the concept of the material wealth of society in general, which includes the land.

A. Boyko: There is somewhere in Marx's rough drafts of "*Das Kapital*" a statement to the effect that land ownership cannot exist. He says this quite clearly. It would be logical to use the concept of "possession." If we speak of land, we come across such a high number of restrictions that we could discuss ownership only as a comfort to us. In fact, in this case we cannot have any exclusive rights, such as would be typical of the rights of ownership. Therefore, we must use the concept of "possession," "use" and "managing." The same should apply to timber and other natural resources.

B. Rakitskiy: Whether we speak of "ownership" or "possession," what truly matters is not the form but the range of subjects involved in ownership relations. I believe that we must proceed from the fact that people are the subjects of law in general and of ownership in particular. Does that apply to the "Soviet people" in general as subjects of the law or does it apply merely to the totality of nations inhabiting Soviet territory? We should not be hasty when it comes to deciding questions of sovereignty and people's rights. In difficult cases, I would recommend to avoid formulas which violate the constitutional right of self-determination. There are 15 prime subjects—the peoples of sovereign republics. There is a sixteenth derivative subject—the USSR. Its existence does not curtail the sovereignty of any one of the other subjects. Making something Union property does not mean voiding a nation's ownership rights.

Yu. Kalmykov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, doctor of juridical sciences:

Nonetheless, I believe that the Committee on Legislative Problems has found a way to solve such problems. Four points may be suggested. First, the claim that the land and natural resources are the property of the nation which inhabits the territory of a given republic or any other national-territorial formation. If we do not acknowledge this fact we risk to inhibit the solution of this problem.

Second, it is stipulated that as a result of the unification of the Soviet peoples in a federation, their land and other natural objects form a single territory, which is the basis of Soviet sovereignty. This concept is good because it links ownership to sovereignty. The result is that the

republics within the Union are a single state, the economic foundation of which is the territory of the USSR.

Third, it is necessary to determine the competence of the Union in matters of ownership. We must openly say that the USSR has the right to handle on the territory of a republic whatever is its own possession, such as defense and border installations, main gas and petroleum pipelines, power transmission cables, and so on.

Fourth, it must be stipulated that all other problems are solved on a contractual basis between the Union and the given republic. With the existence of such a joint decision, which takes into consideration the interests of the republic and those of the Union, we shall be able to break this "magic circle."

The Mechanism of the Law

V. Yakovlev: In drafting this law we must essentially solve the problems on two levels. The first is strategic. The second is the level of the functional mechanism, i.e., the implementation of our strategic ideas and the combination of concepts with the realities of life and the public interests and requirements. Without this the law will be dead. Yet in order to formulate such a mechanism we must mandatorily use the joint efforts of jurists and economists.

Today all of us have noted that perestroyka is still progressing slowly and badly. What is the matter? I believe that our trouble is that the regulatory system which was established in the course of 70 years is basically unsuitable in resolve the new problems. It cannot function normally. Its functioning requires, above all, skilled and knowledgeable jurists. However, there is still no awareness of this fact. Whereas the importance of the role of economists is acknowledged today by everyone, the same cannot be said about jurists. Underpaying judges is a nonsense. Without a developed system of jurisprudence no modern state can function.

Even in the best of cases, the jurist works within the framework of the restrictions formulated by the economic and legal system. Under our circumstances this system has assumed an excessively vertical structure. The producer works not for the consumer but for the superior authority from which it receives assignments and the resources to carry them out. Since economic relations are vertical, the same applies to the regulatory system. From the legal viewpoint, this system is characterized by the fact that standards are not legislatively set. The role of the law, the role of standards has been reduced in our country to virtually zero.

The task of perestroyka is to convert the vertical into a horizontal structure, i.e., to organize horizontal commodity-monetary relations, connecting them through production and consumption. This is from the economic viewpoint. From the legal viewpoint this means a centralized legal regulation of the market. However, it must be centralized not in the sense of commands issued by the center but of the supremacy of the law. The law must

become the principal means of regulating economic relations. Such a centralized regulation, incidentally, exists throughout the world and does not prevent in the least the development of a market-oriented economy.

We are presently engaged in dismantling the old administrative system. Naturally, this is necessary. However, let us not forget the fact that if we limit ourselves merely to dismantling without creating, on a parallel basis, something new, we shall have in our country both a "wild market" and shall have unleashed "dark forces," and the people will sweep us off alongside them. Therefore, if we are changing forms of ownership, we must thoroughly regulate ownership and trade relations and not merely pass the Law on Ownership but other legislative acts as well.

For example, why did such distortions develop in our country in the cooperative movement? There are economic reasons for this, such as inflation, shortage of raw materials, and imbalance between supply and demand. However, we must not reduce everything to them. The point is that we have failed properly to regulate the law of relations on the cooperative market. We failed to protect the interests of consumers. The consumers turned out to be totally unprotected. For example, laws on trademarks and registered marks exist throughout the world. If you buy in France an item stamped "Adidas," according to the law that company is responsible for the quality of the item. What can we do with a pair of pants similarly labeled, which a resident of Moscow has bought on the market in Riga from a member of a cooperative? To whom could he address his claim if the pants split along the seam the day after? Should he complain to the Adidas Company? It is unlikely that the company would compensate him for the damage. It is mandatory for us to learn from the Western countries how legally to protect the customer and, in general, all parties to market relations.

M. Gavrilov: However, it is also possible to overregulate the economy. It is hardly worth it, for example, to pass a law on setting specific ratios between accumulation and consumption. Accumulation can be stimulated more flexibly through a tax system. My view is that anything which is related to property should be written down in a contract. Anything which pertains to economic management rules and to power, should be a subject of the law.

Where I fully agree with Veniamin Fedorovich is that the only mechanism which can ensure the true variety of forms of ownership and the equal rights enjoyed by them is that of a regulated market. What should be understood by regulated? In my view, this implies a antimonopoly legislation. Such regulations would preserve the vivifying stream of competitiveness on the market, something so badly needed today.

S. Alekseyev: I hope that on this problem all of us agree. Regulation must be consistent with the relations which

we are establishing and must include the organic mechanism of a commodity-monetary economy. Uncontrolled relations must be streamlined. However, we must try in this case not to obstruct the activeness of the forces which motivate the market itself.

S. Khokhlov: By thus formulating the question do we not turn any regulation of ownership relations into a legal rule? Perhaps we should speak of regulating the market. However, we must not regulate ownership relations but formulate and protect them with the help of the law.

S. Alekseyev: What you are saying amounts to legal regulations. Let me also add that the discussion which has developed in our country on the mechanism of the effect of the law has strengthened within me, to an even greater extent, the idea that we should not be in a hurry to pass such a law. Although, I honestly admit, at the opening of the Second Session of the Supreme Soviet I was convinced that it should mandatorily ratify the Law on Ownership. I can see now that I was wrong. We should inform the public about this law quite thoroughly and, above all, we must see to it that it master and accept the principles and ideas it contains.

B. Rakitskiy: In speaking of the mechanism, we must remember that the economic system is nothing but an instrument for attaining social objectives. Therefore, the mechanism itself must be "politicized." For it is precisely in the area of politics that currently tremendous changes are taking place in our country.

Sociopolitical forces are showing up, which are capable of assuming responsibility for perestroika. For the time being they are acting chaotically. However, if we are able to introduce them within the range of democratic procedures, at that point they could become a powerful regulatory agent for economic relations in the country.

It is from this viewpoint that I suggest that we consider the problem of destatification. This does not mean simply dividing the property but also a separation of powers. This is right in the case of the bureaucratic apparatus. However, in this case we must also bear in mind the strategic objective—popular rule. Therefore, the mechanism for the exercise of socialist ownership must consist of enabling the people to defend anyone who lives from his work, without exploitation.

V. Kikot: Let us not forget the historical process of development of ownership laws. During early capitalism all forms of economic relations were applied through the right of ownership, use, and handling, which, together, constituted the single right of ownership. Today the situation is essentially different. The laws of most countries define ownership rights in both general and abstract terms. In specific legislation, however—banking, financial, agricultural, land, industrial, labor, etc.—there exist a number of specific stipulations concerning the specific varieties of ownership rights which violently clash with the abstractly proclaimed principle of ownership and stipulate the specific obligations of the owner, restrictions of his rights, and so on. The list of ownership rights

will become more detailed and provide more options. The allocation of ownership functions should ensure the efficiency of the production process. This is also related to the quantitative correlation between governmental and other forms of ownership. The state should have control only over objects which would otherwise simply be unable to function, and their number should be much smaller than it is now.

Yu. Kalmykov: I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Law on Ownership is of a general nature. To us this is a new phenomenon. So far ownership relations were regulated in our country through sectorial rules. This applied above all to civil legislation. Time flies and it is only 3 years ago that the conference took place at which we unanimously reached the conclusion that we did not need a law of ownership. Everything without it was "normal and good." Nonetheless, the economic crisis made this a central item on the agenda. I believe that the Law on Ownership proves the basic idea in civil legislation on the unity between legal regulation in economic and property relations among organizations, and the participation of private citizens. It is particularly important in this connection that the very sequence in the articles of the law give priority to citizens' ownership.

B. Rakitskiy: All of this is true. However, let us not forget the following as well: it seems to me that many problems will arise because the law is not protected from various interpretations. Categories such as "ownership" and "possession" are familiar to all but interpreted differently. Today we are defining the right of the owner and subsequently we shall have a legal regulation or, worse, an instruction drafted by some department, explaining to us who could be considered an owner. Therefore, it would be desirable for the legislator to stipulate (even as an addendum) how to interpret the term "owner" itself.

V. Rutgayzer: Whatever the case, I am convinced that the law will play a tremendous role, for everything which has taken place in our country so far has affected essentially methods of economic management based on orders. What we need is an economic activity based primarily on the principle of possession. That is precisely what I like in this law. I believe that extensive and meaningful work has been accomplished.

The various viewpoints were expressed. On some problems, the roundtable participants reached agreement while others were subject of debate. This is natural. It would be terrible if on problems which literally electrify the social atmosphere, and which are new and complex not only for the masses but also the scientists there would be total unanimity and that the participants in the discussion would keep pleasantly agreeing with one another.

Pluralism of opinion and sharpness of discussions are by no means an obstacle to substantiveness and tolerance and to the formulation of mutually acceptable and fruitful decisions. Let us hope that this has been confirmed by our roundtable.

Furthermore, however competent the specialists may be, their views do not constitute the ultimate truth but are rather a guideline in the great interest displayed by the public. We are not closing the discussion now. We invite our readers to participate in this discussion and we are confident that they will have something to say.

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After Election, Before Election

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[Article by Vladimir Yevgenyevich Guliyev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor]

[Text] For some reason, running through my mind are familiar titles of Lenin's pre-October articles which I had read during my student years or even as a high-school senior: "The Crisis is Ripe," "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Struggle Against It," "Will the Bolsheviks Retain the State Power?". I may even have read "The Socialist Society is In Danger!" What is happening to our society? Where are we going? What is our target? Questions and more questions... The situation is further complicated by the uniqueness of perestroika itself. How at this point not to recall Lenin's words which, true, were said under different situations: "Even Marx could not think of writing a single word on this subject and died without leaving a single specific quote, an irrefutable requirement. That is why now we must pull out of it by ourselves" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 84).

All the questions which life raises are usually answered by life itself, through practical experience and the activities of millions of people. Man can answer only a few of them and, as a rule, only conjecturally.

The Political System

For quite some time (at today's pace 1 or 2 years is a long time) it was believed that one of the dramatic paradoxes of perestroika was the following: an anachronistic political system was called upon to become the main instrument of social change and, therefore, to restructure itself. This was unpromising, however, for it is political actions outside of traditional institutions that are needed, such as new parties, trade unions, all sorts of associations and, above all, bodies possessing real power and administrative authority. The trouble is that the old political system does not make it possible to develop competitive entities with power.

The detrimental nature of this view resides in the formal, one-dimensional and superficial perception of the type of organism which is usually known as a political system. A political organization of society (or a political system) is not a juridical concept (i.e., it is not above all juridical) but a real, a socially extant, a politically existing concept. It includes any and all subjects of political activities—

legal, juridically neutral or clandestine, i.e., illegal. In that sense the political organization of the society during its transitional period includes, in addition to the official structures of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," also non-Soviet and even anti-Soviet associations, i.e., not only those which are officially acknowledged but also all those which could influence the political process or shape public perception. At this point we should also point out the anti-Stalinist groups inside and outside the party, which existed at that time (such as the Ryutin group). Naturally, also groups which, during the period of stagnation, did everything possible to weaken the foundations of conformism, ideological "monotheism" and the diktat of the worst elements of the apparat or, in short, all that to which we refer today as the mechanism of obstruction and which was previously known as the power mechanism. Naturally, not every group of dissidents was actually (or claimed to be) a strictly political formation. However, during time of political stagnation even a samizdat collection of poetry assumed a political meaning.

Unquestionably, perestroika is the work of millions of people and of their views and activities (although "samizdat," and the opposition of isolated individuals, along with the actions of the workers in Novocherkassk and elsewhere, as early as the 1960s, prepared the country's new course). In this context I am referring to something else: at no time, even during times of the heaviest suppression and desolation were political life and, with it, the actual political system absolutely monolithic.

The accuracy of this view becomes particularly clear in its ethnographic or national-religious-regional aspects.

Traditions, standard rules of behavior, religious postulates, pre-Soviet history, the Soviet history of different nations and territorial communities, and so on, created something which seemed like a neglected yet always truly existing spiritual-political foundation on which the Soviet political system was superimposed, in the same way that semidestroyed foundations of an old building are used in erecting a new structure. Some of its parts may be stronger than other because of what is left of the previous structure. Other parts are weaker, for they are built on nothing. Without getting into details, let me ask the rhetorical question: Are the real structure and the functioning (i.e., the institutions, rules, relations, awareness, and so on) of the political system of, shall we say, the 1970s identical in the Baltic area, Central Asia, the Russian Center and the Transcaucasus?

Entirely different (or, to say the least, substantially different) political systems in regions and republics could be found behind the facade of the single and constitutionally identical Soviet political system. It was when perestroika began to remove the "latest layers" on this canvas, that this apparently forgotten yet always present painting underneath emerged on the political surface. It was then that mechanisms with which we were poorly familiar began to function—traditionalism, separatism, Islam, the national self-awareness of big and

small nations and previously suppressed hurts of even smaller ethnic groups, and many others.

Such a conflicting political "action" is what both stimulates and obstructs perestroika. Today the national movement, for example, is ambivalent. It could lead to an economically efficient regional cost accounting system with an efficient division of labor among republics and administrative territories. However, there could also be separatism, autarchy and a fatal breakdown of relations. Furthermore, the rigidity of the political system we inherited—as recent events have already demonstrated—does not mean in the least that all of its institutions without exception are historically doomed, socially inefficient or, in short, hopeless in all respects. For example, the present trade unions are an appendix of the administration. They are departmental instruments and a direct progovernmental channel for influencing the working people. Strictly speaking, they are neither trade nor unions. However, even such a peremptory statement is also an indication of a solution to the situation, which is to recreate proper trade unions, on a serious a professional basis.

There is an even greater need to reorganize the socialist Soviet federative state of the whole people. Those who assume that the renovation of our statehood should take place only by reforming, making it law governed are making a mistake. To a no lesser extent the state is subject to perestroika if it is to become a truly socialist state. It is also subject to perestroika in terms of becoming a state of the whole people, through a free constitutional pluralism of social interests and their democratic harmony. Furthermore, as a Soviet state it is a process which, happily, has advanced. Naturally, it has advanced in terms of its federative status as well. Finally, it has advanced also as a state. That which we usually mean in our country by this term is subject to radical reconstruction, to a revival or, to put it better, to a rebirth. A poorly functional formation which has blended together party, state and trade unions, with a poor separation of powers and, therefore, not specialized, which included the civil society and which swallowed the individual was what we inherited from Stalinist and latter times.

It is frequently claimed that the sovereign state fell prey to the unrestrained diktat of the party, to an usurpation, so to say, of direct ruling-management functions by the party. It seems to me that both this and the opposite happened (actually, with the same outcome): by assuming the power, the party became "satisfied." It lost its features of a political party and, as time went on, increasingly based its leading role on the holding of power, separating its leading role from that of the state in official theory, while in political practices combining them, even strategically (in any case until the resolutions of the 19th CPSU Conference). Having largely lost the features of a party in its relations with the state, the CPSU did not assume the party features in relations with other parties, for no such parties existed. Hence its

"inability" in the process of interaction with the renovated soviets, economic authorities and enterprises (and cooperatives), popular fronts, informal associations, and so on. Having assumed the power, the party no longer learned anything, for which reason it did not learn to live as a party, i.e., to interact with other entities. Instead, it dealt only with the targets of its "leading role" and "guiding activities."

However, having failed to develop the features of a party on the surface, it also, to a large extent, failed to acquire (and, partially, lost those which it had previously acquired) internal features. From a voluntary association of like-minded people, to a large extent it became a formal association of actually idea-minded and "semi-idea-minded" "unwitting time servers" and time servers by conviction. Furthermore, it became an association of rank-and-file and command personnel, of primary organizations and the apparat, of the apparat with the leaders, and so on, and so forth. Not only the rank-and-file mass of party members but also the apparat and the leaders themselves did not form an organic unity (with the sole exception of the period of the Great Patriotic War). For that precise reason, this "surrogate of collective rule" proved capable (once again a paradox!) of promoting an individual, a group of individuals who, under the pressure of a general social crisis, were able to initiate and head perestroika. Had the party been a fully monolithic "association of like-minded people," given this situation, either the country or at least the party would have perished.

Now, under the influence of the changes it itself initiated, the party has become "doomed" to perestroika. Perestroika within the party will go on, albeit unevenly and in different ways, both among the rank-and-file members and among the leadership, and within the structure and functions of the apparat. "Doomed to perestroika" does not mean that "nothing else is possible." "Something else" is quite possible, and not only hypothetically but also in a real threatening aspect, for there are people and groups which rely on the weakened but by no means dismantled foundations of the old economy and which express the respective backward group interests and, for that reason, carry with them the stereotypes of vulgar socialism. Nonetheless, the party is "doomed to perestroika" with a successful development of the situation, even if a "historical hitch" in the renovation of our country were to take place. Otherwise it will be pushed aside by other forces and it would be lucky if it is only pushed aside and not discarded as an organization which has lost its power, authority, social support and program and, with them, any kind of possible future. Also possible is a profound degeneracy of the party as a result of its saturation with not entirely communist elements. Need this be proven? Have the processes in Poland and Hungary not proved the existence of such an alternative which we should take into consideration most seriously? By losing its moral-political domination in society, the Marxist party also loses control over state power.

In short, no return to the old is possible but nor does the new mandatorily have to be bright. The main argument in favor of perestroika lies precisely in this fact and not in exhortations, such as "nothing else is possible" or "history is unfamiliar with the subjunctive declension" (history as always been familiar with it if we bear in mind the historical process and not the possibility of replaying it post facto), or other similar high-sounding statements.

On Constitutional Reform, Elections, Power Authorities and the Apparatus

Above all, I would like to take the side of the anonymous fathers of the constitutional reform, in its first stage. Currently we hear a great deal of angry accusations addressed at them, triggering a feeling, and not just a feeling of protest. Let us take the electoral system as an example. The deputies who were elected by the public organizations are being so unanimously criticized that it looks like pluralism of opinion seems to have been ignored in this case. I have had the opportunity to express my opinion a couple of times on television. Let me repeat it. As a person who willingly and with conviction supported this electoral structure from the very beginning, I shall cite arguments in its defense.

The first objection of our critics is the unequal conditions set for the nomination and election of candidates from districts and public organizations. Yes, in a number of organizations the stereotype was at work: there were 100 candidates for 100 seats from the CPSU, the same from the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies, etc. Furthermore, the nominations were made by the leaderships and not by the rank-and-file members. However, the lack of democracy in the application of the law is not the same as an absolute objection to the law itself, in principle. Any law can be twisted in its practical application. The familiar means of universal balloting by ordinary members of public organizations practiced in democratic countries were not only rejected. They were simply ignored. The steps which were taken were "the simplest possible" and, naturally, "the most reliable."

The second objection: Let the public organizations retain the right to nominate candidates but let the balloting be by territorial district. In my view, we see here an underestimating of direct representation of sociogroup (professional, age, etc.) interests. The angry charges that the institution of the "corporate" state is being revived are both invalid and unethical today. The representation of corporate interests is not something that Mussolini invented. Elections based on the production principle, practiced in the USSR between 1917 and 1936, were also based on corporate representation. Somewhat differently this is practiced in Yugoslavia as well. Possibly, if we look around, we would also find it in other democratic countries. For example, we are familiar with the "curial system" which, in some cases, was a manifestation of class representation but which, in principle, had rational features as well, such as the recognition and acknowledgment, in addition to territorial (and national-territorial)

needs and interests, of other requirements of entities I could describe as transterritorial communities and collectives. Having territorial units vote on candidates from public organizations would mean imposing the interests of territories on corporate problems (young people, women, veterans, and so on) and absorb the latter.

The present system is vulnerable in one respect. Representation of public organizations has proved to be, in my view, logically incomplete. The Supreme Soviet should have a third chamber—a council of social organizations and movements. At that point the advantages of pluralism of opinions, socioeconomic programs, draft laws, and so on, would become clear. They would be highlighted not only through the interests of the territorial communities and of national groups but also by those of other, of transterritorial social groups and, respectively, by the requirements of the organizations and movements representing them. The conclusion is that we must correct, we must democratize, we must “further structure” such a third representative system rather than abolish it.

Let us now consider the “two-story parliament” which, as we know, includes the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Objections to this structure are public knowledge. Let me ask their opponents: Could there exist, in general, a functional legislative, executive and control authority as a “one-story parliament” and what within it would eventually prevail? Would it be a system of “congresses” or even meetings, or else a parliamentary-organized system? I am confident that under our specific circumstances of 1989, the former would win hands down. Instead of performing its job as the revolutionary convent of perestroika, i.e., as a free rostrum of political representation and instead of establishing the necessary minimum of superior authorities and then yielding the political arena to the legislative and executive activities of the Supreme Soviet, a “one-storied” Soviet (or Supreme Soviet), created immediately, considering the shape it would assume, would remain a standing all-Union meeting. Let me be accurately understood: what the congress has done is invaluable. However, any quality could become a fault. In that sense, the familiar statements about a “parliamentary talking-shop” have lost none of their validity.

To sum it up, let me emphasize the following: whether this was part of the plan of the authors of the idea of a “two-story parliament” or else whether it developed spontaneously, both the project and the structure have turned out to be as successful as possible in successfully designing and building something at a time of social ferment and profound changes.

Now as to the apparat, i.e., the paid-professional group of managers who are part of the state mechanism and state-like structures (such as the AUCCTU). The difficulties stemming from Soviet officialdom are too numerous to list. A great deal of convincing statements have been made on the internal unity and corporate,

group, asocial and largely antisocial interests and inefficiency, whether unintentional or deliberate and even self-seeking, of the various types of administrations and their economic incompetence and, finally, their neglect of the social interests, the demands of man and the rights of the citizen.

What attitude should we adopt toward this social stratum, not only in the course of daily emotional contacts but on the principled-political, strategic, social and long-term level? Let me simplify the question: Should we declare “civil war” on millions of our fellow citizens and, even more so, encourage them to unite in self-defense? (It is true that part of the apparat is already waging, with no proclamation whatsoever, “war” on perestroika, but how to respond to this “war?”) Everything depends on the structure of the objective interests of the officialdom. In turn, these interests are a manifestation of their social roles. And so, what are their interests?

Above all, let us mentally discard the stratum of managers who are either totally or primarily corrupt. This applies to those who entirely or essentially survive through theft and bribery. The attitude toward them is simple. It falls in the area of criminal law. The other, one should hope numerically predominant part of administrators, contains, as part of its social nature (in different combinations, depending on the type of activities, access to resources, personal morality, and so on) two principles: those of the working person and the “consumer.” The latter word is not synonymous with the ordinary consumer but nor does it entirely coincide with the term “social parasite” or something like it.

A “consumer” is a bureaucrat in the precise, i.e., the negative meaning of the term, for bureaucratism is an unproductive or underproductive yet highly consuming type of management. Therefore, the worker inside the official links him to the people, while the consumer alienates him from them. The point, however, is that with such a dual nature the official is not alone. He has something in common with all careless producers among workers, peasants, physicians, lawyers, scientific workers and military servicemen. Therefore, this general social pathological condition can be cured through economic (in terms of the nature of ownership and production organization), social (distribution and consumption), educational and other changes, on the basis of the laws and within the laws. Naturally, broad criticism is a sharp tool for the debureaucratizing of society but, it seems to me, it is only payment based on labor, in this case administrative labor, and on the basis of its real economic, political and social results that would be a decisive prerequisite in the struggle against bureaucratism. This is confirmed by global experience as well, for bureaucratism and the struggle against it is the global problem of our time or, in any case, of the 20th century. Only the society which can pay real wages based on the results of the manager and the managerial apparatus can counter the total bureaucratization through which

administrative structures secure for themselves "independent sources" of life and multiplication.

If we make a broad assessment of the situation, particularly in the light of the strikes, we can see a certain duality of power: in a number of republics, local areas and even in the center one can see the struggle between two principles: of the apparat against the people. Both try to make use of representative institutions and forms of direct democracy (movements, meetings, petitions, the press). It is true that the bureaucratic part of the apparat uses in this case the traditional instruments of power as well. The optimal solution, in my view, is, first of all, to develop this normal revolutionary process within strictly legal limits (the laws themselves must be legal and not bureaucratically repressed). Second, the power rivalry should bring about, given a favorable outcome of the process, an efficient system of "co-management." The power should be in the hands of the people and the soviets, and the day-to-day management, to the apparat subordinate to them. Co-management is a necessary link between an administrative system and people's self-management. Management expertise must be separated from the bureaucratic principle and, in the course of time, the former must entirely replace the latter.

Toward a New Federalism

The fact that the old "facade" federalism collapsed is no secret to anyone. The task is to dismantle it as rapidly and painlessly as possible while, at the same time, build a new Union statehood. What are its parameters?

The parameters are defined not by abstract ideological phantoms but by harsh political, economic, ethnic, cultural-linguistic, sociopsychological, territorial-geographic and other realities. Therefore, in structuring the new program on the national problem we must, albeit in terms of general features, develop a hierarchy of values. In the past we proclaimed that "the international unity among working people is superior to everything else." The time has now come to consider the nature of this unity. At what cost? Superior precisely to what? The study of the situation in this area and the expanded political guidelines needed for practical application are found, as we know, in the report submitted by M.S. Gorbachev at the September 1989 Plenum, and in the CPSU platform on the party's national policy.

If to us freedom and the well-being and safety of the working people of all national and ethnic groups become our highest value, not merely in words but in deeds, the political-legal forms must be coordinated precisely with such values. Consequently, "unity" or autonomy, union or independence, unitarianism, federalism, autonomy, and the other objectives we named should be formulated and serve them. All other values must not become self-seeking despotic imperatives.

We believe that under the specific circumstances which have developed now, with an overall trend toward a

worsening and intensification of relations among nationalities, the general principle governing national-statehood building could consist only of maximal flexibility, adaptability, and plasticity of political-legal institutions. In this case as well, it is only political pluralism, and the horizontal and vertical separation of the powers that could be an acceptable way for the preservation and updating of socialism. Any division, any splitting of power rights must be subordinated to the criteria of the need for separations and their suitability for management on different levels, preventing any "excess of power" regardless of the area. However, pluralism does not mean total permissiveness and carelessness, and the tolerance of democratic institutions is not infinite. Otherwise the freedom granted to one national group turns into discrimination against another. Therefore, limits in the variety of state-legal forms should, as the plenum noted, should be set by formulating the fundamental rights and freedoms of the man and the citizen. Their minimal amount, stipulated in basic international documents, must not be limited unilaterally or by agreement between two or more sides (independent countries, Union republics, the center and the individual republics, etc.).

The solution of the crisis which has affected the USSR as a federative state is converting to a variety of forms of interrelationships among its sovereign and autonomous, territorial-administrative and economic units. Life itself, I am confident, will make it necessary to establish an entire range of different relations among them. This would include unitarianism and a centralized federation, autonomy and treaty-federal relations, confederation relations and even international (intergovernmental)-legal relations. Unless we wish to resort to coercion, not to mention bloodshedding coercion, we must progress precisely toward such a high and humane variety of relations. In most areas of the country the lines separating national-state subjects could hardly be considered "firm." Conversely, a nationwide division of territories will require a number of ethnic enclaves, ethnic areas and other administrative units and forms which would contribute to the truly democratic and equal joint survival and cooperation among nations. Nonetheless, the foundation (providing, naturally, that we show tolerance and good will) will be federal and radically updated relations among the majority of the present members of the USSR. The economic foundation of this new law-governed state federalism could be the "system of civilized members of cooperatives," a kind of "cooperative federalism" or a federation of economic associations (direct producing units, territorial and national-territorial formations) based on an efficient socially oriented and sensible division and cooperation between labor and a market in means of production and trade, manpower and scientific and technical achievements.

On the Changing Economic Role of the State

The concept of the "basic state" under socialism (or "the state as the center of the economic system") had a

spectacular collapse. Its supporters, who were very persistent in the past, prefer today to treat it, so to say, as a nonperson. It was this basic state as the center of the economy, that led the economy into a noneconomic and anti-economic condition.

Equally impressive is the defeat of the philosophical and governmental-legal theory of the functions of the socialist state, particularly the social and economic ones, in the "development" and spreading of which the author of this article as well had something to do. Mentioning it briefly (hundreds of dissertations and books and thousands of articles were written to substantiate this theory) it is an apology of state-bureaucratic paternalism. The state, which is a public power authority (which is what it should be) was turned into an image of a universal philanthropist, a "horn of plenty," a kind of Saint Nicholas, who does not appear on New Year's eve only but remains with us 365 days a year, for the full 5 years of the 5-year plan.

How can the state advance under the conditions of a developing socialism, in terms of its economic system?

To begin with, it could guarantee (through legislative and primarily judicial control over the observance of the laws) the legal framework of economic life and strictly legal relations among all production and trade entities. Second, it could act as the direct owner and manager of a strictly limited economic sector. Third, it could be the co-owner, the shareholder-participant in cooperatives, mixed (joint) enterprises and public corporations, not only in material production but in other areas as well, such as, for instance, the mass information media and cultural institutions. Fourth, it could act as a fiscal institution, i.e., as the national treasury and fiscal control authority, as the collector of taxes and as a controller and regulator—exclusively on an economic and legal basis—of the income of all participants in civil trade. Fifth, as the main (but not the only) investor in national economic, ecological, scientific and general social programs. Sixth, as a guarantor for the implementation of national economic, financial and scientific and technological interests of the country in the area of international relations. Seventh, finally, as an instrument for harmonizing—through planning, programming, cooperation, intermediary, arbitration, and so on—of economic and social interests, needs and demands of the individual areas and social groups, as well as an instrument for the resolution of conflicts. Actually, this final point is related to all previous ones and we single it out here as a particularly important aspect of all economic functions of the Soviet state.

To sum it up, let us emphasize the main feature in the changing role of the state: distancing itself from direct economic management and exerting financial-economic influence on it and practicing exclusively legal forms of economic control. In this connection I must object to the contemporary critics of Marx. In their view, Marx simplified the economic system of the future society, reducing it to a single public economy. Naturally, it is

hardly possible and necessary today to defend the infallibility of any type of views, regardless of whoever may be formulating them. Nonetheless, let us point out that Marx addressed his summations not at Russia which, although having a capitalist economy was not free from the severe vestiges of serfdom and which, furthermore, had undertaken the "building of socialism in a single separate country." The economic theory of communism was developed by Marx for the totality of advanced countries which had reached a level of economic socialization considered high for its time. Therefore, the "multiple-system socialism" is rather our own invention, the product of a forced "marriage" of noneconomic "socialization" with economic backwardness, rather than something which Marx "did not anticipate."

We must clarify yet another matter in terms of the links between the state and the economy. Is a law-governed state possible in a society suffering from chronic shortages? There are those who think roughly as follows: we may be poor but let us be law-governed. This is a profound error, and references to Western experience, where law-governed states appeared before the present high standard of well-being had been reached, sound unconvincing. Under socialism, in which the state cannot fail to fulfill constitutionally guaranteed social functions (true, sharing them with nongovernmental public institutions) it cannot become law-governed as long as the shortage of means of production and consumer goods dictate not law-governed economic relations but command-administrative (funding and "rationing") forms of distribution. Wherever universality has been replaced by selectiveness there is no place for a law or else the place of the law is rigidly limited. It is only a law-governed economy in which an equivalent market method of trade and distribution prevails that can lay the foundations for law-governed statehood.

And So, What Kind of Turn Are We Making?

We can clearly see a fast change in the stages of democratic development of perestroika. The first was that of oral democracy, expressed at meetings or official fora. The second was the democracy of resolutions, particularly those of the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The third was the democracy of action: elections of people's deputies, the proceedings of the congress and the Supreme Soviet, the strike of coal miners with the establishment of new spontaneously formed local power authorities. The general crisis of the state is growing. The question is, will society be able to control the situation and turn it into a step leading to its healing or will the crisis sweep off many if not all existing power and control structures.

Pluralism has spread to the fullest extent to the party as well as the other traditional elements of the political system. Therefore, the type of "factions" which are appearing today within the party, the soviets, the trade unions and the Komsomol above all, are of exceptional importance. Can we set up a coalition rallying the

progressive forces in society and, therefore, guiding society out of the crisis? Is such a coalition only capable of grumbling conservatively and criticizing, from the rightist viewpoint, everything that is happening? Finally, could it lead to political revanchism and to turning the country back? It is clear that the worst, the conservative part of the apparat, with its limited restructuring or rather its "additional" structures, has exhausted its potential. On the other hand, the party-state leadership of the perestroika impetus, which dominates in politics (it is true, through shifting and blocking actions) has gained powerful support and extension "from below"—at elections, in the ecological movement and the demands of strikers to speed up perestroika.

It is said that one does not change horses in the middle of a stream and, in this sense, one should not try to remove the party from managing the perestroika process. This is both right and not entirely right. In all resolutions and profound social reforms the process was intensified and accelerated as ever more radical factions took over the leadership. Such a most consistent perestroika "faction" within the CPSU today is found in its rank-and-file members and the best part of elected managers and the apparat, who were given a voters' mandate. This is a segment of the party which least of all separates itself from the nonparty people and which encourages the center to engage in more extensive changes, supporting it, criticizing its inconsistent or indecisive actions and suggesting alternatives in the center, in the individual republics and in the local areas.

What is the origin of the threat? It comes from some of the leading apparat, to begin with. It comes from backward population groups which are nurturing extremism and violence, second. It comes from some of the military whose interests have been harmed, third. It is extremely important to be able to compromise with all of them, to the extent to which this is possible, and thus to isolate the "irredentists." We must prevent all antiperestroika forces and forces which have simply "not found themselves" so far in perestroika and people who have been damaged or dissatisfied with it, from forming a bloc. It may seem that all of this is not helped by the growing variety of views within the CPSU. Actually, as Engels wrote, "any labor party in a big country can develop only in the course of an internal struggle, entirely consistent with the laws of dialectical development in general" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 35, p 312).

So, we have entered the latest stage of the crisis: the stage of cataclysms. What is becoming a decisive political prerequisite for a possibly shorter and less painful (faster and painless could not be achieved) in crossing this stage? First, "avoiding stupidities!" Nonetheless, a great deal of stupidities are still being committed. Consider, for example, criminal law. It has retained the supreme penalty for some property crimes. However, there have been calls for the violent overthrow of or changes in the Soviet governmental and social system, which are now punishable, among others, with a fine. Second, we have

the correlation between resolve and intelligence. Here as well we touch upon the topic of "reform and revolution."

One could say that both our (and the previous) generation were raised in a spirit of pitting against each other a number of sociophilosophical categories, such as base and superstructure, daily life and awareness, etc. Traditionally, such pairs of "incompatible" categories include reform and revolution. Reform, it is being said, is either the by-product of revolution or its palliative, an unsuitable substitution, a result of compromise and, generally speaking, something second-rate. Any profound reform, i.e., a reform which leads to substantial changes in the nature of ownership and power, is revolutionary in terms of its consequences. Furthermore, it has the advantage that it takes place without violence, without physical violence in any case which, in itself, is valuable even more so during our stormy times. There are reasons, one would believe, for considering perestroika a revolutionary reformation, a sum of reforms—profound and not so profound—which lead to essential changes in material, political and moral relations and social institutions. What is the nature of the social problems which are solved through such reforms, equaling, so to say, a social and a political revolution?

It is customary to say that "perestroika is the continuation of the revolutionary cause of the October Revolution." This is accurate! But this means that it is a combination of socialist with general democratic (or, if you wish, people's democratic) revolution. Actually, socialism cannot be "restored" without freedom for the citizens, without national and people's sovereignty for nations and ethnic groups, without the assertion of the peasant's ownership of the land, without giving the plants to the workers, without providing enough food to the hungry (and there are millions of them!) and without solving other problems which are inherent in a truly national revolution, which combines proletarian-socialist with general democratic objectives (including making a democratic peace and abandoning participation in unjust wars). The solution of all of these problems, which was initiated in October 1917, was not carried out for a number of reasons, mainly the coming to power of Stalinism and the growing isolation, starting with the end of the 1920s, of the Russian Revolution from global developments. Therefore, the de-Stalinization of the country and, therefore, democratization, debureaucratization, demilitarization, and demopolization of production, trade, services, ideology, science, politics, culture and art are all additions to the list of the general democratic problems which must be solved in the course of the revolutionary-reformist perestroika. There can be no renovation of society without this general democratic principle which is actually a socialist one.

There is an equal need to restructure the awareness of the people and to release their oppressed awareness and achieve their emancipation. In its time, when the country was involved in a "lagging-catching up" development, there was a corresponding swelling of the

"greatness of exclusivity" complex (the reverse of the inferiority complex). This grew to such an extent as to become a material feature of the overall obstruction mechanism. Perhaps that is why perestroika began by getting rid of such complexes and introducing in ordinary social truth honesty and a critical self-evaluation although, naturally, by no means is all the truth being said and there are deep complexes within the people's minds (such as, let our land remain barren but we shall not allow granting foreign concessions!).

In conclusion, I repeat: history is familiar with the subjunctive. There are always alternatives in the historical process. The next elections will be a decisive step in the historical choice: where to go, how to get there, with whom to go. What is clear is that **we must go**. The main enemy is either a stagnating perestroika or the perestroika of stagnation. Honestly speaking, this enemy is "at the gate" or, at least at the "economic gate." Fighting it alone we shall not succeed. The tasks of the qualitative renovation, of perestroika, and reorganization of social structures in the USSR can be met only through the fearless combination of our natural wealth and intellectual resources with progressive foreign technologies and global experience in management, and only through the gradual "resettling in the European home" through the skillful combination of our state sovereignty with the variety of relations within this conflicting-integral world. Without solving this problem on one-sixth of the globe there will constantly remain one more unsolved global problem, a problem which is indeed among the most important and most painful for all mankind.

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PUBLIC OPINION

Readers Think, Argue, Suggest

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[Text] I. Matyushina, candidate of historical sciences, Moscow: *The Way We Read Lenin*

In the final years of her life Marietta Shaginyan insistently demanded that we read Lenin carefully. Naturally, everyone agreed, paying sympathetic condescending attention to her advice....

It is my profound conviction that in the many decades of "study" of Lenin's works, many people have not learned how to read and think about them attentively. All indications are that this is the result of the long habit of "studying" Lenin's works on the basis of all kinds of methodical recommendations originating in ideological departments, some on the rayon level.

Today we are beginning to reject the canonizing of the thoughts and ideas expressed in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. At the same time, it frequently happens in reality that new developments take over the role

of old forgotten ones. In this connection, let me mention some concepts expressed in such a familiar Leninist work as "What Is to be Done?" which all students in higher educational institutions must mandatorily summarize, be they future engineers or workers in the humanities.

We know that this work was written in 1902, when the Russian social democratic movement was experiencing a crisis triggered by the spreading of opportunism in the global labor movement. This work was a program for solving the crisis. In exposing the gnosiological roots of opportunism in the labor movement, Lenin nonetheless emphasized one of the features of its manifestation in Russia, i.e., the fact that the young leaders of the Russian social democratic movement learn Marxism, metaphorically speaking, from bad textbooks—from "recommendations" based on it. Could we trace here a historical parallel? Here are some other statements made by Lenin: "The spontaneous suppression of awareness also occurred *spontaneously*... it occurred not in the course of an open struggle between two totally opposite views and the victory of one over the other but by 'removing' by the police of an increasing number of 'old' revolutionaries and the ever greater entry on the stage of the 'young' ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 6, p 37). If in history tragedy is repeated in the guise of a farce, in our case it played a fatal joke. Our awareness was eliminated by Stalinism purposefully and methodically, as many of the best minds of global civilization rotted in the gulags.

After a brief "thaw," when we had barely begun to find the truth in the science of history, once again "consciousness" was blocked. For 2 decades, the legitimate press developed the criteria of a nonexistent "developed socialism." Another constantly heard topic was that of the ever growing role of the party. Although one of its postulates is the need to develop theory or, in Lenin's words, the "resumption of theoretical work," in this precise case things were quite different from what they were claimed to be.

Luckily, the generation of the 20th Congress was inoculated with "awareness," and it was precisely this generation that developed the concepts which became the foundations for perestroika. The party and its best representatives face the task of spreading these concepts among all strata and social groups in our country, for it is only in that case that the party can be the vanguard of society.

In this connection, it would be interesting to trace the logic of Lenin's thoughts concerning spontaneity and awareness in the labor movement, for this logic enables us to understand the role of the revolutionary intelligentsia as the creator, the bearer of theory and as the mechanism which transmits this theory to the masses. In "What Is to be Done?" Lenin quotes Kautskiy to the effect that contemporary socialist awareness can appear only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Therefore, awareness is something introduced from the

outside "and not something spontaneous... stemming out of it (out of the struggle—author)" (op. cit., vol 6, p 39). The frequent repetition of the fact that we have the most conscious, and the best educated working class does not make it such. The question which emerges was one debated as early as the turn of the century: Are workers participating in the formulation of theory?

Unquestionably, Lenin answers, "but they participate not as workers but as theoreticians of socialism, in the role of Proudhons or Weitlings. In other words, they participate only and to the extent to which they are able, to a greater or lesser extent, to master the knowledge of their own century and to advance this knowledge" (ibid.). Is this concept applicable to our time? Unquestionably, it is. Teacher and worker Nikolay Travkin is both a theoretician and propagandist of the new thinking, of the scientific foundations of perestroika. Arkadiy Aydak, chairman of the Chuvash Leninskaya Iskra Kolkhoz, is, in my view, one of the most interesting among our contemporary agrarians—a theoretician and a thinker. Pitting the intelligentsia against the workers is not a concept which originates from the workers. It suits the administrative-command system which senses a clear threat to the inviolability of its position with the election of people's deputies.

In my view, we should consider one very interesting and contemporary Leninist thought according to which the party should be able "to organize meetings with representatives of all classes, as long as they are willing to listen to a *democrat*" (op. cit., vol 6, p 83). Equally relevant is Lenin's idea that "he who forgets his obligations to be *ahead of everyone* in formulating, heightening the awareness and ensuring the resolution of *any* general democratic problem is not a social democrat" (ibid.). Was it not neglect of this fundamental Marxist principle that led to the fact that ideological workers were not present at the numerous sanctioned and unsanctioned meetings? Were the inability and unwillingness to hear and listen, and to work where the masses are, the lack of self-improvement habits, and particularly of the habit to read fiction and political works, not what led to a "crisis of confidence" and statements to the effect that few workers were elected people's deputies.

Is the intelligentsia to be blamed for the fact that a people's deputy asks M.S. Gorbachev whether one could anticipate "a faster improvement of the situation in the country with the help of *your* (author's emphasis) thinking?"

Yes and no, I would answer. "Yes" because, unfortunately, ideological workers frequently forgot that "it is necessary to be concerned as much as possible with upgrading the level of consciousness of the workers in general, which requires of the workers not to be locked within the artificially narrowed bounds of "*literature for workers*," but learn how to master *general literature*" to an even greater extent. Unfortunately, Lenin was right when he used the work of "were locked within" because "the workers themselves read and would like to read and

are reading anything which is being written also for the intelligentsia and it is only a few (poor) intellectuals who believe that it would suffice 'for the workers' to describe factory procedures and rehash something which has been long known" (op. cit., vol 6, p 39). But also "no," because the thinking, the real intelligentsia was destroyed and beheaded under Stalinism while during the Brezhnev period it was unable to break into the legal press (precisely the way it happened in Russia at the turn of this century).

The German workers reacted to the death of Ferdinand Lassalle as follows:

"There is a cemetery in Breslau, and in one of the graves lies he who gave us the sword."

Let us hope that the Soviet intelligentsia has "given" to its people the "peaceful sword" of the new thinking, which will make it possible to bring to light the potential of true socialism.

V. Fadeyev, senior scientific associate, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Peat Industry, Leningrad: Isolation Is Not Useful

It is possible to combine different and even seemingly opposite scientific theories, providing that they are accurate. The wave and corpuscular theories of light were combined. K. Marx and V.I. Lenin (in the pre-October period) assumed that commodity production would have no place in the future society and, naturally, did not develop ways of upgrading its efficiency and stability. It was the bourgeois economists who accomplished this, quite successfully at that, something which we must recognize, for otherwise we would have to admit that their "patient" is alive and well because he was given the wrong treatment.

Could we, while remaining on the positions of Marxism, use the works of bourgeois economists? I believe that we can. In organizing a socialist market, we shall be forced to apply, let us say, the theory of the three factors and of maximal usefulness, on which all Western economic science is based. Obviously, we shall have also to make use of the methods of governmental market control. By no means shall we find everything to suit us. Nonetheless we must know about it.

The isolation of our economic science from that of the rest of the world did not bring any benefits. We are forced to solve a large number of problems (major and minor) our own way, i.e., using methods which are no longer used anywhere else. We have our own systems of planning, monetary circulation, material and technical procurements, and methods for technical and economic computations (such unique methods are simply ruinous as a number of examples certify. This, however, is a separate topic).

We are taught to criticize bourgeois economic theories. Yet life makes it necessary to take into consideration the laws of commodity production. Serious scientists, in

solving problems related to upgrading production efficiency, are reaching roughly the same results as their foreign colleagues. However, such theories do not lead us into the "swamp of vulgar political economy" but take us out of it. In order to have access to the achievements of Western economic science we must remove from it the label of "vulgar bourgeois."

Commodity production could be both a booster of progress as well as a tool of exploitation. Today in a number of developing countries fierce exploitation, corruption and organized crime are raging (which supporters of the restoration of capitalism should know about). The use of cost accounting in our country is a progressive development but in this area we have encountered negative phenomena—price increases and unearned wages. It is being said that for the time being there is "froth" in the cooperative movement but unless we correct the errors, there will be a "seasonal flood." The science of economics must anticipate all of this and develop in such a way that both commodity production and the market be put at the service of our own values.

V. Losev, political economy teacher, Dnepropetrovsk: On Prices and Wages

We frequently notice the professional short-sightedness of those who are involved in choosing the optimal ways of solving the accumulated problems. Jurists rely on legislation, forgetting that in our country many good laws are inoperative, even in petty matters. It is not that most people do not trust the laws: they simply do not know them. They are essentially familiar with arbitrariness in front of which one puts the sign "plus" or "minus," and have faith only in the "will of the bosses" which, allegedly, is the only thing capable of bringing order.

Economists are relying on the new economic mechanism. However, in my view, this mechanism requires a qualitatively different type of labor. Unquestionably, economic freedom is necessary in order to have an efficient economy. However, the growth of this freedom (all other conditions remaining the same) will be, in my view, paralleled by corruption, thievery, etc. This threat could be countered by a strong state. However, our state is extremely weak as far as economic control is concerned. It is precisely now, under the conditions of centralization, that we are exposed to unrestrained price arbitrariness. Some economists have suggested that we borrow money to ease the financial crisis. Let us assume that for 2 or 3 years a few things may improve. What then? It is anticipated that in 10 to 15 years our economy will start working "properly," and that by the turn of the 21st century we shall be able to produce an adequate volume of commodities on the level of Japan or the FRG.

It is more likely, however, that we shall be doomed—at least in the immediate future—to plugging the holes. Since prices should not change (such is the widespread view), within a couple of years we shall have to introduce

rationing, this time for 40 to 50 commodities. Let us settle this question: Who benefits from fixed prices? Who benefits from undifferentiated house rents?

Today the arguments are about the type of prices we should have. It seems to me that this is the wrong way to go, for it distracts public attention away from the main problem: Who should set the prices? Is it the market or an official? I am convinced that it is the market and that the market alone could heal our economy. What is preventing us as of now to set balanced prices of goods which are not of prime necessity? In the final account, let instant coffee cost 10 or 15 rubles and let a system of commercial stores be developed.

Many economists, who have tied themselves to the price cycles, have forgotten the important question of wages. Let us assume that both are frozen and that the monetary balance is restored through imports. The result, however, will be that only pensions, rates and salaries of state officials (and the scholarships of the most active segment of the youth) will be frozen. This would make it unlikely to hope for a greater social stability.

Let us assume that we start "importing." Who will buy those imports? If we remember of the scale of the underground economy, we know who. The result will be increased irritation on the part of the ordinary people. To some this may represent an insignificant amount. It may be economically beneficial but is unlikely to ease social tension.

What could we offer instead? In my view, in the triad "economy-social (including national) sphere-state," as a starting element and as a basic point of healing, we should choose precisely the state.

Of late the state apparatus (as synonymous with the administrative system) has been subjected to such serious criticism that many people cannot even conceive of the idea of strengthening it. This is understandable and true, given the present "quality structure" of state officials, bearing in mind that we are unable to implement the reform and even to supervise the amount of nitrates in the vegetables, not to speak of keeping public order and administering justice. However, it is an old truth that the prosperity of the nation depends on the way the labor of the physician, teacher and judge is paid for.

The elimination of the suppressed inflation should begin with a revision of pensions, scholarships and salaries of state employees (having sharply reduced the latter's numbers). Pay a militiaman a salary which will be between 20 and 50 percent higher than the street vendor; the teacher, 50 to 100 percent; the judge, double or triple, and so on. Naturally, an annual coefficient will have to be established based on the cost of living index.

Expenses incurred by the state for housing construction should be included in the amount of the wages. Housing trusts, based on cost accounting, should be organized. Here is a paradox: a person who lives in his own home

subsidizes throughout his entire life those who benefit from free housing. The prices of children's goods as well could be balanced: preferably, aid supplements to mothers should be raised.

The objection to this may be that a wage increase does not eliminate the imbalance between supply and demand but can only accelerate the economic collapse. However, this would be the case if we ignore the concept of "demand for money." As prices increase, such demand grows and, consequently, current demand drops.

Strictly speaking, a substantially more preferable option in the area of improving finances would be that of simultaneously doubling or tripling the price and wage levels (in such a way as to increase demand for money). However, this would be no more than a temporary measure.

The main thing would be changing the economic ratios and creating a sensible economic structure. To this effect there must be price-setting freedom. Prices, however, are the reverse of the wage level. Naturally, if only we could set up some kind of optimal prices.... How can we do this in the case of more than 24 million commodity items? This would hardly be possible to achieve even in the case of 1,000. If we intend to become part of global trade, this turns into utopia.

Naturally, all of this makes sense only if combined with a reform in the banking system and converting the economy (including transportation, most polyclinics and schools) to the status of the currently functioning cooperatives, with a strong antimonopoly policy. That is the area in which foreign trade must concentrate, importing commodities the domestic production of which enjoys a monopoly.

I wrote this letter containing such radical (and obviously unpopular) suggestions very well aware of theory (in 1983 I voluntarily dropped out of postgraduate studies at Leningrad State University, which I found depressing) and I believe that I am familiar with real life, for I am living it rather than studying it sitting behind a desk. Last year I was a member of a contracting brigade. We had the opportunity to sell on the market, on the basis of contractual prices, 15 percent of the cucumbers and tomatoes we raised. I became convinced that it is an error to believe that if the state meat prices are raised to 4 rubles per kilogram the market would raise its own prices to 8 rubles.

For slightly over than 3 months we actively traded in vegetables. This was a real conveyor belt from the field to the store shelf. We had our own stand. For longer trips we leased heavy-duty trucks.

We were interested in the prices charged in different cities (Kerch, Novorossiysk, Taganrog, Minsk, Sumy). At that time the market price of tomatoes in Sumy was double or triple that in Dnepropetrovsk. We started shipping there trucks with tomatoes, in several-day intervals. The maximal price at which we sold our produce

was—only at the beginning—70 kopeks per kilogram. Later it dropped to 50-60 kopeks. It was only after it dropped to 40 that we stopped selling. Why, one may ask, did we not charge a higher price? We had at our disposal not 20 or 100 kilograms, as is the case with the old women who sell on the market, but several tons. The price, which we set ourselves, developed as though automatically: we knew what it should be if we would be able to sell all the vegetables while they were in good condition. We "suppressed" the private entrepreneurs. They were forced to adapt to our own prices. Therefore, who other than they found this unsuitable? I am confident that something similar could take place if our economy were to convert to balanced price system.

I believe that even if some of my ideas are wrong, they could be useful in promoting the further development of pluralism of opinions. Please forgive a certain boastfulness which I detected as I reread my letter.

V. Kruglov, deputy general director, Stomatologiya All-Union Scientific-Production Association, Odintsovo, Moscow, Oblast: The Next Step

Many specialists, including USSR People's Deputies, deem changing the very nature of financing health care to be urgently necessary. Various options have been suggested. In my view, a radical reform in this area can be achieved by introducing a medical insurance system, the more so since it has proven its suitability in a number of countries.

Some enterprises are already now signing contracts for medical services to their personnel. However, this method has still not become extensively widespread, for the social development funds go not only to health care but, above all, to housing construction, the building of preschool institutions and other social projects and to mass cultural and physical culture undertakings.

As we know, the enterprises are given a rate of withholdings from their assessed profit (revenue) paid to the state (including the local) budget, as well as payments for manpower, which goes to the local budget. In connection with the strengthened role of the soviets, a new fund is being set for protecting the health of the population and philanthropy and for additional financing of health care institutions. However, this fund will be unable to meet the increased demand of the people for medical care.

In my view, the next step should be a certain reduction in the payments which factories and plants make to the state budget and use the money to set up their own health care funds. Therefore, the same money which is now channeled into medicine will not become anonymous or "lost" in the general amount but used for its specific purpose. This will encourage the enterprises to sign contracts with medical institutions to cover the cost of the most frequently needed medical services (such as dental aid), the more so since the unspent money will go to the state budget.

It seems to me that the funds used for social insurance (currently handled by the AUCCTU) could become another major source of the health care fund. This would make it possible to pay for sick leave. Furthermore, the collective will have a clear idea of the state of health of the personnel, and the administration will acquire the additional incentive to pay greater attention to working and living conditions. Nor would the pensioners, those who used to work at the plant, be deprived: the plant would pay for the medical services for such people as well.

Along with the health care and philanthropy fund, the local soviets would use the health care funds of enterprises and trade union organization which make withholdings for medical aid, on the basis of contracts, to set up, on a cost accounting basis, health care institutions. An important feature in this case would be the fact that medical services provided to the individual would remain free of charge and the cost will be met, above all, by plants, factories and cooperatives. Budget funds in that case can be used for medical-prophylactic assistance to children, school students, people disabled since childhood, workers in the nonmaterial production area, etc.

I would like to see this suggestion discussed.

A. Novikov, history teacher, Perm: What Kind of School?

Today those who are fluent in two or more languages of the peoples of our country owe this, as a rule, to their independent and persistent studies or lengthy stay in a different linguistic environment and not to the school. The school provides a knowledge of a single language and even that is unsatisfactory. Parents and students face the following choice: to study in the native language or the language of international communication. By choosing the latter, the native language suffers and is lost, which is damaging to national culture as well. The study of the former means that the language of international communications is not mastered. Until the recently there was a trend toward preferring instruction in the Russian language which, as we know, resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of national schools. Today the opposite is taking place, painfully, in an inflamed atmosphere. The preservation of this situation leads to the increased alienation of the people of different nationalities at an age which is of decisive significance in the shaping of their feelings, beliefs and world outlook.

Unfortunately, the managers of our educational system do not see a solution. In a number of statements on this subject, the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education formulated the optimal level of linguistic training of the Soviet school student: native language, the language of international communications, and a foreign language. The language in which the training is done is mandatory, while the other one is optional. How to achieve all this? Most important, does

the contribution of the school to international education consist exclusively of such training? No answer is provided.

Generally speaking, is it realistic to develop the type of system which would make it possible to master successfully and within a short time several languages, including the study of industry, history, culture and languages on a reciprocal basis, and with reciprocal enrichment? N.K. Krupskaya made important suggestions concerning developments in this area. A language is a means of communicating and it is mastered best of all by communicating, she wrote in 1923. "The Russian emigre workers, surrounded by workers in the country of their choice, quickly mastered their language. This was particularly true if they found jobs in a workshop or a plant. Reading newspapers in that language added to their knowledge acquired through intercourse. The best way for the initial study of the language would be extensive contacts among children who speak in different languages. Everything possible should be done to organize this as extensively as possible. The knowledge of the children of emigres should be used. We should organize the exchange of students (for example, a German school-commune could invite several Russian children to spend the summer there and in exchange send its own students). This method should be used and experience should be acquired and developed as extensively as possible" (N.K. Krupskaya, "*Pedagogicheskiye Sochneniya*" [Pedagogical Works], vol 3, pp 70-71).

Nadezhda Konstantinovna deemed necessary that the last year of training in polytechnical schools to include trips around the country and, for some students, abroad, with a view to studying the production process. In her statements on the exchange of school students speaking different languages and their participation in the joint study of production (both in theory and practice), we notice the embryo of the idea of the **International Labor School**.

In the intervening years, tremendous changes have taken place, which make the creation of this type of school both more necessary and more realistic. Some experience has been gained and ways of international contacts among schools students not only within our country but also with foreign students have been found. Mixed classes, classes offering training in two languages, exchanges among families and schools, and joint labor and recreation by children of different nationalities and many, many other opportunities have still not been either analyzed or applied. Perhaps the only area in which some change may be noticed is the exchange of students between the USSR and the United States. Why is all of this considered unimportant in terms of organizing contacts within our own country?

It seems to me that our difficulty lies above all in the lack of attention paid to this aspect of school activities.

Excerpts From Letters

A. Shaley, foreman, Shop No 4, Elektronika Scientific Production Association, Voronezh:

I do not wish to insult the thousands of people who have always worked honestly and conscientiously. However, the years of equalization, solemn reports, and endless applause have not vanished without a trace. This includes us, labor veterans. A person who has lost interest in and taste for work could, unwittingly, cause terrible harm (consider the catastrophe near Ufa, for instance). The feeling that one is working not for oneself but for "some unknown uncle" who pays not for labor but simply for "being present," remains to this day, after we, in any case among us, have realized that perestroika is not needed only by some but by all.

A. Zaytsev, CPSU member since 1961, Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Rostov Oblast:

We keep hearing that our society has become embittered, that people do not believe in anything, etc. The young ask what is strange about that: we are like our teachers. This is entirely logical. One asks what one should do if one's student are to trust him. This does not apply to educators only. In my view, today such an internal task faces every true communist. Unfortunately, not all party members can pass the test of our difficult times. There are those who turn back their party cards. This is no catastrophe, if our ranks are being abandoned by obsequious and indifferent people and toadies. The revolution, as we know, was made by a party whose membership did not exceed 3 million (out of a population of more than 170 million). Why then run after numbers? What matter most are the human, the moral qualities of party members. Today we can see particularly clearly the way a person understands and the extent to which he realistically promotes justice and if he has the qualities of compassion and the feeling of duty. This particularly applies to the party members. If we ignore this we shall not go far. All of us realize the heaviness of our burden. It is those who sincerely believe in our objectives and are morally ready to work for them who will withstand.

V. Vasilyev, Odessa:

We make hasty decisions today, and 1 or 2 years later we realize their negative consequences. What happens then? Who bears the responsibility for this, how much funds are necessary to repair the damage, and where do we find such funds? One wonders, if we remember the large number of such decisions....

All of us trust that cost accounting and basic economic computations will encourage the specific executives to assume a responsible attitude concerning the decisions which are being made, and to see to it that such decisions are competent and effective. Unquestionably, however, strict demand must be made including that of material liability. It is important comprehensively to encourage promising developments which yield results; however,

nor should we leave unpunished short-sightedness and the unwillingness to anticipate the consequences of one's actions.

I. Sokolov, CPSU member, Leningrad:

Of late interesting articles have appeared in the press, as well as shows and motion pictures, some of which deal with problems of morality. Meanwhile, however, our entire life today consists of nothing but shortages of everything. Naturally, one could explain why there is no sugar, butter or soap, as it is being explained from high rostrums and in the press. However, I believe that even one or two real steps aimed at surmounting the scarcity could contribute more to strengthening that same morality than 100 intelligent and useful articles about it.

N. Gavrilov, Arzamas, Gorkiy Oblast:

In my view, political training should not be taught for its own sake. Life raises a great deal of new and varied problems. It is precisely they that must be considered in the light of theory. We need analytical articles on basic problems of perestroika. For example, the demand for the democratization of party life calls for a study of the role and place of the party in society and the formulation of the party's scientific sociology. The economic reform cannot be considered without analyzing the motive forces interested in such a perestroika and the social structures through which it can be carried out. Many such problems exist, as you are probably aware from letters to the editors, concerning theories with gaps in them. This is an area in which a theoretical journal could be of great help (including in political studies).

V. Blok, composer, candidate of art sciences, Moscow:

The work "*Sotsializm i Voyna*" [Socialism and War] is the only book which V.I. Lenin written in co-authorship (with G.Ye. Zinovyev). In volume 18 of the third edition of Lenin's works (which came out in 1931) there is a facsimile reproduction of the cover of the first edition, listing as authors "G. Zinovyev and N. Lenin." Nothing is being said about co-authorship in the fourth edition and in the book "*Socialism and War*" which was published separately. It is mentioned in the fifth edition, although not specifically.

Until the beginning of the 1930s the bolsheviks were free to decide for themselves whether to write their works singly or in co-authorship, for at that time no permission was asked of Zhdanov, Suslov or Pospelov. Permission became required later, in order to retouch history and authorship.

Here is another example: in 1918 the work "*G. Zinovyev and N. Lenin. Against the Current. A Collection of Articles from SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT, KOMMUNIST and SBORNIK SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA*" came out in Petrograd. Subsequently, this collection was reprinted three times (in 1918, 1923 and 1925). However, today's public is unfamiliar with it. Its reprinting, with the necessary commentaries, seems expedient to me.

V. Volkov, CPSU member since 1956, Dnepropetrovsk:

Every time I walk past the building of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, I am puzzled by the huge high reliefs of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is a striking disparity between these depictions and my own (and not only mine) ideas about these people. I see somber and angry old men. Lenin's image makes a particularly depressing impression. Is this the way we know him from the numerous photographs? What about his animated, intelligent and energetic face.... With such remarks I may be invading the area of lofty artistic creativity, but I cannot fail to think that the depictions of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the facade of this institute should be entirely different.

Responses to Our Publications

Z. Sokolova, candidate of historical sciences, Moscow

S. Vorodin and Yu. Kudryavtsev. "Crime: Not Panic But Understanding." *KOMMUNIST* No 14, 1989.

I consider the "Social Protection" section in your journal extremely important and necessary. It is perceived above all as a direct link between the theoretical organ of the party and the masses, specifically those which need more than anything else justice and social protection.

It is precisely from this viewpoint that I consider this article exceptionally relevant and timely. The reason is not only the problems and tasks it discusses, for they are essentially not new. Our press has paid relatively greater attention to crime as a phenomenon which has existed throughout our entire history. We must acknowledge, however, that the consideration of the overall problem of crime has always been marked by a certain absolutizing. It was totally separated from the ties linking it to society, and it is as though society itself was freed from responsibility for the existence of this anomaly.

Therefore, researchers who followed this trend consciously eased their own task by remaining unconcerned with the search for the truth. As a result, as a rule, science obtained not a study of crime but an artificially created "image" of crime, decorated with a variety of emotions and made to fit specific political situations.

A long time ago, after it had lost its humanistic trend in terms of the scientific foundations of criminal law, I lost my own respect for juridical science. Furthermore, I mistrusted it totally. Little has changed in this area of knowledge even after the start of perestroika, although perhaps more has been accomplished here than in the other social science disciplines.

This article in *KOMMUNIST* made me revise my views and attitude toward this scientific area. It sharply stands out among the general flow of publications on crime by virtue of the seriousness of its analysis and its truly humanistic basis in exposing the complex aspects of crime as a social anomaly.

"No panic but understanding!" This appeal should be heard above all by those who make policy in the struggle against crime and by the various committees (temporary or permanent) and commissions which have nothing in common with the amateurish activities which are apparent in this campaign (for the time being this is precisely a campaign!) in the struggle against crime, which is being waged by society, once again "jointly," "within a single front," etc.

What, from my point of view, is it that makes this article published in your journal interesting and valuable?

First. The authors do not provide details on crime data but had they done so, they would have proved, as I firmly believe, that the crime of bribery, added up for the years 1973 and 1983 does not stand any comparison and, naturally, the amounts of the bribes have more than tripled. This fact essentially answers the question of the relative as well as absolute growth of crime today, since the start of perestroika. However, another question arises: Why is it that the idea of increased criminality is being intensively exaggerated less by the mass information media than the administrative system? Naturally, this is not being done in the interest of self-criticism. The idea persists that the concept of the "growth of criminality" today suits certain regressive forces and is being exploited by them for strictly defined purposes: to strengthen the command-administrative system and to prevent its dismantling. Perhaps not deliberately, but this is precisely one aspect of the policy of the conservative forces that the authors expose.

Second. The article rightly cautions against any superficial evaluation of phenomena which lie deep under the surface and the appearance and cultivation of conditions under which the policy of the struggle against crime could easily degenerate into a sum of antihuman actions and a primitive struggle against humanism which, being the greatest value of socialism, needs social protection. The authors do not conceal the difficulties along this way. They can see possible distortions in various directions and, particularly, in the local areas.

The social cost of the pursuit of this political course could become a major obstacle in the renovation of socialism and its political system if humanism is violated to one extent or another, the more so since it was by the fault of the authoritarian regime which was established in our country in the 1930s, and the Stalinist-Brezhnev deformations that the sinister image of an antihuman society was imposed on socialism. Nowhere, in no other area of social life was humanism violated so shamelessly as in criminal legislation which, to this day, has not abandoned many antihuman and false premises in assessing the moral values which constitute the foundations of socialism.

I would like to hope that the views expressed in this article will be further developed. Otherwise it turns into pseudoscience and antihumanism that will triumph, while crime itself will continue to grow, for the line

demarcating it will begin to erode and there will be total loss of criteria in our perception of crime. The time is coming when criminal justice must consider concepts such as compromise and its place in surmounting the trend toward the growth of crime.

Third. The scientific substantiation of the concepts expressed in the article are supported by the overall study of the conditions and factors which shape the "antisocial situation." One could argue about whether this is a new element of policy and a new scientific category. In any case, its introduction in scientific circulation is a step forward in the study of the anomalies in socialist society, anomalies which we have already experienced and are continuing to experience. The strength of this aspect, as viewed by the authors, is based on a clear vision of the objective factors which determine the appearance of criminal motivations.

In this chain of logical considerations expressed by the authors I would like especially to single out the problem of the violation of humanism in our society in the case of people who need social rehabilitation after their release from places of incarceration. Instead of helping them, society once again pushes them, despite all they have suffered, into crime, turning them into a social outcasts. This has always been the case. One might have thought that along with perestroika there should have been a change in the way we look at a person who has redeemed his guilt. However, such is not the case. It is precisely now that strictly pragmatic interests have the upper hand. In practice this leads to ignoring all charitable "commandments." The fact that essentially a person has been refused social rehabilitation is a specific example of the way society itself creates a crime-conducive situation. It turns out impossible to break the vicious circle of trials not only as it affects the former criminal but also society, of which he is a member.

Fourth. Obviously, the question is accurately raised about the crisis in the criminal justice system as part of the crisis of the entire administrative-command system. Essentially, this is a crisis of fairness, for the word "justice" itself means fairness.

The topic of the crisis in the criminal justice system is vast and autonomous from the viewpoint of philosophy and the law. However, this problem has been posed and must be solved. Perhaps a problem, a "related" (historically) analysis of the crisis in the criminal justice system would enable us to see from an entirely different and even an unexpected side the faultiness of the present theoretical concepts concerning the foundations of socialism, and indicate new possibilities for its renovation.

From the Sociologist's Viewpoint

A. Krasovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate, Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy, Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, Minsk: The Young About Themselves

Understandably, our hopes for social renovation are largely related to the young, for which reason we cannot fail to be interested today precisely in the opinion which the young people have on the changes which are taking place, their stance, and the range of their problems and values. We are trying to clarify some of these questions as part of the study entitled "The Life of the Young Generation of the 1980s."

I would like to acquaint the readers with the results of one of the surveys conducted among Minsk school graduates of 1984, i.e., the young men and women who were raised during the period of "stagnation" and who entered life, for all practical purposes, during the time of perestroika. Among those surveyed, 31 percent were workers, 20 percent were employees, and 36 percent were university students (let us note that 5 years after graduating from secondary school, 37 percent were married, 61 percent were single and 2 percent had either divorced or remarried).

The study of the answers enables us, above all, to draw the conclusion that virtually no young man or woman remained indifferent to the changes which are taking place in our society: only half of 1 percent, in assessing their attitude toward perestroika, chose the answer "I am indifferent to it, it does not affect me."

In terms of the real changes which are taking place at specific enterprises, VUZs and technical colleges where these young men and women are working or studying, the situation is more complex. The breakdown of the answers was as follows (in percentage):

Table 1

There Have Been Some Changes for the Better	31
There May Be Perestroika But I Neither Notice Nor Feel It	25
It is Difficult to Say Whether There is Perestroika or Not	24
Nothing Has Changed	18
There Is Perestroika and It Has a Positive Impact in Many Areas	2

Typically, the percentage of those who chose the first and the last variants of the answer (33 percent) account for approximately one-half of those who, in principle, approve of the course of renovation of society. The conclusion which can be drawn is that the attitude toward perestroika is shaped more through the lens of the assessment of processes which are taking place in our social life as a whole rather than under the influence of the immediate situation at work or at the VUZ.

What are, according to the young, the real ways leading to improvements in socioeconomic relations? It would be interesting, in this connection, to analyze their answers to the question "Had you been its manager, what would you have changed at your enterprise or

school?" Ninety-two percent of workers and 95 percent of students suggested, above all, that their plant (institute) be equipped with more modern equipment. Many young men and women (80 percent workers and 75 percent students) point out shortcomings in the wage system, believing that it must be improved. In their view, it is also necessary to change the system of moral incentives for labor; 30 percent of young workers and 60 percent of students note that they would introduce "real self-management," and grant it greater autonomy. Eighty percent of workers and 70 percent of students emphasize the need to improve performance discipline (including that of managers); 63 percent of workers and 52 percent of students believe that, in general, it is necessary to replace many middle-level managers (in the institute, teachers). The overwhelming majority of those surveyed believe that being considerate in relations is important and that one must thoroughly undertake to improve the housing conditions and recreation facilities of the young people.

Let us note, however, that in assessing the possibilities of the manager and suggesting, on this basis, various options for improving existing working and training conditions, the young people do not aspire at all to hold such positions. Only 7 percent of the respondents said that they would like to become middle-level managers and only 1.2 percent said that they wanted to become high-level managers. In projecting their life plans, about 8 percent of the young would like, in the future, to work (regardless of conditions) in places which offer higher salaries, and 13 percent would like to find jobs where there is less responsibility but more money. More than one-half of the young people hope to become highly skilled specialists in their field (incidentally, it is precisely in this group that the percentage of people who favored perestroika was the highest). Let us also note at this point that some 15 percent of young men and women chose, in assessing their professional plans, the item "other," explaining it most frequently that they would like to "work where the job is interesting and the salary is higher."

Naturally, in order to gain a more profound understanding of the attitude of the young toward perestroika, it is important to know the reasons for their activities and their value orientations. It is quite indicative that (judging by the results of the survey) the most important value for the majority of the young (96 percent) is having good and loyal friends. As to objectives in life, concern for health plays an important role (singled out by 84 percent). The young rate highly the desire for constant self-improvement (82 percent); 35 percent of young men and women would like to earn a great deal of money and own expensive objects; 60 percent agree with the fact that "in order to achieve anything in life one must have a great deal of useful acquaintances and proper connections." In the case of 30 percent of the respondents, the

aspiration to develop profitable relations and acquaintanceships is one of the most important objectives in life; in assessing their attitude toward this objective, 40 percent were neutral.

In the rating of their objectives in life, the young rated among the least important the aspiration to engage in social activities. Only 25 percent of the young men and women considered this objective as significant; 28 percent were categorically negative toward it, and 45 percent "had trouble to answer it." Thirty-seven percent of the young agreed with the claim that social work does not contribute anything to the person, but only takes his time. Let us note that our selection included 87 percent of Komsomol members and two-thirds of all respondents believe that "as a social organization the Komsomol has exhausted its possibilities in having an educational influence on young people."

In speaking of the attitude of the young toward social changes, their professional activities and social work, let us direct the attention of the readers to a very essential factor which largely influences the self-definition of young men and women in life. This refers to the school. The results based on the overall assessment of its role in training young people for independent life exceeded even the most pessimistic of our expectations. Only 4 (!) percent of the former secondary school students gave a positive answer to this question 5 years after their graduation. Frankly speaking, this is depressing and also largely explains the problems which face the young as they begin their independent life. This confirms the general conclusion that the involvement of young people in perestroika and in the reorganization of social life is a difficult and by no means problem-free process.

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CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

New Model of Security and the Armed Forces

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[Article by Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, USSR Minister of Defense, army general]

[Text] Dogmas and stereotypes which until recently seemed unshakable and had determined relations between states over the course of many centuries are collapsing under the onslaught of the new political thinking. Rejection of the old and its replacement with the new in the contemporary theory and practice of international politics and, above all, in such a traditionally complex and difficult area as the military, is a process which arose from the depths of the atomic and space age and grew out of realities qualitatively distinct from everything human civilization knew in the past. In

other words, it is an *objective* process. The CPSU has not only revealed the essence of it, but has also drafted a fundamentally new concept of political thinking, corresponding to its laws and tendencies, including a system of viewpoints on building a nuclear-free, nonviolent world. This attests to our party's tremendous creative potential.

The bases for the concept of the new political thinking were formulated by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and later solidified at the 27th Congress and the 19th All-Union Conference. At the UN General Assembly in December 1988, M.S. Gorbachev set forth this concept in generalized form and disclosed the key significance of implementing the ideas of the new political thinking in order to create a new model of security. The practical results of solving problems related to armed forces, to the shift from super-armament to defense sufficiency, should be an indispensable condition and the unique basic building materials and structures for this model. Recognizing its historic responsibility for the fate of socialism and peace, the Soviet Union has displayed good will and acted as the initiator of this shift. We have implemented unilateral, large-scale practical steps to reduce troops and arms and have radically transformed our Armed Forces in conformity with a defensive doctrine and the principle of defense sufficiency.

Preparation of these steps and their subsequent implementation rely on conclusions from theoretical study of the contemporary situation and the scientific forecast of its development, from an all-round analysis of the problems of interaction of armed forces, of the military factor on the whole with other elements which form the structure of the new model of security.

Military Aspects of the New Model of Security

From the moment the state appeared as a political form for organizing society, providing for its security was related, above all, to *military strength*. Precisely this was considered the most effective and often, essentially, the sole policy tool in conflicts of state interests. The logic of military strength thinking gave rise to hundreds and thousands of wars and conflicts which have taken many millions of human lives. Yet, linking this thinking to scientific and technical progress and the improvement of weapons and methods for waging warfare has led to a steady growth in the number of victims and the seriousness of destruction as a result of wars and armed conflicts.

This tendency manifested especially boldly in the 20th century. As everyone knows, 10 million people were killed in World War I, and twice that many were maimed. On the whole, this war reduced the population of Europe, taking into account the decrease in its growth, by 35 million people. Direct losses in World War II increased, compared to the first, by a factor of 5.5. Furthermore, 29 million people were wounded or maimed and 20 million children were orphaned...

Seemingly, if not the first, then the second world war should have been a sufficiently clear *lesson*: military strength, however great it may be, does not guarantee the aggressor the achievement of political goals and, moreover, leads it to defeat, devastation and failure. The inertia of military-strength thinking and the habit of operating exclusively from categories of deterrence and diktat, urged the reactionary, aggressive circles of the West to develop the drawn-out, exhausting "Cold War" after 1945, which could have been an important turning-point in mankind's transition to a peaceful period in its history. In terms of its nature, content, goals and tasks, this was an all-round preparation for another "hot war."

The definitely anti-Soviet, anti-socialist orientation of this preparation forced the Soviet Union to take answering steps to ensure its own security. The basic meaning of these steps lay in achieving *military strategic parity* with the United States. In hindsight, it is obvious that some of our steps toward this goal could have been different, not symmetrical. This would have enabled us to avoid involvement in the arms race. Moreover, a definite shortage of efforts to use political, economic, diplomatic and other possibilities to ensure security had its effect. Nevertheless, the establishment of military strategic parity was historic in terms of its significance for the socialism's fate and was an achievement for all mankind. Even now, it remains a decisive factor in preventing war and maintaining peace.

Recognition of this objective fact leads us, it would seem, to a logical dead end. In fact, on the one hand, military strength can guarantee security to no one, yet, on the other, it serves to prevent war, i.e., to ensure security. Although the dialectic here is really complex, the situation it creates is not a dead end. The military strategic parity that we have achieved prevents forces of reaction and aggression from unleashing war, since it guarantees the infliction of unacceptable answering damage on the aggressor. This is the peace-making role of parity, its unquestionable significance as a factor in preventing war. Let me again stress: in *preventing*, but not in eliminating war from mankind's life.

As the experience of history indicates, security based on military strength or the threat of its application is unreliable. Parity is like balancing on an edge between war and peace. The higher the level of parity, the more dangerous and the greater the amplitude of mankind's swing would be. The nuclear element of military strength has extraordinarily aggravated the danger of a beak-down and has given it a universal nature. Its presence in the arsenals of parties which are in a state of confrontation has definitively revealed the dependence of civilization's existence itself on attempts to ensure security with a foundation in military strength.

Nuclear scientists, convinced with their own eyes of the destructive possibilities of the new weapon, capable of destroying mankind, were the first to realize this. They sounded the alarm. "We must learn to think in a new way," the Russell—Einstein—Joliot-Curie Manifesto of

1955 acknowledged, "we must learn not to ask ourselves what steps must be taken to achieve the military victory of the camp to which we belong, *for such steps no longer exist*; we must ask ourselves the following: What steps must be taken to prevent warfare, the outcome of which would be catastrophic for all participants."

Unfortunately, this formulation of the problem was not comprehended at that time by the overwhelming majority of state, political and military leaders of the West. Therefore, the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union, which contained the rudiments of a qualitatively new approach to fulfilling international security, found no support. In particular, a proposal made by the USSR in 1946 to prohibit the production and use of nuclear arms and to use nuclear power for the well-being of mankind remained unrealized. Years and decades of nuclear conflict, crawling toward global catastrophe, were required so that, finally, the *need* for new rules for general human community existence would be realized not just theoretically, but in practical policy as well.

The backbone of concepts for the new model of security consists of the sum total of such rules, formulated on the basis of fundamental political principles: freedom of choice, the diverse social development of different countries, supremacy of the common human ideal, internationalizing constructive political dialogue among states, and demilitarizing international relations based on a balance of interests. It is qualitatively distinct from everything that existed in the past. Of these, it seems, at least three basic differences could be singled out. It is, above all, the integrity and indivisibility of the national and international components of ensuring security. It is a radical shift of priorities in the utilization of means to ensure security, from military to political. Finally, it is the direct application of the new model to practical policy, to shaping an effective mechanism for ensuring comprehensive security.

It goes without saying, the creation of a new model of security is not a day's task. Obviously, its implementation presumes a number of intermediate stages in which confrontational approaches should be dismantled, the obstructions of distrust, suspicion, and hostility removed, and imbalances and asymmetry in armed forces and armaments, which worry the parties involved, eliminated. In short, a *bridgehead* should be created and strengthened for a further gradual movement from super-armament to sufficiency, to a democratic, nuclear-free, nonviolent world. In this regard, it is apparent that building a new model of security is impossible without reducing the level of military opposition, without accepting and materializing defensive military doctrines and, finally, without mutually reducing armed forces and arms to the limit of defense sufficiency.

Consequently, the evolution of the *military aspect* of ensuring security—from a determining, and then self-sufficing role in its previous models, to performing functions in support of the necessary material guarantees

for political priorities in the new model—acquires fundamental significance under contemporary conditions. A radical reassessment of views on the role of military strength in social progress lies at the basis of this evolution. Whereas in the pre-atomic age, in the words of K. Marx, violence acted as midwife to an old society, pregnant with a new one, today it can easily be transformed into the grave-digger for world civilization. Weapons of mass annihilation, having become the apotheosis of the destructive capabilities of military strength, have led to the emergence of a paradox, in which implementing these capacities is equivalent to suicide for the owner of such a weapon.

As a result, the rejection of forcible methods for solving inter-governmental contradictions and of war as a way to achieve political goals has become the imperative of contemporary world development and has stipulated the place and role of common human interests and values as the cornerstone of the new model of security. It is important to emphasize that this is not at all a tactical course, as some politicians and strategists in the West have attempted to interpret the USSR's proposals and steps to create a new model of security. This is no tribute to the state of affairs. It is a requirement of life itself. Naturally, Marxism-Leninism, as a live, creative, and developing teaching, cannot help but respond to this requirement. As everyone knows, until recently it related the complete and definitive solution of the problem of eliminating violence from society's life to the victory of socialism in the course of socioeconomic and scientific and technical competition between two social systems, to the withdrawal of imperialism from the historical arena as a source of wars and military conflicts. However, objective reality has made substantial corrections in these concepts, and the threat of destruction which hangs over mankind has made eliminating weapons of mass annihilation and excluding war, nuclear, as well as conventional, from the practice of inter-governmental relations not only an urgent task, but also an indispensable condition for survival.

Really, counting on military strength or the threat of its use acts as a catalyst for strengthening tension and confrontation. It constantly produces rivalry in the development and production of arms and leads to an increased level of balance of the parties' military potentials and, thus, to the gradual self-elimination of the restraining effect of military strategic parity. Combined with the growing acuteness of socioeconomic, humanitarian, ecological and other problems, which no state has the strength to solve alone, this signifies an accelerating crawl toward global catastrophe. Hence, the literally vital necessity of reducing the parties' military strategic balance to the lowest possible level, completely excluding nuclear and other types of mass annihilation weapons from this balance.

This also determines the direction of qualitative transformations in the content of the military aspects of ensuring security within the framework of the new model. Naturally, the significance and role of these

aspects will steadily decline in proportion to the expansion and strengthening of political, economic, international-legal, humanitarian and other aspects. At the same time, military strength, apparently, will remain one of the material means and important elements of the system for ensuring national and overall security for a fairly long time to come. In any case, the priority of nonviolent, primarily political ways and means of raising the effectiveness of this system not only does not exclude, but even presumes, especially in the initial stages of its creation, the presence of a military mechanism for blocking sources of aggression and preventing war. The armed forces of the parties are a link in this mechanism. While a military threat exists, they, developing in the direction of defense sufficiency, will directly participate in maintaining the necessary conditions for the development of other elements of the new model of security.

Toward Reliable Security Through Defense Sufficiency

Presently, concepts of *defense sufficiency* are being cleansed of past deformations and are being filled with a qualitatively new content. As everyone knows, until relatively recently these concepts were related exclusively to the readiness and capability of a state's armed forces to carry out active, aggressive actions. Today, defense sufficiency is interpreted as conducting all measures in the military area in strict accordance with the degree of real threat and the minimum defense requirements.

The solution of this task within the framework of the new model of security encompasses a number of inter-related spheres. The military-economic sphere includes the functioning of a country's minimum possible economic potential in the interests of defense and the implementation of a reasonable conversion of military industry. The military-technical sphere presumes concentrating basic efforts on directions of weapons and military equipment development which ensure the reliable solution of all defense problems with the least expenditures. The military-scientific encompasses the theoretical substantiation and development of specific qualitative and quantitative characteristics for reasonable defense sufficiency. The military-political stipulates steps to impart stability and predictability to the relations of states in the military area and to rule out the direct use of military force to achieve foreign political goals. The ideological sphere relates to shaping a defense awareness, free of the prejudices of military superiority and the "image of the enemy" complex. Finally, the strictly military sphere unifies the tasks of building armed forces capable of guaranteeing reliable defense.

It is hard to overestimate the political significance and role in creating the new model of security of the fact that all these aspects of defense sufficiency have found integral expression in *contemporary Soviet military doctrine*. It was formed, relying on the tenets of preceding doctrines that were proven in practice. Even before, our military doctrine was of a defensive nature, aimed at

defending the socialist Fatherland, and expressed the aspiration of the world's first socialist state toward peace. The basic tenet of Lenin's Peace Decree formed the foundation of the Soviet state's military policy and defined the content and orientation of doctrinaire directives.

A definite imbalance was permitted between the political and military-technical aspects of military doctrine in the course of subsequent military building. Whereas in the political respect military doctrine was always defensive and stipulated the rejection of military attack on anyone at all and, with the appearance of nuclear arms, of its use first, in the military-technical plane the emphasis was put on decisive aggressive actions in the event of a war unleashed against the USSR and its allies. It was assumed that the higher the Armed Forces' capability of such actions, the more solid the defense and less likely an opponent's attack. That is, the defensive orientation of the doctrine's political side in fact definitely contradicted the orientation of its military-technical side toward offensive actions. This contradiction is entirely eliminated in the contemporary content of our doctrine, put into effect in 1987.

The contemporary Soviet military doctrine, as a *system* of officially accepted fundamental views on preventing war, on military building, on the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for repulsing aggression, as well as on methods for waging warfare to defend the socialist Fatherland, is an integral result of a comprehensive, profound analysis of the current stage of world development. Its thoroughly defensive orientation is embodied in the principle directives to the effect that the building and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces are subordinate to preventing war, that the USSR will never, under any circumstances whatsoever, be the first to begin military actions against any state, has no territorial claims against anyone, does not treat any people as its enemy, and will never use a nuclear weapon first under any condition.

Our military doctrine was not only proclaimed, but also subsequently implemented. By this token, defense sufficiency as a *material element* of the new model of security is put into practice and acquires visible features. After all, it is entirely obvious that it is simply insufficient to proclaim one's adherence to the idea of disarmament and announce one's readiness to take this path. One must move along it toward the goal. It is also clear that such movement makes sense only if everyone participates in it. The new direction of movement is diametrically opposed to the former. Thus, someone must break the inertia, make a turn-around, and take the first step against the flow.

The Soviet Union has done this. Not only has it declared its readiness to reject the status of a nuclear power and remove the nuclear component of its own armed forces in the event, of course, of a similar step on the part of other nuclear powers, but it has also made responsible decisions that reinforce this declaration. We have begun

an asymmetrical reduction of medium- and short-range missiles. We have agreed to eliminate more missiles by a factor of over 2 (1,846:846), and more warheads by a factor of almost 3.5 (1,487:442). Today all Soviet and American short-range missiles have already been eliminated, as well as medium-range missiles destroyed under strict mutual verification: more than 70 percent in the USSR, and 50 percent of the missiles in the U.S. Thus, the process of practical nuclear disarmament has started. In order to reinforce it and make it irreversible, the USSR has decided by way of initiative to remove 500 warheads for tactical nuclear devices (aviation—166, artillery—50, missiles—284) from the territory of its Warsaw Pact allies by 20 December of this year. In the course of 1989-1991 we are prepared in general to remove all nuclear munitions from the territory of our allies, under, of course, the condition of a similar step on the part of the United States.

In order to expand the framework of the disarmament process, it was necessary to spread the nuclear disarmament which has begun to other types of weapons. That is why the Soviet Union has made a new, initiative decision to unilaterally reduce its own Armed Forces. Let us recall that in 1989-1990 their number was reduced by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 820 combat aircraft. By the end of this year already, over 7,000 tanks and a significant number of artillery weapons and assault-crossing systems will be removed from the effective strength of ground troops. More than 700 combat aircraft will be removed from the Air Force, and 40 fighting vessels, including 12 submarines—from the Navy.

Along with the reduction of troops and arms, the structure of the Armed Forces is being transformed in a defensive spirit. The number of military districts, armies and divisions is being decreased. The share of defensive systems is increasing due to the reduction in offensive systems. Operational maneuver groups, called "tank strike forces" in the West, are being eliminated.

The disposition of forces deployed in the territory of our Warsaw Pact allies is being changed. More than 50,000 men, over 3,000 tanks and a large number of other arms and equipment have already been removed. Of the six tank divisions planned for removal from the zone of direct Warsaw Pact and NATO contiguity, three have already been moved to the USSR. They are all being disbanded. At the same time, part of the strike aviation, landing-assault, assault-crossing and other subunits, intended primarily for offensive tasks, with arms and fighting equipment, are being removed from the troop groups. Meanwhile the general military divisions remaining in the territory of our allies are being reformed. A large number of tanks are being withdrawn from them: 40 percent from the motorized infantry divisions (their number is being reduced from 260 to 155 units), and 20 percent from the tank divisions (from 320 to 250 units). The divisions are being given a simple defensive structure. The disposition of forces in the East is also being changed. In the course of 1989, one tank

division and three air defense brigades were withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic, and an air division, air regiment, and a number of other units and subunits were disbanded.

Movement toward defense sufficiency includes radical changes in the *arms industry*. In the course of 1989-1990, its volume was reduced by almost one-fifth. A plan-regulated conversion is provided for: from 40 percent production for peaceful purposes in the general defense complex industry this year, to 60 percent in 1995. This year the production of high-concentration uranium for military purposes is being halted. In the course of 1989-1990, in addition to the industrial reactor for processing weapons-grade plutonium which was shut down in 1987, we plan to close another two such reactors without introducing new capacities to replace them. We have ceased to produce chemical weapons and are starting to destroy the reserves of them.

Our *military budget* is also being reduced to the common denominator of defense sufficiency. In 1987-1988, our military outlays were frozen, which signified their reduction by 10 billion rubles in practice, compared to what was stipulated in the 5-year plan. At the Congress of People's Deputies, a proposal was advanced to reduce military expenditures in 1990-1991 by another 10 billion rubles, i.e., by 14 percent. This proposal is being implemented. In 1990, 70.9 billion rubles were allocated for defense purposes, which is 8.2 percent less than in 1989. On the whole, the economizing on defense expenditures in relation to the approved 5-year plan amounts to almost 3 billion rubles—a sum approximately equal to 40 percent of our current annual defense budget.

In the defense budget structure for 1990, outlays for purchasing arms and military equipment comprised slightly more than 31 billion rubles; for conducting scientific research and experimental design work—almost 13.2 billion rubles; for maintaining the Army and Navy—about 19.3 billion rubles; for military construction—approximately 3.7 billion rubles; for paying pensions to reserve servicemen—2.4 billion rubles; and for other outlays—1.3 billion rubles.

Today, the *training* of the Armed Forces and all their activity are being transformed through the prism of defense sufficiency. The main efforts are concentrated on the qualitative mastery of defensive actions. In conformity with this, the programs for operations and combat training of staffs and troops, the service regulations, and other documents are being reworked and improved. The number of large exercises and maneuvers are being reduced and their scales limited.

Let me again repeat, these are all real, practical steps, in which our contemporary military doctrine and the concept of defense sufficiency are materializing. I stress this because to this day in the West, despite commonly known facts, some people are attempting to represent our doctrine as a kind of "propaganda measure," and its defensive nature as allegedly unconfirmed in practice.

The underlying reason for such fabrications is obvious: they are intended to somehow neutralize the improving influence of peaceful Soviet initiatives and specific steps in the area of disarmament on the international atmosphere, and to hinder the development of positive tendencies that have been noted in world development and in building the new model of security.

Of course, such attempts oppose the interests of the people and are doomed to failure. The pledge for this is the assertion of glasnost in international relations, occurring under the influence of restructuring in our country, and the joint development by states of a system of measures for *trust and verification* as an indispensable condition for shaping the new model of security. The experience in drafting the INF Treaty, the current talks in Geneva and Vienna, summit meetings, and developing contacts and ties between the USSR and the U.S., the Warsaw Pact and NATO, including in the military sphere, attests to the fact that there are no insurmountable obstacles on the path to solving even the most acute problems.

In proportion to the cultivation and enrichment of this experience, the framework for the system of measures for trust and verification could be expanded to transparency. It seems that *transparency* in the military, i.e., the maximum possible openness and transparency of interrelations, is capable of acting not only as a stimulant in shaping the new model of security, but, in the final account, to become almost a guarantee of the effectiveness of this model. After all, in this case the active participation of the people's masses themselves, who are objectively interested in not allowing war, in a nuclear-free, nonviolent world, will be ensured in solving defense problems.

Regrettably, we are forced to verify that the understanding of the need for a truly reliable model of security, arranged for everyone, based on defense sufficiency, is making its way with difficulty in the political and military circles of the West. In the United States, in particular, military expenditures are not decreasing and the implementation of virtually all prospective military programs is continuing. In NATO, on the whole, a significant increase of over 20 billion dollars was noted in allocations for military purposes—from 481.5 billion dollars in 1989 to 502.2 billion dollars in 1990. Re-equipment with the latest arms and military equipment for the bloc's armed forces and the development of their military capabilities is going on without halt. As before, the training of troops and forces is being conducted according to the concept of "nuclear terror" and to the doctrines of "direct opposition" and "flexible reaction," which are far from defensive in nature and are aimed not at sufficiency, but at military supremacy.

It should be entirely clear that the Soviet Union cannot but take all this into account in its own defense building, and was forced to worry about maintaining the Armed

Forces in a qualitative state which provides for sufficient and reliable protection of the peaceful labor and lives of the Soviet peoples.

At the Expense of Qualitative Parameters

The inclusion of the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the system of principles, tested in years of practice, including the civil and Great Patriotic wars, for forming our Armed Forces is one of the most important characteristics of the present-day stage of Soviet defense building. Naturally, the new principle is implemented in close interconnection with others, gives them a modern content, and has a quite definite political meaning for orientation toward *qualitative improvements* in the Armed Forces. Such an orientation, defined in the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the 1st Congress of USSR People's Deputies, proceeds from the overall strategy of revolutionary restructuring and the comprehensive renovation of Soviet society. It takes into account the specific conditions and tendencies of the contemporary military and political situation and the status and prospects for the development of military affairs, and coincides with the main direction of movement toward the new model of security.

In speaking of qualitative improvement in our Armed Forces, we refer not to replacing one direction of the arms race with another, not to cultivating the military might of the Army and Navy, but its *maintenance* within the limits of defense sufficiency, with minimal outlays at a level that guarantees reliable provision of security for the country. This was noted in the 2 November 1987 report, "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," by M.S. Gorbachev, who emphasized that so long as a danger of war exists, "henceforth we will do everything possible to maintain our defensive might at a level that excludes the military supremacy of imperialism over socialism."

The quantitative approach to solving defense problems has outlived itself. Whereas in the past it, being predominant in our defense building, enabled the Soviet Union, as already noted, to achieve military and strategic parity and to maintain it by way, as a rule, of symmetrical, "mirror" counteractions, this is now becoming ever more economically disadvantageous, politically unpopular and unacceptable, and ineffective in a strictly military respect.

A qualitative approach as applied to the *technical equipment* of the Armed Forces signifies a radical increase in the reliability of equipment and in its combat and utilization characteristics, unification and standardization, and ensuring a high maintainability and economy of production and utilization. As applied to *military science*, it presumes the accelerated development of scientific trends related to developing an integral concept for preventing wars, and of the construction, training and application of the Army and Navy in conformity with a defensive doctrine and within the

framework of the new model of security. As applied to the Armed Forces *staff*, a qualitative approach implies the creation of an organizational and staff structure and a system for cadre training and staff instruction and upbringing which will ensure the fullest implementation of combat capabilities and the effective performance of defense tasks with a minimum outlay of forces and resources.

The question of what the modern Armed Forces should be is central to their radical restructuring. The broad interest being displayed in this question is entirely natural. It is another matter that, under the guise of an "innovative" approach to solving it, incompetent opinions, for the most part counted on for outward effect, are often being expressed, including the "necessity" of rejecting universal military obligation and converting either to a militia system for organizing the Armed Forces, or to a mercenary army. From the viewpoint of military theory and practice, such suggestions, and we are witnesses that they are sometimes advanced in an ultimatum, destructive form, do not answer the current stage of our society's socioeconomic and political development or the alignment and dynamics of interaction among military and political forces in the world arena.

Thus, a militia system for organizing the Armed Forces presumes their configuration according to the *territorial* principle, in which all obligated citizens, militarily trained, are involved in service. Essentially, this is a quantitative, extensive approach to defense building. For this reason alone, it does not meet the requirements of the times. Given the present level of technical equipment in the Army and Navy, a militia system makes it impossible either to possess modern armaments, or to achieve the necessary coordination in the utilization and combat application of weapons which are crew-served in terms of their nature. The dislocation of militia units according to the place of residence of persons liable for service and their formation according to ethnic indications, to which, in particular, nationalistic and separatist forces in a number of regions in the country persistently appeal, will inevitably convert the Army into an organization objectively unable either to prevent or repulse possible aggression, or to protect a country as large as ours, with its enormous territory, long lengths of land, sea and air borders, the diverse density and multi-ethnic structure of the population, and the diverse military and strategic significance of one or another region.

As far as a *mercenary army* is concerned, calculations show that its maintenance requires additional outlays. Clearly, as applied to the specific socioeconomic conditions of our country at the present time and in the near future, such a system is of little use. However, besides the economic aspect of the matter, the spiritual aspect is of great significance. After all, as everyone knows, in a mercenary army the lofty concepts of military, patriotic and international duty are crowded out by material and caste interests. Finally, the configuration of reserves trained under a mercenary system does not guarantee the fulfillment of tasks for sufficient and reliable defense. As

far as professionalism is concerned, which supporters of a mercenary army frequently appeal to, practice shows that armed forces staffed on the basis of universal liability to service are not only not inferior, but even surpass it in a number of parameters.

The further development of our Armed Forces according to the Leninist principles of formation and their improvement as a multi-ethnic, extraterritorial, professional army, staffed on the basis of universal liability to service, meets the interests of protecting the socialist Fatherland. Such an army, being an inalienable part of the multi-ethnic Soviet people, guarantees the reliable defense of our Homeland—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Many, or rather, virtually all problems related to intensifying the restructuring of the Armed Forces and their qualitative improvement directly emerge on the *person*, his inner world, world-outlook and moral aspect. Implementing the directives of a defensive military doctrine and the principle of defense sufficiency is accompanied not only by the radical restructuring of technical equipment, organizational and staff structure, and troop training, but also a difficult, painful break with habitual views and stereotypes. A search is being made for contemporary, dynamic, live, effective forms and methods for organizing instruction and upbringing, and new approaches are being developed to solving old and newly appearing problems.

Obviously, the main thing here is to arouse and mobilize the political and practical activeness of every officer, ensign, and warrant officer, of every sergeant and sergeant-major, of every soldier and sailor, in directing their creativity and initiative along the track of practical solutions to the specific problems of restructuring. Precisely this is the key to the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces, to maintaining their readiness at the proper level, under conditions of broad-scale reductions and transformation of the structure and system for training troops and navy forces.

Substantial reserves, the introduction into work of which is capable of yielding a tangible acceleration in realizing qualitative parameters, exist here in terms of raising the level of organization, the universal assertion of regulation order, and strengthening military discipline. The processes of intensifying *democratization* and *glasnost* play a growing role in solving these problems. As practice shows, these processes lead to elimination of conditions for the appearance and existence of phenomena, alien to the nature of our army, to its collectivistic, comradely spirit, and to its traditions, above all, conditions such as non-regulation interrelations. They do not and cannot exist in places where the moral and political atmosphere in military collectives is determined by spiritual closeness between officers and soldiers, where the commanders, political bodies, and army and navy party and Komsomol organizations work in constant close contact with parents, school collectives, PTUs, enterprises,

kolkhozes and sovkhoses, or local party and soviet bodies, and where the individual approach prevails in the upbringing of staff.

The successful solution of the practical problems of restructuring and the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces depends to a great extent on the preparation of young people for military service and their disposition toward worthy, conscientious and honest fulfillment of military duty. There are many problems here, and recently many of them have been considerably aggravated. Efforts are being made by nationalistic, extremist, and separatist forces in certain regions of the country to undermine the authority of the Armed Forces, as well as attempts to lower the prestige of military service and to devalue in the social consciousness such sacred concepts, as military duty, responsibility for the fate of the socialist Fatherland, and readiness for its defense. Cases of discrimination against servicemen and members of their families occur in the allocation of housing, residence permits, and job placement, and there are cases of infringement of their constitutional rights. In some places, the matter has reached cynical acts of outrage upon monuments of battle glory and symbols of the Soviet Armed Forces and the USSR. The fact that attempts are being made of late to give an official nature to certain actions, contradicting the clauses of the USSR Constitution and Union-wide laws on the Armed Forces, the system for manpower acquisition, the procedure for spending military service, the organization of training youth for service, etc., evokes a feeling of alarm.

Serious flaws in the general physical preparation of conscripts and poor knowledge, as well as actual ignorance of the Russian language on the part of many, especially those joining the military system from the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, have a direct effect on solving the problems of qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces. Their number is growing. According to registration results at conscription units for citizens born in 1971, the number of young men who do not know or poorly know the Russian language exceeds 125,000. This is 20 percent more than last year. In this regard, it is easy to imagine how much this complicates the mastery of a combat specialty by young soldiers, the coordination of military subdivisions, the effective use of the most complex military equipment, crew-served by its nature, and of modern devices and methods for handling combat actions. After all, the representatives of 10-15 nationalities serve in each of our companies or batteries, and up to 30 or more—in a regiment or on a ship. On the whole, the sons of all—more than 100—nations and nationalities of the land of the soviets serve in the ranks of our officers' corps and in the combat ranks of the Army and Navy. It is entirely obvious that without a common language for interethnic interaction,

the role of which is played by the Russian language, the Armed Forces cannot effectively function or perform the tasks facing it.

Active work is being organized and done in the Army and Navy on the interethnic upbringing of soldiers and their unification into a single harmonious family. The processes, including negative, which take place in interethnic relations in certain regions of the country are being taken into account in this work. The commanders, political bodies, and party and Komsomol organizations are striving to ensure an equal and even attitude toward soldiers of all nationalities. Subject assistance is being given to those who know the Russian language poorly. All of this is yielding results. However, it seems very important that work being done in the Armed Forces be more closely linked to the activity of school and national education bodies, labor collectives, and party and soviet bodies in local areas. This would enable us to know, not from hearsay, not from frequently incompetent and unobjective publications, the problems that exist in the Army and Navy and to participate in their constructive solution.

The restructuring of Soviet defense building and the USSR Armed Forces is being conducted on the basis of Leninist ideological and organizational principles, along the track of our society's revolutionary transformation. In renewing all aspects of the life and activity of the Army and Navy, it ever more fully reveals their moral and political potential as a socialist military organization. The Soviet Armed Forces, in developing according to a defensive doctrine and the principle of defense sufficiency, in acquiring a new quality, is becoming an ever more flexible, coordinated, mobile, and technically equipped combat organism possessing a firm unity of views, will and actions, which relies on the all-round support of the people and draws spiritual strength from its heart. This is the guarantee of reliable defense and security of our country.

The creation of a nuclear-free, nonviolent world, proposals on which were formulated by M.S. Gorbachev in his well-known January 1986 declaration, and of the new model of security—not by developing arms, but by reducing them—requires sustained, goal-oriented, and responsible work. The subsequent practical steps by the USSR in the military area, which are being implemented in the context of the new political thinking, have tremendous significance for ensuring its results. They serve so that the new model of security begins to acquire specific vital features and gradually becomes a real factor in modern world development.

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IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, SEARCHES

Time of Changes

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[Article by S. Kolesnikov and G. Cherneyko]

[Text] 1989 was a year of radical changes in the socialist countries of East Europe. We have all seen how, under the pressure of popular energy, stiffened forms of political life were destroyed, habitual concepts were exploded from within, qualitatively new social structures were created, how new leaders appeared while changing the previous generation of leaders, and how the image of the party, which for so many years has acted "in the name and on the orders" of the toiling masses, has changed. The masses themselves have gone onto the proscenium, introducing everything usually related to a truly mass movement into the tempestuous political life: hope and pain, romantic enthusiasm, the bitterness of memories, a spirit of freedom, and a sobering by reality which does not come simply.

The chronicle of events in East Europe, which have accelerated sharply in recent months, is well-known. Let us recall only a few landmarks in these processes.

June 1989: As a result of defeat in the elections, the Polish United Worker's Party was deprived of a factual monopoly on power. A coalition government was created on the initiative of "Solidarity," which has started the evolutionary process of transformation on the basis of the interaction of all basic political forces.

October 1989: The Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Congress decided to found the Hungarian Socialist Party, which should synthesize the values of the socialist and communist movements. A strategic goal was proclaimed: democratic socialism. The country's parliament is amending the constitution to legalize a multi-party system. Preparations have begun for free democratic elections.

October-November 1989: A new leadership is chosen in the German Democratic Republic. The first breaches were made in the Berlin Wall, which has symbolized the "closed nature" of the socialist model for over a quarter century. The Socialist Unity Party of German [SED] is preparing for an extraordinary congress.

November 1989: The Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum decided to change the higher party leadership, guilty of the appearance of a crisis in the country.

November 1989: Vatslavskaya Square in Prague was filled with people. People are demanding changes. The Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat are submitting their resignations, so that the Central Committee Plenum will be able

to choose a new party leadership, relying on the trust and support of the working people.

What are the reasons for such a tempestuous, "explosive" development of events? Are they identical for all countries where processes of change are unfolding? Is this a testament to the instability of socialism, so zealously predicted by the West, or the consequences of subjective errors and a confluence of political circumstances? Finally, what are the processes of renovation in East Europe—a factor in the destabilization of such a shaky structure of postwar peace or an integral part of the progress of civilization? Right now, it is quite difficult to give exhaustive and simple answers to the multitude of natural questions.

Today, world socialism is choosing its path of development and adapting to the present day, to the requirements of the latest stage of the scientific and technical and technological revolution, and to the rates and quality of progress. It is adapting to those changes in production forces, which for now are only a tangent undertaking in our society, having allowed the countries of the West to advance considerably ahead in everything relating to structural shifts in economics, to the new type of interconnections for science and industry, to new forms for providing material well-being for people, giving an opportunity to "humanize" daily existence. Computerization, the new quality of life, biotechnology, commodity abundance—all these achievements of modern civilization should be the property of all peoples. Jumping through the invisible barrier separating different "technological ages" and organically joining in world-wide processes is, perhaps, the leading impetus for the changes in the European (and not only European) socialist countries.

We should also add a certain important element to this, incidentally, one well-familiar to us. Overcoming the "plank" of modern scientific and technical progress, erected over time to a dizzying height, is an way out to a level that meets the requirements of socialism, a return of dignity, and the eradication of national humiliation. In this regard, the sentiments of the former "workmen of Europe," who amazed the world with modern machine tools and provided shoes to a significant share of the European population, the pride of the residents of the "second Paris," ruined during the last war, are close and understandable to us. Along with the citizens of the first worker and peasant state in the German land, we cannot help but ponder the differences in the standards of living for people of the same nationality, separated by a demarcating line. The time has come to answer these difficult questions. They must be answered directly and frankly, without dogmatic "cyclicity," but also without nihilistic extremism.

History was arranged such that mankind undertook to solve the new tasks of a global, civilization-wide nature in the period in which the world of socialism had approached the most complex and difficult boundary of its own sociopolitical development.

The socialist countries, each to a greater or lesser extent, are surviving the crisis. There are many reasons for the "creep" into such a condition. These may be of either an objective or subjective nature, and may have both general, as well as ethnic roots. However, the most important reason is the neglect of the Leninist thesis that "triumphant socialism is impossible without implementing full democracy" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 253).

The crisis is a withering of the old and the torturous, painful birth of the new. This crisis of a model, foisted on countries by dogmatic structures of power, is at the same time a revival of the socialist idea, cleansing it of errors and deformations and returning to its democratic and humanistic values.

Apparently, words of repentance would be appropriate here, if only because we owe the theory and practice of Stalinism for too many of the deformations that distorted the lives of peoples in neighboring countries, for the unthinking copying of the command-administrative model, and for blindly re-writing the imaginary "laws" of socialism. The thrusting of our own shortcomings was not always, far from always, ill-intended. Conversely, it was often done with a sincere certainty of their necessity, with the best motives. At times, it was introduced into the living flesh of national life with the help of close advisors, under a reliable shield of battle armor. However, at the same time, precisely this repentance gives us hope and a right not to identify the crisis of an obsolete model and of structures which have outlived themselves, in the heat of the moment, as a crisis of the idea of socialism itself, which has its deepest roots in its European home.

Today, we are beginning to realize that the need for diverse forms of development for every social system is a natural and objective law. As M.S. Gorbachev recently noted, building a society according to one model, one mold, even if it is a question of a single kind of social system, is a dangerous dead-end path, as experience has shown. Every society should mature for radical changes itself, and every people itself determines what it needs and how and where to go. Otherwise, there can be no healthy international relations.

On the one hand, the reforms in the socialist countries are a natural process of the self-improvement of socialism and, on the other, an integral component part of mankind's progress, of the combination and mutual enrichment of diverse social experience. Realizing the need for renovation has become an imperative of the times. Leading political forces in many socialist countries have made this appeal. After all, today the speed of the movement of social awareness is so great that delay may end up being equivalent to defeat.

The transformation processes are unfolding in their own way in each country. Their irregularity and contradictory nature depends on the extent of the society's maturity, its readiness for changes, and the status of the subjective

factor—the capability of political parties to determine a strategy and tactics for protecting and renovating socialism on time. Hence, the specific features in approaches to implementing reform. Each party is seeking its own path, taking national conditions into account. The party reformers are united in that they are proceeding in their work from a need to implement, along with profound economic reforms, a restructuring in politics, in the social area and in the spiritual sphere, and to build a rule-of-law state.

Here, a feeling of the times, the ability to begin the always-complex, sometimes torturous process of reform in a society of self-renovation, takes the foreground. There is one alternative here: either "catch up" with the processes of spontaneous activation of the masses, which have gone out of all control whatsoever, and roll in the waves of political passions, or initiate the changes ourselves and stay a step, a half-step ahead of swiftly developing events, directing them along the path of social progress.

The Hungarian reformers have made such an attempt, radically transforming the image of the party and making corrections in its programmatic goals. There are many problems on this path. Far from everything is going as outlined by the October Hungarian Socialist Party Congress. The new party structures are taking shape with difficulty. The first step in the pre-election marathon is being made with even more difficulty, in keen competitive struggle with opposition forces. On the other hand, the reform plans often meet with misunderstanding on the part of the honest and sincere people who devoted decades of their lives to the struggle for the ideals and the building of socialism. Division takes the foreground more often than consolidation. However, having started out one day along the path of change, it must be followed to the end. The more so, since in this case the party has the responsibility of trail-blazer.

Recent difficult experiences, above all that which occurred in Poland, have taught the socialist world a great deal. The present-day tasks of the Polish communists include: restoring the shaken trust in the party, creating conditions for uniting the values of leftist forces, the worker's movement and commonly understood socialism with the new directions, taking contemporary realities into account, and preserving the maximum number of party members, rallied not by force of order, but by unified ideological will.

The PZRP Congress which opens in January 1990 will answer the question of the party's future, of what it will be. Preparation for the congress has already started with divisions in the party and the isolation of different factions. The "July 8 Movement," for example, gravitates toward sociodemocratic tendencies and embraces the traditional values of leftist forces: pluralism, free elections, protecting the rights of the individual, aid for the weak, and a sensitivity to the offended. This faction has declared a need to create a new party for democratic socialism. There are also other platforms, which deny the

possibility itself of economic privatization (or apply it only to family workshops), strive to unite the "face of hired labor," and place the values of "classical" communist ideology in the foreground.

Time will show who will find a place in the process of reform. Defining its own position with regard to the changes that are occurring and the party's tasks under the conditions that have been created, the October PZRP Central Committee Plenum made the following resolution: "In critically evaluating past experience and making conclusions from party resolutions that have radically changed, keeping in mind the results of the party-wide survey, the Central Committee is in favor of carrying out profound changes for the purpose of creating a new party—the Polish Democratic Socialist Party for Leftist Forces. This party should be able to draft promising programs and to define current tasks, to represent and protect people who live by their own labor. This should be a party which can be a motivating force for commonly understood leftist forces, which will strive to win the trust and support of society and to oppose the pressure of right-wing forces."

Today, that which is being accomplished in the GDR is fully part of the framework of the process of renovation that has unfolded in the socialist countries. The 9th SED Central Committee Plenum, at which changes in the party leadership occurred, has become an important landmark in its reorganization. The plenum declared the communists' decision to act in the interests of renovating socialism and of the country's gradual development.

The complication of internal problems, a lack of desire on the part of the former SED leadership to submit them to society's court, and the lack of opportunities for other parties in the Democratic Bloc to play a more noticeable and constructive role in the country's life have destabilized the political situation in the GDR. Voluntarism and dogmatism predominated in economic administration for a long time and the decisions made were based not on precise economic calculations, but on approximated estimates, while eyes were closed to stagnating factors. Every year, the more the atmosphere in the country worsened, the party and state increasingly lost the trust of the citizens, who in fact were alienated from participating in solving topical social problems.

Direct contact with the masses, tolerance of dissidence, the desire to understand and find points of contact and to draft a general platform—today all these have become distinctive features of the style of party work.

The dialogue between the SED and the citizens of the GDR is of a truly mass nature. The party Central Committee has openly acknowledged that the party leadership is responsible for the situation that has taken shape and for the people's loss of trust. Precisely this sober self-assessment has enabled the SED to keep its role as the country's leading party and to achieve definite successes in regaining lost positions for itself.

A party should be, in the full meaning of the word, a unifying social force, a genuine factor for national unity. This approach was asserted in the programmatic speech at the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum by its general secretary, Petr Mladenov. The party's task is to promote building a self-managing civil society. It declared: restructuring in Bulgaria is being considered solely and exclusively within the framework of socialism, in the name of socialism, and on the path of socialism. Daily, if not hourly, the buttresses of the command-bureaucratic system are shaking loose, yesterday's idols of administration are collapsing, society is freeing itself of the deformities of corruption and nepotism, and injustices permitted in previous years are being corrected.

The aspiration to overcome the crisis of trust in the party also motivated the participants in the extraordinary plenum of the CZCP Central Committee, which elected a new leadership. The authorities should not resort to force to solve one problem or another: all the difficult experience in the history of socialism in Czechoslovakia reminds us of this. The CZCP is overcoming the rigid stereotypes of the past and beginning a public dialogue on the basis of mutual respect for everyone interested in the country's fate.

History has again faced communists with the task of making a choice and, united with other democratic organizations, leading the people. However, at the present stage this task is complicated by past mistakes, errors and inconsistency. Although the processes of social renovation are proceeding on the whole in a favorable atmosphere, for now there are a great many difficulties and factors which restrain normal development. These include not only the open resistance from opposition forces, acting on someone else's scenarios. Indeed, the parties themselves are not always on top of the situation. Life as shown that society suffers great losses in such cases. A formal, purely "verbal" proclamation of a course toward renovation is even more dangerous for it: firstly, because stagnant phenomena continue to intensify and the crisis is aggravated, and secondly, the people's disbelief in the possibility and capability of the party to lead society along a path of radical change is strengthened.

The role of parties under the complex conditions of social renovation were illuminated most lucidly. Concerning the work of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, for example, the Yugoslavian journal DANAS writes that the authority of communists has never dropped so low. The party has retreated in all areas. It is even interpreted as a direct hindrance to transformations, and its leading bodies—as the main destabilizing element. Weakness, indecision, and half-hearted actions inevitably evoke the people's distrust in such leadership and lead to dissatisfaction not only with the existing orders, but also with socialism as a system.

Yet, after all, precisely the parties provide the main guarantee that gradual change will be implemented

within a framework of socialism. They are obligated to the people to draft a specific program of actions and unite the revolutionary forces of society in the name of socialist ideas. Active dialogue with the people, support of any valuable initiative "from below" (including from the party masses), and a calm attitude toward the broad spectrum of opinions in discussing and solving the most significant problems—this is the only possible path for parties which strive to keep for themselves the right to be the social vanguard.

Open pluralism in political life is the reality of the current stage. The diversity of social manifestations has radically changed the nature of the work of parties and their organizations. Rejecting the leading role, monopoly, and power is the most important decision made by the parties under the conditions of the processes of renovation that are developing. Today, we must not lead "from above." We must go along with the masses and lead them so as to most accurately reflect their interests and moods. Today, a place in the political system must be won anew. The directive style of party work has faded into the past. Political cohesion is impossible in a pluralist society. We must not level the different movements which want to keep their own faces, but seek out points of contact with them, developing a flexible mechanism for interaction in the name of lofty humanistic goals. Here is the sphere for applying the party's abilities to meet the requirements of our day.

The party will keep its competence only if it finds ways and methods to establish partnerships with other political forces. Whereas in past years the bloc, so-called allied parties played a fairly passive and essentially purely formal role in drafting the strategy and tactics of social development, today they are filled with a desire to expiate their guilt before those whose interests they were called on to protect.

A typical sign of the processes of democratization in a number of East European countries is the appearance of opposition associations (fora), which include a broad range of political forces acting for changes. These movements are appearing along with already-created parties or those still taking shape, which at one time actively operated on the political scene. It is evident that differentiation, or more precisely, the definition of political positions and social biases still lies ahead. Meanwhile, the socialist forces are still faced, as a first priority, with the task of attracting to their side not only the active, most radically minded part of society, but also the passive masses, vacillating and disoriented in the complex upheavals of political opposition.

Thus, the vanguard parties of the socialist countries are solving a two-part task today: firstly, not to be left behind the "train" of civilization-wide processes, behind the progress of the intellect and accelerating technological revolution. Secondly, a more local, but no less topical problem: not to be left behind the rate of development of

social awareness in their own countries, behind the growing politicization of the masses. The fate of socialism depends on this.

Yet another aspect must be touched on in speaking of events in East European countries. This is the international context of the processes of renovating socialism. A typical expression was seen recently in the NEW YORK TIMES. "Behind these events," the columnist writes, "lies something greater. A hope has appeared that America itself will be freed from its own great fear: the fear of communism, which has haunted American society for so long, distorting its laws and casting a shadow on American democracy."

Even in the recent past, relations between East and West in Europe were reminiscent of religious wars. Each side was prepared to annihilate the other merely because it preached different views. Now, the time of great ideological opposition is coming to an end as we recognize the requirements of our day and the community of civilization, the priority of common human interests. A counter-movement has begun, with each of the sides preserving its sovereignty and authenticity. This is a specific feature of the shifts that are occurring.

However, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, "the rate of changes in the East is clearly outstripping the necessary changes in the West. This is because some people there still hope in vain that the processes in the socialist countries will lead, they say, to their conversion to the position of Western values. However, ideological cyclicity in inter-state relations should not prevent realistic policy."

Reality cannot be forced. The East and West must adapt to each other, and not jump through stages, which would threaten chaos: Soviet policy proceeds from such premises. Everyone's approaches should change, both on one, as well as the other side of the border. Today, we reject the concept of a "two-pole" world and do not consider the increasing diversification and rejection of the false "cohesion" of the socialist "camp" to be a factor in destabilizing international life. The processes of democratization and renovation can and should be combined with the maintenance of stability. The changes incorporate profoundly positive principles, but also reveal many attendant factors. Contributing to everything positive and eliminating that which interferes with the normal development of renovation processes also means ensuring stability both within individual countries, as well as in world affairs.

The swift events of recent times have truly crucial significance both for establishing genuinely equal relations among the socialist countries and for their political vanguards. If we look without prejudice at the revolutionary transformations that are changing the face of socialism, one cannot help but notice that they are developing along the track and under the direct influence of Soviet restructuring. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the CPSU and the Soviet Union are again, as in past

years, thrusting their own approach to solving the imminent questions of contemporaneity on other parties and countries. The world community is becoming increasingly convinced that no doctrine exists for restricted or otherwise limited sovereignty, and there are no satellites obediently revolving around a great power, just as there are also no paternalistic aspirations to suggest to others the direction of movement, the choice of forms and methods for work and leadership, and ways for further development.

Every party and every country is independent in its actions, free in its evaluations and decisions made. However, this does not exclude their increasing interest in each another. This is understandable. After all, it is a question of the processes, common to all, of renovating socialist society, of cleansing it of errors, deformations and distortions. It is a question of the qualitative improvement of the mechanisms for cooperation both within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, as well as in the context of building a Europe-wide home.

The changes persistently require eliminating the political and ideological stereotypes which, in the course of many years, were inherent in publications telling about the life of the socialist system. Here is a typical letter from the editorial mail to *KOMMUNIST*: "Let me ask you to illuminate in your journal just how the events of recent times in the GDR correspond to the theses set forth in the article by E. Honecker, 'Loyalty to Revolutionary Behests' (*KOMMUNIST*, No 14, 1989)? Impartial!..." (S. Alekseyev, Krivoy Rog). It seems, the events of which we are speaking answer this question themselves. The parties are subjecting their recent past to strict analysis and are revealing the causes of stagnation, making it possible to more fully investigate what is happening, to give trustworthy assessments of one or another event (including 1953, 1956 and 1968) or political leader. Priority in such assessments should belong precisely to the fraternal countries, otherwise we risk falling into the sin of paternalism which we have condemned, the sin of praising or reproaching along our own viewpoint. This has already happened, and there will be no return to it.

Precisely this approach guided the Soviet government, which supported the viewpoint of the CZCP Central Committee Presidium and the government of the Czechoslovak SSR on the unwarranted and erroneous nature of the entry of the armies of five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In conclusion, an episode which is, perhaps, of a personal nature: One of us recently happened to catch a fragment of a television report in a Budapest hotel. Emitting puffs of asphyxiating smoke, tanks were deployed in the crowded streets of the old city, and mountains of rags and papers burned along the sides. Automatic gun bursts could be heard... The famous Hungarian director Marta Meszaros was filming a new movie on the dramatic events of 1956.

This was what was striking: it was only after several tortured seconds that he managed to catch his breath, after realizing that it was a matter of cinematography after all. How deeply seated in us is the anxiety that the tragedy of violence not be repeated! He then thought of something else: a feeling, which had already become habitual in the few years of restructuring, of freedom and of certainty in the impossibility of halting the eternal aspiration of the peoples for renovation and progress. Recent events in the countries of socialism reinforce this certainty.

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NOTES IN THE MARGINS

New Story of the Pied Piper

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[Article by A. Ulyukayev]

[Text] We are opening a new rubric in which we propose responding to articles in other publications which evoke a need in us to explain and express our own point of view.

As the readers know, with the beginning of restructuring, *KOMMUNIST* refrained from direct participation in public polemics. There were reasons for this, above all of an ethical nature. We proceeded and do proceed from the fact that it is not fitting for the journal of the CPSU Central Committee to use the tone of direct criticism, remembered sadly by several generations of Soviet people. *KOMMUNIST* quite definitively spoke out against well-known resolutions on questions of ideology and culture, having disavowed and condemned their obscurantist spirit and protective function, and has voiced its opinions on a number of sharp socioeconomic and political problems and questions of history and of contemporary internal and international development.

However, today the development of social existence and consciousness has crossed to a new stage, in which an ever broader circle of questions about our past, present and future is being drawn into the orbit of talks and discussions. The polemic does not always remain within the framework of scientific correctness and conscientiousness. It is impossible to remain silent and decline to express our opinion in such a situation.

The letters to the editor also convince us that such specific conversation is needed in the journal. The readers increasingly more often, sometimes rather sharply, ask why we do not respond to this polemic that is occurring in the periodical press. This is a just criticism.

The "Notes in the Margins" rubric will contain materials which differ in terms of content, nature, and genre. They may be authors' or editorial articles. Of course, we invite our readers to participate in it.

Since we were wee children, we know the sad old fairy tale of how a piper, promising to rid the city of Hamelin of rats, enchanted and stupefied the children with his melodies and drew them away from their paternal home, away from their native city: nobody knew to where or for what. Sociopolitical history attests that at crucial times, when social and ideological stability is giving way to searches for the new, pied pipers appear first here, then there, gathering listeners and whistling new, and sometimes old melodies for them, sometimes achieving success, manipulating the emotions and passions of people, especially the "humiliated and insulted," now and then even pushing them on a path of destructive adventure.

The words to these tunes may be different. So long as they hypnotize the people. Black and white magic, racial and ethnic exclusiveness, the search for enemies of the people, and all possible revelations and promises, promises, promises... Common to them all are claims to have the last word in truth, messianism, a simplified explanation of complex problems, aggressiveness, and hope for miracles. This is always dangerous. It is most dangerous of all, perhaps, when the existence of society and the socioeconomic foundations for its existence and development become the object of shamanism. Of course, one can understand the pipers. Or rather: the modern listener's ear is open not only to hypnotic melodies, but also to the entire polyphony of human civilization. A strict ideological diet replaces a real choice of ideas and concepts. Not spells, but arguments, proofs and live thought enter the price. How can this be endured!

If the essence of the changes in our society were to be expressed briefly, it is a movement from utopia to science. Our great teachers took this thorny path in their day. The "change of our entire viewpoint toward socialism" was an important landmark in it. Domestic social science suffered this path, which sometimes became a pilgrimage, having left by the wayside entire generations of philosophers, economists, and sociologists, some expunged from among the scientists, others from life.

Now, when the process of studying and realizing the true state of society, of groping for ways to modernize socialism, has begun, suddenly the doors of ice-houses are opening and letting out the "bracing" breath of the "Short Course" and "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," paving the "snow paths" for a backward movement from science (albeit, for now, half- or even quarter-science) to utopia, and then to anti-utopia.

Of course, of there are definite views and ideas in society and they should be expressed. Scientific explorations must be made in all directions. However, after all, science is research, doubt. Yet, in this case it is rather a question of claims to true faith, from which one cannot separate, of attempts to monopolize Marxism, having "loved" it to death.

The pied pipers obviously can no longer endure sitting out and waiting for a cold snap. For years they have waited, and will. They are descending on the sinful land,

landing their "limited contingent" with unlimited ambitions, and appropriating for themselves the "high name of people's protector," the more so since now it is in no way associated either with consumption or with Siberia. True, it is unclear who authorized them to do this, who handed the proud banner over to them or handed over anything in general. Have they not nominated themselves, not given their blessing to themselves?

How many of them are there, to where are they driving? What do they want, what do they reject, to which mansions do they lure us? Let us try to find out. Well, there is material for this: a number of publications grant them their pages fairly extensively. Articles by A. Sergeyev in *EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI*, "Problems of Renovating the Economic Theory of Socialism and the Conceptual Variants of Radical Restructuring" (1989, No 3), "From Today to Tomorrow or the Day Before Yesterday?" (1989, No 9), and A. Salutskiy's talks with him under almost the same title, "Tomorrow or the Day Before Yesterday?" (and with the very same, sometimes even literally, content), in the journal *"NASH SOVREMENNİK"* (1989, No 10) and with Yu. Vorobyevskiy "A Million in the Shadow of a Ruble" (*SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*, 24 November 1989), stand out in particular.

So, what do they criticize, how do they steal away their listeners and readers? A penetrating, vigilant glance immediately spots the frightful face of the enemy in the nights of restructuring (*EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI*, No 9, 1989, p 121). Suddenly, we identify it: a phantom is wandering the Union, the phantom of capitalism. How does a doctor of economic sciences recognize it? Quite simply: a plutocracy is forming in the country (the term, incidentally, is not new, used especially heavily in the Germany of 1933-1945), a strata of new "Soviet Burovs"—millionaires and multimillionaires, whose accumulated capital is no less than 500 billion rubles! That is, it is noticeably larger than the state budget of the country or its internal state debt. Why 500, and not 600, 800, or 1000? It is simple enough to write zeros. The author himself does not bother with any kind of argument or proof whatsoever. Why?

The claim that 3 percent of the depositors have concentrated 50 percent or even more of the sum of deposits in the Savings Bank has become commonplace. Recently, in an article, part of which was read on television, A. Sergeyev raised it to 80 percent. Who has more? It turns out that, per capita of "ours," there are about 230 rubles, but per capita of "theirs"—about 30,000, or more by a factor of almost 150!

People are already clenching their fists, someone's hand is already reaching for a cobble-stone, the weapon of the proletariat, in order to send it right through the window of a plutocrat, and there are already broad-shouldered Robin Hoods ready to shake the millionaire who has gone too far.

No, no! Our author asks that a protest be entered in the minutes. No anarchy whatsoever. Only strict order, determined by the healthy class sentiment: "Although some may not like it, the working people love to 'count the money in someone else's pocket,' because it is their, not someone else's money" (EKONOMICHSKIYE NAUKI, No 9, 1989, p 127). The logic is superb: "And just who are they, in your opinion," as the famous lover of counting the money in others' pockets, M. Panikovsky, said.

The author calls the percentage of depositor-plutocrats an absolutely precise fact, which "no word-mongers whatsoever" are in a condition to refute. I cannot call myself a word-monger, although I would very much like to. However, the authenticity of this fact must be proven. Here is its story. In the early 1970s, a study was made of a large share of deposits in the Latvian SSR Savings Bank. This far from representative study was first (1975) reported in passing, in literally two lines, without any of the details standard in sociology whatsoever (who was surveyed, when, method of study, etc.), in the extremely low-circulation theses of reports at a scientific conference held in Riga, and was later repeated in the journal EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIYA PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTVA (No 6, 1982, p 122). The publication drew attention to itself. Without references to it, figures of 3 and 50 percent appeared variously in articles, ever freer from all stipulations of the study. In turns, the indications of its degree of representativeness, the limited nature of the time frames, the application to only a single republic, and the length of years, which considerably changes the situation, faded away. Finally, a genuinely deceptive figure was illuminated in all the colors of righteousness. Now one small thing is lacking: the steady play at raising it—80 percent, 90, 100...

Data has long been available on the entire Union for the distribution of savings according to the size of deposits. They can be read in a solid newspaper with a circulation of almost a million (EKONOMICHSKAYA GAZETA, No 32, 1989, p 16). They contrast strikingly with the figures being quoted. If we impose the Savings Bank data on the structure suggested to us (3 percent—50 percent), it turns out that in fact per 3 percent of the "fattest" savings-accounts (let us recall that in his "conceptual" article in EKONOMICHSKIYE NAUKI A. Sergeyev writes precisely about the number of savings-accounts), there are far from 50, even less so not 80, but only about 20 percent of the deposits. Fifty percent of the deposits are concentrated not in 3 percent, but in about 13-15 percent of the savings accounts, and 80 percent of deposits—in approximately 40 percent of savings accounts. As we see, there is a difference, a big one. However, why call attention to facts, if they do not suit a convenient scheme!

There is other interesting analytical information, prepared from data of statistical studies at the end of 1988 and published in IZVESTIYA (24 October 1989). The overall sum of deposits by workers and members of their families is 125.6 billion rubles (42.3 percent of all

deposits), and their average size is 1,503 rubles. The sum of deposits for office workers is 81.8 billion (27.5 percent, and an average size of 1,515 rubles. The sum of deposits for kolkhoz workers is 35.2 billion (11.9 percent), and their average size is 1,758 rubles. The sum of deposits for pensioners, students and others is 54.2 billion (18.3 percent), and the average size is 1,408 rubles. Do these objective data also follow the line of the "word-mongers?"

It is interesting that, in the original publications, having no political context whatsoever, the sums of deposits were correlated with their number. In this sense, A. Sergeyev's articles have complete pluralism: he first attaches his favorite 50 (80) percent of the sum of deposits to 3 percent of the number of savings accounts (deposits), if this is in a scientific journal, but if it is in a mass publication, he easily switches to depositors. Those who refer to him as a serious economic authority use depositors quite willingly.

They are trying to make a mountain of a molehill, but no matter how one blows, a soap bubble will burst in full accordance with the laws of nature. It is even sadder when entirely responsible comrades, including even party officials, build their political programs on a foundation so slippery with soap.

Without a doubt, the "absolutely predominant number of Soviet families live 'from paycheck to paycheck'." Or rather, they would like to live that way, spending their wages and receive the necessary goods. The fact is just that they are far from always able to acquire goods against this wage and are therefore forced to delay their demand until better times. So, it sits in the form of Savings Bank deposits or "cookie-jar" savings. However, everyone is waiting for better times.

What kind of better times, what kind of roses has the author of the articles readied for us? He has several prescriptions stored up. (Generally speaking, the decisiveness that S.N. Parkinson noted in several doctors is inherent in him. Not troubling themselves with examining the patient, they write a prescription right then and there.) Its essence is that we must immediately and rigorously conduct a monetary reform. He claims that its main meaning is not economic (overcoming deficits, inflation), but social—the same noble impulse to count the money in someone else's pocket. Our doctors also see a boundary, up to which incomes are from labor, but beyond which, from deceit. In some publications this is 5,000, in others, 10-15,000 rubles.

How is this determined? They do not burden themselves and others with any computations whatsoever. Therefore, we can only guess at the solidity of their estimates. In defining the limits of labor incomes and savings, do they proceed from the size of a professor's salary? That is, that up to 500 rubles per month is from labor, and anything beyond that is plutocratic? In any case, the typical confusion between the amount of income and its nature exists here. Could not 1,000, or even (frightful to

say) 3,000 per month be earned? It could. It substantiates the literally 24-hour labor of the "Arkhangelsk muzhik," an inventor's sleepless nights, the nervous tension of an enterprising proprietor, or the drama of ideas that is the work of a true scientist. Yet, even 50 rubles could be from entirely non-labor sources. Here it is a matter, as is so often the case in life, not at all of quantity, but of the quality, nature, and genetic code of this money. The same enthusiastic supporters of these foundations, with unaccustomed ease, herd the bribe-taker and "shop stewards" into the same millionaire's cell with the academician, hero, sailor, or carpenter.

However, what is it like for someone who, for instance, worked in the North, dreaming of an automobile or other miracles of modern engineering, but really ends up with calluses and a trade-related illness and cannot spend his earnings? They did not wait for him at the market with this money. What is it like for lessees? Do they want to work thus, while they still know how? Do they want to feed those who previously assigned them an earning barrier, beyond which they could leap?

They rush to pacify us: everything will be fine, if he can prove the labor origin of income. That is, he is assumed guilty! Competent agencies do not have to prove the non-labor nature of their income, yet we have to prove the labor nature. How? By showing our calluses? Is it up against the wall for those whose hands, God help them, smell not of fuel oil, but of scarce soap? Are they guided by the progressive experience of the not-unknown General Galliffet who, after suppressing the Paris Commune, ordered everyone whose hands smelled of gun powder to be shot?

Indeed, the practice of tax declarations is accepted throughout the civilized world, and we should not lag a step behind. This is reasonable. However, there are many serious problems on this path which must be discussed and resolved. Precisely the Western practice attests to the fact that a mass of methods exists for hiding income, for evading tax and financial inspection. There are experts and an whole consultative literature on this account. Do we really think that our "millionaires" will be less inventive here, than across the ocean! Yet, it will not be easy to provide the working person with all the necessary reference aids.

The delusions are different. However, it is really, truly too much to confuse the development of a tax-assessment system, of accounting for the movement of incomes and property, with a "revolutionary" step such as monetary reform, some talk of which suffices to entirely derange a monetary system, which is none too solid without this, or to definitively collapse the consumer market.

Unfortunately, the myth that monetary reform is of benefit to the working people and a blow to shady dealers has a special hypnotic force. Meanwhile, analysis of the historical experience of the 1947 Reform, of archived letters of contemporaries to central institutions, and of

the report memoranda of the minister of finances and the chairman of the board of the State Bank at that time attest to the contrary. An unforeseen monetary-commodity fever, the mass purchase of goods, large-scale manipulations with cash-in-hand and savings banks deposits accompanied the reform, which was accomplished, seemingly, in deepest secrecy. The panicked dumping of money, the buying-up of anything and everything, entirely upset the consumer market. This worked in favor of the "shady dealers." As everyone knows, it is easier to catch fish in troubled waters.

The pipers of all times imagine the horrors of enrichment and accumulation. Call the guards, they exclaim. Do away with poverty, and you do away with honesty. They shout this not in their own name, but in the name of the people: the "working people expect," the "working class will not accept." All categorically, without a shadow of doubt.

The song of honest poverty has been sung for decades. A particularly sonorous verse was sung in the late 1920s. The most famous puritan and outstanding moralist of all times and peoples was choir leader at that time. He thundered against those who called people to "enrichment," i.e., to a decent wage for good work, to economic incentive, considering the material interests of the working people, who strived to obstruct the ideologically supported robbing of the peasantry. Then, a method was developed: expose the tie between these foul claims and the Western wind, the noxious influence from abroad. Once again: "...Above all, the active work by Western Sovietology, its attempt to ever more seriously influence Soviet social science, is obvious" (EKO-NOMICHSKIYE NAUKI, No 3, 1989, p 39).

In past times the only way out of this worthy position was a preventive strike against both the hands that which reached out for earnings, and against the heads so vulgarly thinking about it. They struck strongly against the supporters of the slogan "enrich yourself," so strongly that we have not come to our senses to this day.

However, what about this makes the author of the articles so indignant? Are we cheating? Is he, it turns out, fighting the whole time to "let the workers earn" in the next few years?" Yet, to do this must we reject "any increase in output norms, reduction in price, and a mass reduction of tariff categories?"

That is, we will count the money in some pockets, but in others—not on your life! However, how do we distinguish "clean" from "unclean?" What if one person works on equipment from the "times of Ochakovskiy and the conquest of the Crimea," while another works on equipment recently purchased with hard currency? In order to purchase it, money earned by the sweat of their brows was deducted from both! Yet the profit in productivity, and hence in salary, goes to the latter. However, after all, matters are no worse for the other in terms of his share of calluses. From whom should we take and to whom should we give?

Of course, we must let the working people earn, or rather, not keep them from doing it. Except, we should not do it by way of the notorious averaging, but by creating conditions for real economic independence of enterprises, by eliminating obvious and hidden earning ceilings, and by encouraging secondary employment. Moreover, it is not, after all, a question of nominal, but of real incomes. The point is what and how much a working person can buy for his ruble. Letting him earn means halting inflation, coping with the overall scarcity, strengthening the consumer market, and not permitting a further depreciation of the worker's ruble. One can print a great deal of paper, except one will not be satiated by this.

What is with us, to be obsessed with the despised metal? Let us consider policy. The author of the articles under consideration also includes a good portion of the crystal-clear class approach in it, entirely unexpectedly taking it onto the highway of political pluralism and a multi-party system. It seems, objective conditions have taken shape here for "two parties: *communist*, reflecting the interests of the working class and kolkhoz workers, as well as the scientific and technical (above all factory) intelligentsia (in another place he also adds "a Marxist-oriented social sciences intelligentsia," whose orientation will, of course, be determined to the personal compass of the colleague.—A.U.), and an *anti-socialist* party, socially based on the new private owners-exploiters and, so to speak, "the intellectual bourgeoisie" (the part of the intelligentsia in favor of converting to a capitalist way of development)" (EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, No 9, 1989, p 125).

Strongly and brilliantly stated! So, you see a golden (bourgeois!) tablet before you with the inscription: "Central Committee of the Anti-Soviet Party of the Soviet Union," and a list for paying membership dues, where the columns total utterly millions and billions, and a malevolent Program, according to which the present generation of Soviet people will live under capitalism.

Who is in this party? Approximately as follows. The exploiters are: S. Fedorov, V. Postnikov, M. Bocharov. The intellectual bourgeoisie are: N. Shmelev, A. Aganbegyan, G. Lisichkin, Yu. Levada, and T. Koryagina (A. Sergeyev personally makes this recommendation in his articles).

Understandably, the pipers themselves and their unswerving followers, as well as those whom they decide to consider workers, kolkhoz workers and the factory intelligentsia, are part of the "Communist" Party. The last detachment is especially interesting. There is no such beast in nature! The intelligentsia is not a category in a trade and skills reference. It is neither factory, nor institute. It is a person's intellectual and ethical state. It depends not at all on geographical, professional or official circumstances. There are as many cases as you please, where a lathe operator is an intellectual, or an engineer, although there are also as many, where he is not at all.

So, if our highly esteemed colleague has announced the creation of his party, let us see how he does with tablets and cornerstones. Here is a short summary of that which the interviewer (EKONOMICHESKIYE NAUKI, No 3, 1989) gracefully calls "conceptual considerations."

1. First and mainly, of course, "counting the money in someone else's pocket." Well, this is understandable, we cannot get around it.

2. The "absolute necessity of restoring and developing the collectivistic principles of production." To restore, it is then a question of the principles that existed in the "good old days" and will now, it seems, disappear when restructuring strikes up.

A. Sergeyev explains what he intends to restore. First, a plan-organized central economy. We will not bore the reader, once again proving that in our planned centralized economy not a single 5-year plan has been fulfilled, but in a number of cases has led to an increase in disproportions. Specialists have already investigated this question in detail (KOMMUNIST, No 18, 1987; No 6, 17 and others, 1988).

Second, universal employment in combination with equal payment for equal labor results. (Is this good? It is not bad, answers Comrade Stalin). Not bad is not bad. However, why *restore* this? After all, for a long time our right to work signified a right to socially useless work, the purposeless transfer of natural riches that are being exhausted without this, with which many were so "fed up." If the product of such labor (according to estimates by associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences TsEMI, this is up to a third of all social labor) is simply unneeded by society, payment for it is a deduction from payment for someone's socially necessary labor. This means that part of the latter is unpaid. This is exploitation. How can this be? Are we dividing into "clean" and "unclean" here? Who is more fed up, and who less so? Indeed, in general, universal employment must be distinguished from per capita, which masks concealed unemployment: the right to work, or the right to any work, including ineffective and useless, which is simply harmful.

Third, general availability of housing: It would be especially interesting to hear about this from those who have been waiting about 15 years in lines and are still waiting for it, often having less than the 3 square meters per living soul that are allotted to the dead. Nostalgia for these times, for communal collectivism, when "everyone lived alike, so modestly, with a corridor system and only one lavatory for 38 rooms;" the aspiration to "restore" them will hardly find sympathy among the majority of our fellow citizens.

Finally, let me quote two Leninist expressions on the subject. Let the reader evaluate them himself. "One need not fear that the petty bourgeois and petty capital will grow. One should fear that the state of extreme hunger, need, and insufficient food will continue too long..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 84). "...There is no proof that 'collectives' have it

generally better. One should not tease the peasant with false communist boastfulness (*ibid.*, vol 45, p 44). These were said in 1921 and 1922, the period of "changes in our entire view of socialism." Oh, to shout! Oh, to enroll in the intellectual bourgeoisie! It is curious that, generously quoting Lenin, our pipers never look further into the "memorable year of 1919."

3. "The development of the whole system of production relations should be forecasted and planned." This, according to A. Sergeyev, means that, first, we should repudiate the thesis of "equality of rights and equivalence of all multi-faceted forms of property, exclusive of use," and we must "restore" the leading role of state centralized property. Second, the "incomes of cooperatives should be restricted by a defined coefficient to the average wage in the state sector," and the sphere of their activity should be gradually switched to food production and the production of certain kinds of raw materials. However, after all, we already have various kinds of raw material than anyone else in the world. It is not it, but the final product, ready for consumption, that is sharply lacking. Why forbid cooperatives to build housing and roads, to repair household appliances, to sew shoes and clothing? The effectiveness of their labor and quality of the goods and services, the customers' satisfaction, and not speculative coefficients, should determine incomes. Third, we should solve the question of the future of the lease form, its growth into large collective socialist or into large capitalist industry. However, why can't small collective or individual industry be stable? After all, this exists in world practice, including that of socialist countries, and we do have developments by our outstanding scientists—Chayanov, Makarov. Most likely, one cannot agree with everything here. So, let us discuss, let us experiment. We need not rush a red light.

Any perspective up into the details (forms of activity, coefficients) is already, it seems, known. Everything has been weighed, measured, and added up. One need not direct attention to Engels' famous statement to the effect that the people of the future will be no more foolish than we, and there is no need to give them specific instructions. No more foolish than Marx and Engels, or more foolish than certain adherents and hypothesizers who clearly aimed to depict them on their own daily calendars with ordinary Marxists, to mint, like coins, a set of model quotations.

4. In order to achieve a means worthy of these grandiose goals, we must single out in the structure of the national economy a "strategic echelon, functioning in a special plan-centralized mode" (the same administrative-command armored train that sits on the siding, but is there, is there in case someone changes the points!). Its task is to ensure the organization of planning and management, the allocation of resources, the disposition of funds and limits (what bracing words!). Well, we have done this. The tremendous network of informants in local areas, the branched system for bringing information to the Center and processing it, the passing by the Center of the sole correct decision, its immediate

delivery to local areas, efficient fulfillment, the reaping of abundant fruits, and only one problem: how are we to build so many storehouses and granaries, in order to fill them with the unprecedented harvest?

Oh, if only there were no frost on the flowers! If only we knew how to distinguish reliable information from unreliable (a class approach? Staunch commissars disguised as false bureaucrats?! If only there were control, we must establish control. And control over the control, etc., etc. In order to assess the reality of such control, let me remind you that the range of products being produced now comprises more than 24 million items. The document circulation, going through the Gosplan system alone, includes billions of various forms and reports.

5. For dessert—"reducing the prices of consumer goods, of all goods and services." This is our way. Not only was there, it seems, a time when prices decreased, but there will, there will be!

True, the sceptics and grumblers from the "intellectual bourgeoisie" will in no way understand, how to let them earn, i.e., how to increase payment for labor, to guarantee full employment in its usual form, which means, all material and labor outlays, and in this regard also reduce prices and production costs? What else can we take from them? It was said: strengthen the centralized principle. What else!

Well, let us assume that we will find a magical means, some sort of special collectivistic pill that will force everyone all together to work well, to manage economically, making surplus labor socially necessary and reducing outlays of labor and materials. However, after all, they tell us that the whole cost should be reduced, i.e., the profit as well. This means, in the first place, that the heroic efforts of collectives to economize and to raise labor productivity will not be materially encouraged. Although, between the lines it implies raising wages. However, if this does not come from profits, it will be included in production costs. Yet, this hinders reducing the latter. Second, the state budget income will drop. How in this regard does A. Sergeyev intend to "restore" or even keep free education, health care, and housing? At the expense of what will he maintain his "strategic echelon?" It is incomprehensible. If we exclude the socioeconomic miracle of which he is a great enthusiast, only the tested method of increasing the budget deficit remains. That is, we must reproduce inflation, devaluation of the ruble, and savings, unsupported by goods, but ardently seeking them, on a broad basis. This, of course, will not bother A. Sergeyev. Undaunted, he will suggest what to do: strengthen centralism. This is the persistent refrain of all his works.

We are not opposed to centralism, although we interpret the center quite differently.

It seems to me that some people interpret the political and ideological (even if informal for now) center to be precisely themselves. To this attest their attempts to monopolize Marxism, their claims to act as the sole

solicitors on matters of the working people. Well, restructuring has given everyone, including their opponents, an opportunity to wage political struggle, an opportunity to prove themselves within it. We must only be aware that this is precisely a political struggle and that ambitions, supported by hypnotic gestures, are present.

To call things by their own names, we are dealing with an attempt to create an ideological basis for a political party, aimed at utilizing the inevitable difficulties of reform as yeast for their own pies. For some, the pies seem attractive. Here is the problem: The filling is inedible. We have had our teeth sunk in it for decades, and only broke them. I hope the wisdom tooth is still whole.

One last remark: Possibly, the reader will notice a certain sarcasm of tone. There is no need to justify it—it is a requirement of the genre. Let me remind you of Marx's words to the effect that mankind happily parts with his past. Yet, the melodies of pipers are exactly the past. Maybe, not so well forgotten, as one might wish, but, I hope, irrevocable. Relics, cast by the wave of glasnost upon the shore of Renewing Socialism, of socialism, which, regardless of anything, should take the difficult path from utopia to science; to well-being; to democracy; to freedom; to real humanism.

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SOCIAL PROTECTION

'Zone' Open to Criticism

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[This is the last work of the late Professor Nikolay Alekseyevich Struchkov, RSFSR honored scientist, doctor of juridical sciences, who passed away suddenly in November 1989]

[Text] The time of restructuring makes it possible to look at a great deal in a new way, including our country's corrective labor institutions. Attention to the work of this area of justice is more than justified on the track of democratization and legal reform, especially against the background of the sharp growth in crime and overall worsening of its characteristics. Many critical opinions have been voiced about the work of the corrective labor system. The main one reduces to the fact that punishment in the form of imprisonment and the corrective labor institutions which implement it rarely correct anyone, but rather quite successfully "re-forged" a relatively harmless law-breaker into a consummate scoundrel. Is this true? If so, why? Obviously, these questions cannot be answered simply, and a great deal requires comprehensive evaluation.

The Past and Its Legacy

Possibly, on the verge of the 16th-17th centuries mankind made a fateful mistake, having chosen imprisonment and jail as the main means of struggle against crime, most likely because nothing else could be found to oppose crime. The Soviet state created in 1917 found the prison system, almost untouched by the Provisional Government, a customary method, as though it stood to reason in itself, for influencing criminals. The use of a similar system under the new conditions was quite definitively instructed: "When the revolutionary class wages struggle against propertied classes which offer resistance," Lenin wrote, "it should suppress this resistance; we will suppress the resistance of the propertied with all the means, with which they have suppressed the proletariat—no other means have been invented" "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works]. Vol 35, p 136). However, it was a question of using the attributes of a prison system, not the system itself in its previous, untouched form. Therefore, early in 1918 the RSFSR NKYu [People's Commissariat for Justice] collegium bureau was already faced with the task of carrying out a broad reform of prison work. The Soviet state took the indicated path, which abounded with difficulties and contradictions.

Perhaps, the most important of these was the virtually simultaneous appearance of an extraordinary system of places of imprisonment, brought into being by the circumstances of counterrevolution and civil war, and the establishment of a truly new system for implementing punishment, corresponding to tasks raised after October.

The compulsory extraordinary system of places of imprisonment included concentration camps and forced work camps, to which the VChK and revolutionary tribunals sent persons who represented a threat to the Soviet system, in accordance with the VTsIK resolution of 17 February 1919. At this time, the prisoners were highly mixed: counterrevolutionary criminals and people who had committed so-called general crimes (speculators, deserters, card sharks, drug pushers, those convicted of official crimes, etc.), interred for the "entire duration of the revolution" or "until special dispensation," prisoners of war from the Civil War fronts, and others.

Gradually, many camps lost their exclusive nature and were joined to the overall prison system of the NKYu and the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs]. However, the idea itself of the camps, which arose under extraordinary conditions, continued to live. Each was embodied, for example, in the organization in 1923 of the Kholmogoro-Pertominskiy OGPU camps in Arkhangelsk Province, which were moved to the Solovetskiy Islands the same year. The Solovetskiy camps became infamous for the severe experiences which fell to the lot of many people: from representatives of parties that did not support the October Revolution and White officers, to ordinary criminals and declassé elements.

However, the development of a system for implementing punishment under the conditions of the Soviet system did not appear on this path. Above all, its legislative foundations were laid. The first legislative act containing a system of standards for implementing punishment was the 23 July 1918 temporary order of the RSFSR NKYu, "On Imprisonment as a Measure of Punishment and the Procedure for Serving Such." The aspiration to reform the implementation of punishment was graphically manifest in the fact that the instruction outlined a deviation from the traditional place of imprisonment, jail, which was given the second name of "general place of imprisonment." New institutions were commissioned: reform schools for young criminals (a form borrowed from the United States) and experimental institutions for persons, with regard to whom there were grounds for indulgence in conditions or for early release. At the end of 1920, the People's Commissariat of Justice passed a new legal act, the Resolution on General Places of Imprisonment, in which there was no mention of jail in general.

In a certain sense, the creation of the new system for correcting those sentenced to imprisonment was summed up in passing the first Soviet law on punishment, the RSFSR Corrective Labor Code of 1924. The code introduced a differentiated system of prisons, which made it possible to apply humane measures for encouraging the correction of convicts who yield to this. These include the agricultural (farming), as well as trade or factory colonies which appeared back in 1918, and the transitional corrective labor homes for persons who had displayed their reform and thus proved that they could live under semi-free conditions.

This line for shaping the new system of punishment corresponded to Lenin's instructions, which he gave in "Synopsis of the Section on Punishments in an Item of the Program on the Court." Lenin thought it necessary to have more suspended convictions, to apply social censure more, to replace imprisonment with mandatory labor under house arrest, to switch from prisons to upbringing institutions, and to expand the practice of comrades' courts (*ibid.*, vol 38, p 408). These ideas were reflected in the Program, passed by the 8th Party Congress in 1919.

Of course, not everything that took shape in the early 1920s is suitable now. Nevertheless, precisely at that time a foundation appeared, on which the Soviet system for correcting and resocializing people who had committed crimes could be developed. However, this was not to be. On the malicious irony of fate, the OGPU camps, created beginning in 1929 and which in fact continued to exist (as NKVD-MVD camps) until 1960, were also called corrective labor institutions.

A great deal has been said and written about these camps. People remain who served and worked there, and some who went through it as prisoners have survived to this day, including dispossessed kulaks, repressed "enemies of the people," people who received groundlessly

long terms of imprisonment as plunderers of socialist property according to the law of 7 August 1932, and many others.

The former employees and former prisoners of the camps evaluate them differently. The former usually emphasize that a legal basis existed for their functioning, as the higher leadership displayed a justified strictness and exigency for the slightest deviation from orders and instructions, be they violations of the norms for prisoner allowances or arbitrariness. The latter recall that these instructions were purely a formality and easily circumvented, and that arbitrariness regarding the entirely rightless prisoners, who were considered little more than "camp dust," was a daily and constant phenomenon.

Indeed, the camps had a legal basis: the USSR TsIK and SNK resolution of 6 November 1929 changed Article 13 of the "Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics," which stipulated imprisonment in corrective labor camps in remote areas of the country, and the "Resolution on Collective Labor Camps" was approved by a USSR SNK resolution on 7 April 1930. This resolution was an open document. It contained entirely acceptable formulations regarding the legal status of prisoners; the whole series of instructions was sufficiently humane; prisoners were permitted to work in institutions, enterprises, works, and even in administrative posts, and residence in dormitories near labor projects was allowed; the right existed to go beyond the camp borders. However, the same resolution, namely the departmental documents, contained provisions which denied, above all, the "enemies of the people" many of the rights that prisoners could enjoy.

There are full grounds to assert that the camps were an indispensable component part of the repressive machine that began operating at the turn of the 1920s-1930s. The mass executions of people guilty of nothing was added to by sending an enormous number of people to places of imprisonment based both on court sentences, as well as on the decision of special councils, "troykas," and "dvoykas," and from lists which the NKVD prepared and Stalin and his assistants approved.

The camps became part of the economic system. It is typical that F. Dzerzhinskiy, in a note to I. Unshlikht on 16 August 1923 and in a number of other documents, voiced the idea of creating camps to solve national economic tasks by way of convict labor. With the formation of the camps, Dzerzhinskiy thought it possible to reject the death sentence. In a letter to Stalin in 1928, N. Yanson, RSFSR People's Commissar of the RKI (shot in 1938, posthumously rehabilitated), suggested using the labor of prisoners to develop remote areas. Camps were created for the construction, through the efforts of prisoners, of canals, roads, industrial projects, mining minerals, and logging in the Extreme North, the Far East, and the taiga.

Everything was subordinate to "economics." Feeding the prisoners strictly depended on the fulfillment of

development norms, which were in fact beyond the strength of people who had lost their health as a result of cruel investigative interrogations, the transport stages, diseases, the prison and camp "soup," exhausting labor, and a badly organized way of life.

The already-noted insufficiently definitive nature of the resolution norms and direct departmental instructions led to the extensive arbitrariness of the camp administration. Hence, the cruel and cynical neglect of prisoners' rights, the degradation of their human dignity, and the mockery, which predominantly fell to the lot of "enemies of the people." All this occurred against the background of a criminals' union that had become almost universal, and later also of fascist accomplices of the camp leadership, which unleashed its hands for mass cruelty and sadism.

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that not only the Stalinist repressions and not only the cruel treatment of wrongly convicted people, who generally did not deserve any punishment whatsoever, were criminal. The entire system for operation of the camps and the entire structure of relations in them was defective. The Stalinist camps should go down in history as one of the most terrible circles of hell of past repressions, which inflicted irrevocable damage on socialism and social morality.

For justice's sake, we must nonetheless admit that in the 1930s the ideas of the corrective labor codes passed in the 1920s had not been entirely extinguished. Attempts were made to preserve some sort of legality, to create a system of corrective labor institutions subject to other, non-camp procedures. In a number of Union republics, the drafting of new corrective labor codes was started, but they were passed in far from all republics. They proclaimed the idea (in those years!) of creating corrective labor colonies as basic forms of places for imprisonment with humane methods for treating convicts. However, the operation of these codes was restricted considerably and their instructions were replaced by the requirements of NKVD-MVD departmental acts.

The 1950s: Toward New Legislation

In 1954-1956, the camp system received simple official censure. A decision was made to eliminate the corrective labor camps, frankly subordinated to solving production tasks to the detriment of reforming convicts. This decision was implemented over several years; colonies became the basic form of corrective labor institution; society began to take some part in the correction and re-education of convicts.

However, the main thing which characterizes the mid-1950s, above all, is the adoption of measures aimed at the subsequent restoration of legality to the sphere of preliminary investigation, court activity, and the implementation of punishment. Gradually, new corrective labor legislation took shape. In July 1954, the USSR Council of Ministers passed a new "Resolution on Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies." This was a fundamentally important step: the departmental regulation of

the implementation of punishment, which reigned from the mid-1930s to early 1950s, was replaced, true, not yet by a law, but nonetheless by an act of a higher body of state administration. The Council of Ministers approved the "Resolution on Corrective Labor Colonies and Prisons of the USSR MVD" in 1958. The documents proceeded from the fact that the basic form of corrective labor institution is the corrective labor colony.

Whereas the camp was a system of places of imprisonment related to labor projects and was intended on the whole to solve large national economic problems, the colony, as an independent institution, was faced with the task of ensuring the correction and re-education of convicts on the basis of their involvement in labor and educational work.

The searches for a new, more humane and effective system for implementing punishment continued in the 1960s and 1970s. New normative acts were passed, the main idea of which was the ever greater removal of imprisonment conditions from camp procedures. In 1963, a new form of place of imprisonment was introduced—the colony settlements for people "firmly established on a path of reform." These were already, to use international terminology, open-type corrective labor institutions. In 1964, conditional release from places of imprisonment was introduced for convicts who had started along a path of reform, for jobs in constructing national economic enterprises, and in the 1970s—the suspended prison sentence with mandatory involvement in labor. Resolutions on observational commissions were passed in the republics at the end of the 1950s and 1960s for the purpose of promoting and organizing society's participation in work to implement punishment.

The developmental logic for legal regulation of the implementation of imprisonment stipulated the formulation in 1958 of the question of creating a Union criminal-executive law—the "Bases for Corrective Labor Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics." However, the Bases were passed only in 1969. The corrective labor codes of Union republics were developed and passed in 1970-1971. These documents, with the changes and additions introduced in the 1970s-1980s, are in effect to the present day.

Thus, a legislative basis was formed for a new system for implementing punishment, making it possible differentiate influence on convicts of different categories for purposes of their reform, to treat them according to their legal status, established by law. Although it also stipulates entirely natural restrictions on rights, at the same time it proceeds from an intolerance of arbitrariness, mockery, infringement of human dignity, and causing physical and moral suffering.

Indeed, changes have occurred. Nonetheless, the implementation of criminal punishment, as before, suffers from considerable faults. There is an explanation for this. A successfully drafted law is one thing, but the

practice of its application is often quite another. It is precisely in the practice of applying corrective labor legislation that the old, "camp" views have had their effect. In particular, the incompleteness of the transformations started by N.S. Khrushchev, his own return in a number of matters to old positions, and mainly, the highly tangible attempts in the stagnant times to resurrect that which they had begun to reject in the too, alas, brief period of "thaw," contributed to this. The restoration of legality was to be formal in many ways. As before, criminal proceedings were instituted against citizens illegally, prisoners were often treated according to old methods in places of imprisonment; the old camp traditions were still alive, and new ones took shape. Mass repressions had faded into the past, but the persecution of dissidents continued.

The Present Day: Facts and Evaluations

Today, evaluations of the work of corrective labor institutions can be found in almost all newspapers and journals. These are articles by journalists, interviews of leading MVD employees, and letters from citizens, who have, above all, in one way or another encountered investigative isolation wards, colonies, and prisons. Facts are cited, as a rule, the results of personal observations.

The state of affairs in the modern corrective labor institutions is not without grounds for being evaluated highly negatively, above all because our system of punishment is insufficiently humane. True, in appealing for a display of humanism and mercy with regard to convicts, people often forget about those who suffered from the crimes, sometimes suffering irreplaceable losses. Nonetheless, humanism with regard to the criminal is not caprice, but the imperative of a society which is reforming itself. Understandably, it cannot be unlimited. Its limits, expressed in certain restrictions of rights, are established by law. Firstly, these limitations are established for purposes of the normal functioning of corrective labor institutions and for ensuring the safety of everyone involved with it and order, without which lengthy habitation in a closed space by a large number of people with, as a rule, asocial (and anti-collective) mentalities, often with a not entirely healthy psyche, is impossible. Thus, the internal order of a prison or colony, with its strict regulation of all aspects of life, unquestionably restricts the desires and habits of everyone who ends up there (which is why many convicts interpret it as an infringement of their rights).

Secondly, the property of punishment is realized in the limitation of rights. Placing the convict in prison in isolation from society is already, in itself, a substantial restriction of rights. However, the seriousness of isolation is increased by restrictions on the acquisition of food items (in addition to the existing monotonous and meager ration), in receiving parcels and transmissions, in correspondence, etc. Obviously, all this is necessary, if only to ensure a differentiated approach to convicts and

a possibility, depending on their behavior, to change the number of rights granted them.

Another question arises: What is the nature and optimum amount of these restrictions? We must openly say that in many ways they reflect the old, "camp" approach to convicts, when people thought more about their isolation, rather than their re-education, when it was thought that the more forbidden during imprisonment, the better. They were not in the habit of thinking that a number of restrictions lead to a break of useful ties to the "will." Even today, such an approach hinders the rejection of many "traditional" restrictions. To this day, restrictions are established through comparison with previously existing restrictions, arbitrarily, one could say, or in any case, with an absence of any serious scientific criteria whatsoever. Yet, we must have such criteria. They could be drafted through the joint efforts of physicians, psychologists, teachers and jurists.

Many publications about places of imprisonment at times categorically speak of the unsuitability of the cadres working to reform convicts, above all, their low moral level, lack of culture, absence of necessary knowledge, negligence, callousness, and even cruelty. Such simple assessments require object investigation.

Unfortunately, there are ignorant and dishonest people among the employees of corrective labor institutions, as everywhere. The approach to convicts which was characteristic of the camps is far from eliminated. Judging by the official statements of the appropriate leading officials, they know about this and understand the situation. The system is being expanded for training cadres not only with secondary specialized, but also with higher education. Specialists from the national economy, party and soviet bodies are arriving in the service. However, in view of the enormous size of the corrective labor system (it now contains about 800,000 convicts and no one can guarantee that this number will not increase, since crime in the country is growing without restraint), the cadre problem cannot be solved all at once.

We should approach the evaluation of corrective labor cadres with consideration for yet another circumstance. This is the make-up of the convicts which, especially now, after the 1987 amnesty, and when the courts are applying punishment in the form of imprisonment very sparingly, is very complex and dangerous. The share of those convicted for serious crimes comprises more than 60 percent. The proportion of those convicted for premeditated murder among all those serving imprisonment is 11.5 percent; for premeditated infliction of serious bodily injury, 10.1 percent; and for robbery—6.5 percent. Many are distinguished by aggressive behavior toward other convicts and toward representatives of the administration. Whereas 15 seizures of hostages were committed by convicts in prisons in 1988, there were 35 such seizures already in only slightly over 5 months of 1989. Over the last 3 years, more than 300 employees of

corrective labor institutions and officers and soldiers of internal troops were attacked, of whom eight people died and 130 were wounded.

We must remember that very dangerous murderers, robbers, rapists and thieves are placed in corrective labor institutions. It is not easy work to be in their environment, to spend one's service in corrective labor institutions, located hundreds of kilometers from cultural centers and urban civilization, constantly aware of the danger of attack or seizure. Is there not in this, in addition, reasons for the violations of legality and the rights of prisoners, for crudity with regard to them? Cases of serious professional and moral deformation among corrective labor institution employees are frequent, and the lower the general educational and cultural level of the employee, the stronger it is. This serious problem should, at last, become the object of first-priority attention on the part of psychologists and jurists.

The factual domination, which exists in a number of prisons, of the most dangerous segment of convicts, defeated by the criminal subculture, of "thieves in the law," over the remaining segment of people serving their punishment, evokes particular alarm. In such institutions, true power belongs to the criminal world, not the administration, which is "switched out" of the system for influencing convicts. However, it is even worse when the administration, in order to achieve a sham well-being at work, enters into contact (often silent, without special agreement) with the criminal "authorities" for purposes of maintaining order in the corrective labor institution. Perhaps, the main reason that corrective labor institutions unsatisfactorily solve the problem of reforming convicts lies in these circumstances and, moreover, the fact that they have earned a fair evaluation as "crime schools."

This situation is intolerable. The "closing" of representatives of the administration with professional criminals who are serving their sentences, which is expressed, besides the above, in the supply to the latter of alcohol and narcotics, permission for illegal contacts with the outside world, etc., is a betrayal of official duty, a treachery requiring severe accountability. However, organizational measures are needed too: the use of all permissible actions, aimed at breaking up criminal groups of convicts, at establishing constant, 24-hour surveillance over the prisoners, wherever they may be, and the exposure of people guilty of oppressions and reprisals. Room-by-room isolation of those serving punishment would be of considerable help in this. Since it is impossible to do this immediately, it is thus necessary to organize a surveillance service, particularly using technical means, so that the administration will always be informed about the situation existing at any point in the institution, and would be able to control this situation and take timely steps.

However, no matter how difficult and dangerous working in corrective labor institutions may be, it is necessary to simply demand from their employees, with

no provisions whatsoever, humane treatment of convicts, exclusive of mockery, intentional degradation of dignity, beatings, arbitrary rule in general, and arbitrariness expressed both in illegal deprivation of convicts' rights, as well as in granting them uncalled for or undeserved privileges.

The necessary exigency toward employees of corrective labor institutions should also be reinforced by a concern for them. The number of convicts fluctuates, and in past years its reduction automatically entails a reduction in cadres. Is it not more reasonable to pursue the example of certain socialist states, for example the GDR, in which with a reduction in the number of convicts the empty places of imprisonment are put up for capital repair and re-equipment, preserving the necessary number of personnel for handling this task? We should provide the real protection of corrective labor institution employees from any encroachments on their lives and health. Finally, the conditions for working in corrective labor institutions, if one does not add the dislocation of the latter to this, requires improving the working and living standards and raising the official salary scale for associates.

What Next?

Currently, legislative work is being done along the track of legal reform and in the struggle against crime. A draft "Bases for Criminal-Executive Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics" is being prepared, which is proposed to replace the existing "Bases of Corrective Labor Legislation." The norms of this law are called on to contribute such that convicts stop being a danger to society and, moreover, not only that they not break laws, but work and be of benefit to the country, to their dear ones, and to themselves.

To do this, while serving punishment, as well as upon release, convicts should experience sociopedagogical influence, the content of which should be determined by the latest achievements of sociology, pedagogy, psychology, the theory of social management and, of course, law. In connection with this, we must note that the procedure and conditions for implementing punishment in the form of imprisonment according to law presumes the use, as a basic means of reforming and re-educating convicts, of the regime, socially useful labor, political upbringing work, and finally, general educational and professional or technical training for convicts.

The above-listed means of influence are legally regulated to a varying extent. The regime, as a juridical institution that signifies the strictly regulated internal order of a corrective labor institution, is almost entirely regulated by legal norms. It is also possible to regulate labor conditions for convicts sufficiently fully. As far as political upbringing work, general educational and professional and technical training is concerned, the law can stipulate only a few rights and responsibilities for the convicts from the viewpoint of their daily behavior (conditions for watching movies and television shows,

attending classes in school and for mastering a production specialty, release from work, provision of free food during exams, etc.).

Organizing convict labor requires economic knowledge, but upbringing, training, and even inclusion in labor processes requires pedagogy and psychology. Somehow, pedagogical work is being carried out. Essentially, there is no psychological service in corrective labor institutions. It was introduced only in upbringing-labor colonies for teen-agers, and meanwhile it will still be a long time before saturating the whole system with specialists and before we have professionalism in this work. Here, it turns out that corrective labor policy (as it is reflected in legislation), in terms of its content having an obvious inclination toward the upbringing of convicts, is essentially deprived of the possibility of doing this task. Apparently, this may also be a reason for the low effectiveness of implementing punishment in the sense of achieving the goal of reforming convicts. Unfortunately, prison employees often strive to "re-educate" a convict by depriving him of his right to a regular meeting, putting him in a penal isolation ward, etc. Understandably, it is easier to "take steps" against a violator, than to painstakingly observe him on a daily basis, analyze the information and, through humane and merciful treatment, patiently remake the person and eliminate his faults. True, organizational defects are telling here as well: in fact, the head of a detachment is in no state to work scrupulously with every convict, when there are a hundred, or sometimes even more, convicts for each!

From the first years of Soviet power, social useful labor has been acknowledged in Soviet theory and practice as the basis for re-educating people who have committed crimes. Precisely then, it was emphasized that the participation of convicts in labor should solve the problem of self-support for places of imprisonment, which seems fair even now. However, in those long-past days, the country was in a state of ruin, joblessness reigned, and labor in general, any kind of labor, was considered a way to educate a new person. Today the situation is different and the existing law stipulates the convicts' obligation to work. In this regard, not only their ability to work, but also a specialty, as far as possible, should be taken into account. From considerations of the maximum involvement of all able-bodied convicts in labor, of granting it a stable nature, and of ensuring funds, raw materials and orders in the 1960s-1970s, the USSR MVD included the production activity of corrective labor institutions in the country's national economic plan. It was thought in this regard that, by participating in solving state-wide problems, the convicts would assess the significance of their own labor and thus experience an additional positive influence.

However, in fact it turned out that the fulfillment of production tasks and a plan, the failure of which entailed strict accountability, took first priority at the expense of upbringing work. Such a situation is intolerable. We must search for a new organization of convict labor.

While preserving the existing system for their production activity (since its rapid rejection would lead to a destabilization of labor involvement), we must resort to new forms: we must create brigades of convicts, possibly working on the basis of lease relations in the municipal and domestic or agroindustrial complexes, as well as service for the population in the projects of local soviets. It seems possible to send strictly defined categories of convicts to work, performed jointly with the labor collectives of enterprises and construction sites. All this would enable us to better combine the obligation to work with a desire to work in one's profession, to participate in permissible ways in solving production problems, to interact with normal people, and finally, not to grow too unfamiliar with the atmosphere of "will," to which one must return.

The upbringing influence on convicts merits special attention. For purposes of raising its effectiveness, people usually note the expedience of reviving Makarenko's system. It seems, however, that attempts to copy it lead to no good. Firstly, Makarenko applied his system under the unique conditions of the 1920s-1930s, not at all with respect to inveterate criminals, but mainly to unfortunate juveniles. Secondly, that which he succeeded in, due to his talent and selfless devotion, might not be obtained by others. We need a different, modern system of upbringing, in some ways utilizing the distinguished teacher's legacy. It seems that the thesis of socializing the personality, or rather, resocializing a criminal's personality, developed in sociology and social psychology, ought to be the starting point of this system. This system could operate within the framework of a regime for implementing punishment. The regime, which contributes to suppressing the criminal subculture of convicts and is a way to teach discipline, creates definite conditions for employing the principles of pedagogy and psychology. In view of the situation that has taken shape both in regard to the growth in crime, as well as in work to implement punishment in corrective labor institutions, the scientific development of the problem of sociopedagogical influence on convicts for the purpose of their resocialization should, in our opinion, be considered one of the primary tasks.

However, this is only one side of the problem. The other, evoking far greater alarm, is the adaptation of people released from prisons to life under normal conditions. The absence of conditions for such adaptation (loss of family, housing, and residence permit; discrimination in employment; influence of the criminal environment, and all this in respect to a personality, as a rule, seriously psychologically traumatized by years of being in the "zone"), is one of the main reasons for recurring crime, not to mention vagrancy, drunkenness, drug addition and prostitution. Unfortunately, there are few good appeals, and the aggravation of the economic, political and psychological situation in society today scarcely permits us to hope that society will work on this problem in earnest. Nonetheless, we must recognize the struggle against crime and the implementation of punishment, as

an inalienable part of it, as our common work, which should be constantly supervised by central party and state bodies. In the work plan, so to speak, the main responsibility for achieving the goals of punishment belongs to the corrective labor institutions. However, hardly to them alone. Corrective labor institutions have the right to count on the participation of local soviets of people's deputies, public organizations and other formations of citizens, labor collectives, and relatives and friends of convicts in their efforts.

Currently, corrective labor institutions make up a unified Union republic system, for the functioning of which the center is in fact responsible—the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, sometimes sharing responsibility with the MVD of Union republics or making the MVD of autonomous republics and the UVD of krais and oblasts responsible. Party and Soviet bodies of Union and autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts during extraordinary events which arise in corrective labor institutions, usually act in the role not so much of answering for, so much as holding responsible for the state of affairs. Such a situation can exist no longer. The regional bodies of power must also be responsible for the state of crime and for the results of the work of corrective labor institutions. However, they need to have real rights and possibilities in order to do this.

There is reason in having two systems of bodies which implement punishment, including corrective labor institutions. Responsibility should be placed on Union republics without an oblast division, autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts for reforming and resocializing persons convicted of crime, as we say, of "local significance," i.e., committed by people living in the given area. The argument here is as follows: the criminals were found among residents of the region, worked with them at one and the same enterprises, which means that they were "overlooked." If so, they must be reformed in a local corrective labor institution with the help of labor collectives and society. Criminals who undermine the foundations of society and the state and possess a staunchly anti-social mentality are another matter: state criminals, participants in organized, stable criminal groups (gangs, mafia), racketeers, corrupt elements, professional criminals, especially dangerous recidivists, and active participants in so-called mass crimes. They would serve punishment in corrective labor institutions of central subordination, not according to place of residence, with a more rigid regime, etc. Of course, we must not forego the principles of humanism with these people either. However, there is a limit to everything: society has a right to reliably protect itself from infringements.

Life has raised a number of new problems for the practice of implementing punishment. Right not, it should be a question not of separate corrections in the work of corrective labor institutions, but of shaping a new thinking and new approaches to the matter. The renovation of socialism is, above all, a revival of common human values in social consciousness and in life. In the area under consideration, this means concern,

above all, for every Soviet person and his protection from crime, ensuring a worthy standard of living and the well-being of those who work or spend their service in corrective labor institutions, and finally, it means the humane, law-governed treatment of convicts. There is no argument: the growth of crime is pushing us toward extreme decisions, but we must not yield to feelings. We must find healthy, realistic solutions to the existing situation. An approach to implementing punishment, based not on emotions, but on reasonable humanism and social justice, also makes it possible in the final account to overcome crime and achieve a more important goal: changing the morals that give rise to criminals.

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PAGES FROM HISTORY

1937: Opposition to Repressions

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[Article by Oleg Vitalyevich Klevnyuk, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] "From television, I learned that *KOMMUNIST* will be publishing materials on those who opposed the Stalinist dictatorship.

"This is just what our press lacks. After all, it seems as though no one was able to resist the threat of being annihilated, and everyone submissively placed his head under the ax... With full certainty, I can confirm that back in the years of collectivization there were people who steadfastly stood up for Leninist positions.

"Once, in our village, where I was born and raised, the following occurred. In order to implement the plan for complete collectivization, two authorized representatives arrived: one from Moscow, another from Kharkov (at that time, Kharkov was capitol of the Ukraine). A sharp public debate arose between them. The Muscovite was in favor of rapid universal collectivization. The representative from Kharkov, conversely, proved the destructiveness of such a policy, calling it anti-peasant. I remember his words: "Lenin taught us to implement the introduction to collective labor not under threat of a stick, not hastily, but gradually, by showing the advantages of collective management." The village assembly met his words with cries of approval. To this day, the village elders remember this official...

"He was soon recalled. We escorted him, in the peasant way, outside the village, and many cried. His name was Minakov. Later, in the late 1930s, he was shot.

"After his departure, the Stalinists threw aside absolutely all restraint. They imposed excessive taxes on those who resisted collectivization, took away homes, and deprived people of shelter and bread, dooming them to death by starvation.

"This happened in Priazovye (now Zaporozhye Oblast). Respectfully yours, I.V. Deripasko, war and labor veteran, Donetsk."

With this letter to the editors, we would like to open a series of articles on those who, under the most difficult conditions, often risking their lives, preserved a belief in justice and law and tried to oppose arbitrariness, to write and to speak the truth. For the time being it is hard to say what these articles will be like, for we all still poorly imagine this layer of Soviet history, which was not in our textbooks and for a long time was a topic of specific "interest" only to the punitive agencies. We are counting on the help of specialists and readers of our journal and await documents, materials and reminiscences.

Clearly or unclearly, the problem of the moral choice of the acting persons in the tragedies, and of the level of compromises permitted under conditions of the cruelest state arbitrariness, is constantly present in the numerous debates on the sources, causes, and specific circumstances of the mass repressions of the late 1930s. Having rightly placed the chief responsibility for that which happened on the strongest, the state, nonetheless we are often too categorical in claims of universal submission, ignorance, and conventional like-minded thinking. Such a simplification of historical reality not only leaves many important questions unanswered, for instance, questions of the sources of society's viability, or of its future cleansing of deformations. This sort of simplification is deeply unfair to the memory of those who resisted as best they could and, essentially, deprives us of the most important moral supports and impoverishes democratic culture, the foundations of which have always been based on the example of people who found strength within themselves to live by their consciences in the most difficult of times.

Of course, the study of this extremely little-known segment of our history is basically a task for the future. We need new sources, including ones inaccessible for the time being, and new approaches for this. However, the existing facts, it seems, already enable us to dispute stereotypes which simplify the past and to refine certain assessments.

Of the 1930s, 1934 was, perhaps, the most favorable in a political respect. In January-February, the 17th Party Congress was held not only under the sign of the repentance of former opposition members and a glorification of the Stalinist course. It was as though there was an unspoken agreement: Stalin was unquestionably right in all his former deeds, but in the future the country should live otherwise, because "the basic difficulties have already passed" and the "danger of a party schism has been eliminated." A number of events in 1934 made it possible to count on substantial changes. Former opposition leaders were reinstated in the party and given work. The 17th Congress approved the 2nd 5-Year Plan, having discarded the idea of a "great leap" and having realized the opportunity to change the national economic proportions in favor of group "B." Economic

experiments continued ever more actively in industry, and the countryside received indulgence. In November, the VKP(b) Central Committee decided to dismantle a significant part of the two most important supports for the existing system of "extraordinary" economic administration: eliminating bread ration cards and converting the MTS political departments into ordinary party bodies. The "thaw" was gaining stability, it seemed.

Possibly, that is why Kirov's murder on 1 December was a shock. Far-seeing politicians immediately understood what kind of arguments the shot in Smolnyy gave to those who supported aggravating the class struggle. It was really difficult to devise the best pretext for a sharp change of course. The repressions that soon began confirmed the worst expectations. However, they did not immediately take on the scale that existed in 1937. Over a number of years, the organizers of the repressions chose a convenient position and safe moment, as though they had contrived a decisive strike.

Stalin's political opponents called him a "brilliant plotter," who knew how to "gradually enlist the apparat and the country's public opinion in any undertaking which, if presented immediately in full volume, would evoke fright, indignation, and even rebuff." The organization for the mass repression was precisely such an "undertaking." In 1935-1936, they were "dosed" in relatively large "portions," alternating with temporary retreats. For the time being, these fluctuations are inaccessible for a complete study of the facts. It can be assumed that the insufficient solidity of the country's economic situation and opposition to the repression policy of the part of more moderate forces in the party restrained the supporters of this cruel course.

The circumstances surrounding the acceptance and revocation of a directive letter of A.N. Vinokurov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, sent to local areas in July 1935, may serve as definite testimony to the existence of such opposition. This document sharply condemned the practice of groundless institution of legal proceedings against a "tremendous number of people." It suggested that the justice bodies put a halt to it. "Court employees should remember," the letter said, in particular, "that they are responsible for every incorrect sentence, for every wrong court decision... Assessment of the courts' activity should be measured not by the number of cases considered, but by the results that court work brings in the matter of developing socialist building, raising the cultural level of the population, and so forth." Where mass illegal prosecutions had been permitted, Vinokurov ordered a review of cases to begin. His directive remained in force for about 2 months, but later, without a fuss, was classified as a political error and removed from circulation.

Another attempt to slow the repressions in this period was made by the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry [NKTP]. In it, a large group of energetic employees had formed around G.K. Ordzhonikidze over the course of several years. Knowing the real

reasons for the numerous failures and misunderstandings in the economy and the real cost of accusations of sabotage, they often voiced dissatisfaction with the repressions. This was once displayed openly at a USSR NKTP council in the end of June 1936. "The basic reason for our trust's failure to fulfill the production program," A.M. Khachataryants, manager of the "Stalinugol" Trust, declared, for example, "is the unsatisfactory work of the command structure... The command structure is not working intensively, as a consequence of accusations made against it without investigation... Instead of thinking of how to introduce one innovation or another..., the engineers, afraid of falling into the position of saboteurs or conservatives, have tried to do everything by the letter of the law." Ordzhonikidze actively supported such statements. He called the accusations of sabotage against engineering and technical employees nonsense. "What kind of saboteurs! Over the 19 years of existence of Soviet power we... have graduated more than 100,000 engineers and just as many technicians. If they, as well as the old engineers whom we re-educated, all turned out to be saboteurs in 1936, then congratulate yourself on such success," he said.

Subsequent events showed that such statements were not accidental. For several months after the council conference, attempts were made to protect economic managers from repressions. Thus, at the end of August 1936 the VKP(b) Central Committee considered the case of expelling Tabakov, director of the Satkinskiy Zavod "Magn-ezit" (Chelyabinsk Oblast), accused of aiding and abetting Trotskyites, with all the ensuing consequences, from the party. The Central Committee changed this decision as mistaken and punished a number of employees of the local and central press for spreading unproven information about Tabakov. It was fundamentally important that this decision was published in the newspapers. At the same time, the Central Committee made a decision on the work of the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom. It contained many words on vigilance, yet at the same time protected Ye.I. Vesnik, director of the Krivoy Rog Metallurgical Combine, and his deputy, who were also accused of the "most terrible" crime, Trotskyism. In connection with this case, the Central Committee dismissed the secretary of the Krivoy Rog Party Gorkom. PRAVDA soon printed information on the Dnepropetrovsk Obkom Plenum, which examined questions raised by the Central Committee decision. Having made the requisite statements about enhancing the struggle against enemies, the plenum condemned individual party organizations where there were "intolerable elements of immoderation, exaggeration, petty bourgeois alarmist panic-mongering, and self-humiliation."

Such a policy of balancing repressions with appeals to caution and with checking the too ardent "unmaskers" also continued in the first weeks of September. In addition, on 10 September the newspapers printed a report by the USSR Prosecutor's Office to the effect that the investigation conducted has not revealed data for

instituting legal proceedings against N.I. Bukharin and A.I. Rykov, previously accused of participating in the activity of the so-called "united Trotskyite-Zinovyev center." Yet another item of no little significance: all these decisions and practical steps were made during Stalin's absence from Moscow.

Stalin took a decisive step at the end of September. Along with Zhdanov, he sent a telegram from Sochi to Kaganovich, Molotov, and other Politburo members. It said: "...We consider naming Comrade Yezhov to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs an absolutely necessary and urgent matter. Yagoda has clearly not been up to the task in the matter of exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovyev bloc. The OGPU has delayed on this matter for 4 years." In Moscow the next day, a decision was made to replace Yagoda with Yezhov. Instructions on promoting the struggle against Trotskyite-Zinovyev elements soon followed. The repressions began to gain strength everywhere.

In particular, the fabrication of cases of economic sabotage acquired great scope: numerous cases of mismanagement and production defects were prosecuted under the political articles. At the end of November, USSR Prosecutor A. Ya. Vyshinskiy was instructed in a month's time to study all criminal cases concerning large fires, accidents, and output of low-quality production for the purpose of exposing their counter-revolutionary, sabotage-related underlying cause. At the same time, under the slogan of developing criticism and self-criticism, a campaign to reveal enemies by the forces of "society" was developed, and public denunciations and demagogic accusations at various aktivs, meetings, etc., were encouraged.

At the end of January 1937, a trial was held in Moscow on the case of the so-called "parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyite center." Economic leaders were convicted: Yu.L. Pyatakov, first deputy people's commissar for heavy industry; G. Ya. Sokolnikov, first deputy people's commissar for forest industry; S.A. Rataychak, head of Glavkhimprom, People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry; and others. In addition to everything else, they were accused of sabotage, intentional disruption of plans, worsening production quality, arranging accidents, etc. Everything charged in the case was confessed by the accused: 13 people were sentenced to be shot, and four—to long terms of imprisonment.

Under these conditions, Ordzhonikidze and his supporters could only try to obstruct the further expansion of repressions. The following tactic was chosen: the NKVD bodies had already unmasked the enemies, and the task was mainly to make up for the negative consequences of sabotage through conscientious labor.

On 1 February, Ordzhonikidze again publicly asserted his disagreement with claims of widespread sabotage in industry. Speaking at a reception of workers from petroleum processing plants, he repeated this thought,

expressed at the NKTP council in June: "...Our engineer... is building his home in the Soviet Union. He is devoting all his strength to building socialism, all his knowledge... If I may be so bold to declare, our country has at least... no less than 90 percent such people. (Applause). It can be no other way. They are our native sons, our brothers, whom we raised." Those attending understood the real meaning of this statement, which came a day after the end of the case against Pyatakov and the other industrial leaders. This was also indicated, incidentally, by their applause for Ordzhonikidze's attempt to set a unique quantitative limit, beyond which the repressions should not spread. However, Ordzhonikidze's speech appeared in the press only in March, after his death and the February-March VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum.

In February, Ordzhonikidze and his associates organized the verification of cases fabricated by the NKVD on heavy industrial projects. Representatives of the people's commissariat were sent to various rayons of the country for this purpose. Soon, they all reported the absence of grounds for accusations of sabotage activity and presented the appropriate facts and considerations. Thus, S.Z. Ginzburg, chief of Glavstroyprom of the NKTP, and I.P. Pavlunovskiy, deputy people's commissar, went to the construction site of the largest railroad car building factory in Nizhnyy Tagil, where the NKVD had arrested construction chief L.N. Maryasin and party committee secretary Sh. Okudzhava at the end of 1936. "Sergo asked me to carefully study the status of the plant's construction and to discover what the enemy activity of the accused consisted of. Grigoriy Konstantinovich advised me not to delay in Moscow and to leave as soon as possible in the people's commissariat railroad car, which served us as housing at the construction site itself...," Ginzburg recalled. "As far as I remember, Sergo called Tagil in the middle of February and asked me what state the construction was in and what the enemy activity at 'Uralvagonstroy' consisted of. I briefly reported that the factory had been well built and completion of the job would not require much work... Sergo again asked me what the enemy activity was. To this, I answered that, except for minor shortcomings, ...I had discovered nothing at 'Uralvagonstroy.' Ordzhonikidze then asked me to find Pavlunovskiy and return to Moscow as soon as possible, and on the way, in the railroad car, to write a note on the state of affairs at 'Uralvagonstroy'..." Other representatives from the people's commissariat came to similar conclusions.

Besides the verification materials, Ordzhonikidze's "dossier" also had statements from a number of industry leaders warning of the critical situation in local areas as a result of cultivating the wave of exposures of "enemies." Thus, the director of the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Plant, S.P. Birman, an old party member, wrote to Ordzhonikidze (the letter is not quoted as in the original, but in the form as read to participants in the February-March plenum by V.M. Molotov): "The situation that is being created, especially in recent times here

in Dnepropetrovsk, forces me to turn to You, as an old comrade and a Politburo member, for instructions and cooperation. It seems to me that the directives of higher party authorities concerning the universal development of criticism and self-criticism have been improperly interpreted in some ways here in Dnepropetrovsk. Here, the foreign word 'criticism' is often confused with the Russian word 'blather.' I assume that the party directive was intended, by way of conscientious criticism, to disclose real enemies and bring real shortcomings to light. Yet, many have understood it to mean that they must, no matter what, sling mud at each other and, primarily, at a certain category of leading official."

Ordzhonikidze set forth all these and, possibly, other facts before Stalin, attempting to persuade him to slow the repressions. There is substantial evidence that a serious conflict arose between them. Documented confirmation of a disagreement between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze also exists in connection with the preparation for examination by the party Central Committee plenum of the question of sabotage in heavy industry. Ordzhonikidze was named the speaker on this question. "In the last days of his life, Sergo busily prepared for his report to the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum... On 15 and 16 February, Sergo wrote a great deal and outlined theses on sheets of paper and notepads." In this testimony by Ordzhonikidze's wife, Zinaida Gavrilovna, made 2 days after her husband's death, Ordzhonikidze's condition prior to the plenum is voicelessly transmitted. The "theses on notepads," if they were kept, are inaccessible for the present time, but we do have a typewritten copy of the resolutions prepared by Ordzhonikidze, with Stalin's notes. Stalin's remarks were sharp and made known his extreme displeasure with Ordzhonikidze's unwillingness to acknowledge the presence of a branched sabotage network in heavy industry.

On the whole, the events of these days were as follows: on 15-16 February, Ordzhonikidze worked on his report to the plenum; at the same time, he asked Ginzburg and, possibly, leaders of other commissions, about the results of verifying the cases of sabotage; he presented the draft theses to Stalin; he at least reported Ginzburg's conclusions to Stalin (Ginzburg returned to Moscow early in the morning on 18 February, and soon afterwards Poskrebyshev told him that "I.V. Stalin has asked you to send the note on the state of affairs at 'Uralvagonstroy,' about which Sergo told him"). On February 18, Ordzhonikidze was no more. According to the official story, he suddenly died from paralysis of the heart during his daily relaxation. At the 20th Party Congress, N.S. Khrushchev reported that Ordzhonikidze committed suicide. The facts set forth above, it seems, indicate either that Ordzhonikidze, having despaired of proving his case to Stalin, actually shot himself, or that Stalin, having sensed a threat in Ordzhonikidze's persistent preparations for the plenum, took steps of his own.

Ordzhonikidze's ceremonial funeral was held several days later. Newspaper articles published in regard to Ordzhonikidze's death and later, on the anniversaries of

his death, persistently advanced the thought that he was a firm supporter of the merciless extirpation of sabotage.

At the February-March Plenum (23 February-5 March 1937), officials of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry were sharply criticized. The report by V.M. Molotov, who spoke in Ordzhonikidze's place, was literally full of accusations of political blindness and spinelessness. The NKTP associates who checked the cases of sabotage on site and disagreed with the claims of the NKVD, as well as S.P. Birman, whose letter Molotov assessed as a defense of departmental honor, were reprimanded.

The formulations in themselves, made at the plenum, additionally clarified the subject of the disagreements between economic managers and higher political leadership, the arguments of the sides. "Now," Molotov announced, "one can often encounter opinions that the talk of sabotage is greatly exaggerated, and that if sabotage was really of such great significance, we would not have the successes of which we are proud. The successes of our industry, they say, attest to the fact that sabotage is somewhat exaggerated." The essence of these words is more understandable, if one takes into account that industry in 1935-1936 worked quite successfully, have achieved an unforeseen growth in labor productivity, compared to previous years. The obvious senselessness of the claims of a coexistence of mass sabotage and economic achievement was obvious. That is why many efforts were made at the plenum to prove the "imaginary nature" of this contradiction. For example, Stalin devoted a special section of his report to this, naming it "Shady Sides of Economic Successes." There are successes, Stalin explained, but they have blunted vigilance and enabled enemies to become more active.

The plenum resolution included a statement that the revelation and exposure of saboteurs "occurred with the passivity of number of industrial and transportation agencies... Moreover, certain agencies in industry have even hindered this work." Soon, almost all NKTP leaders had been repressed.

The February-March Plenum decisions officially reinforced the course toward mass repressions. Of course, in the first place the NKVD bodies were correspondingly disposed to implement it. However, not just them. An entire system of mechanisms was created to heat the atmosphere in society of suspicion, denunciation, and ideological amortization of the dissatisfaction with arrests. The numerous aktivs and meetings which discussed the problems of strengthening vigilance were one of its links. They were called on to stir up "moral authentications" in the labor collectives, to familiarize people with the idea of the rightness of denunciations, and to bring to light and extol those who were already unconditionally prepared to destroy "enemies" and rip the masks off their stooges. The Stalinist leadership displayed special favor toward this category of active unmaskers, most of whom were society's riff-raff, frustrated somehow and taking vengeance on the whole

world for their failures. At the February-March Plenum, a certain Nikolayenko, a Kievan who had written complaints to the leaders of the Kiev party organization for a long time, was essentially proclaimed a heroine of the nation of "little people." Her "signals" at the beginning of 1937 served as cause for the devastation of party cadres in Kiev.

All the same, regardless of the powerful support of the authorities, the unmasking measures far from always went smoothly. The position of people who retained a feeling of personal dignity and propriety were an obstacle on their path. Of course, such a position was dangerous in the direct meaning of the word. Not many risked openly opposing the pressure of the demagogues. To make up for it, the deaf silence of the halls or the formal statements of forced orators were frequent at such measures. This was all fully displayed immediately after the February-March plenum. The meetings and aktivs held then, called on to develop the impetus given by the plenum, in many cases did not satisfy the party leadership and attested to the existence of passive opposition to the chosen course. Summarizing the results of the aktivs held in people's commissariats, N.A. Antipov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission under the USSR Sovnarkom, noted that for the present time the aktiv participants spoke "most of all about already-exposed cases of sabotage and diversions, in all ways avoiding the listing of new names. The aktivs of many people's commissariats, he continued, were held formally, as though performing an ordinary duty, and "did not reveal the reasons for sabotage, the reasons for poor work." Soon PRAVDA made similar accusations aimed at the people's commissariats of heavy and light industry. Commenting on the course of work of the aktivs of these departments, the newspaper wrote: "Plunging into the practical matters of economic construction, many leaders of sections, trusts, and plants have ended up in the captivity of a narrow-minded pragmatic attitude... In investigating an accident, such an economic manager looks for the technical reasons that caused it, but does not see the hand that caused the disruption of production."

Several participants in the aktivs of scientific institutions also steadfastly refused to act according to the prescriptions of the February-March plenum. The unmasking of "enemy activity" in the Academy of Sciences aktiv was sluggish. The scientists' demonstrative passivity evoked the party leadership's displeasure. For example, the fact that Academician S.I. Vavilov "utterly avoided the political aspect of the question in his speech, declining to express his attitude toward the plenum's decisions and Comrade Stalin's speech" was established with irritation. The impertinence of VASKhNIL academicians, most of whom in general did not attend the aktiv, was noted. Moreover, Academician N.K. Koltsov, who had nonetheless attended this measure, arranged a whole demonstration. After calling the attacks on genetics a campaign against science, he declared: "I have not renounced that which I said and

wrote, and I will not, and you cannot frighten me with any threats whatsoever." He concluded his speech with the lines: "Comrades, cast off your fear. Science's disposition is not timid. Do not clog its flow with any plug whatsoever."

It is understandable, however, that such speeches could not halt the fly-wheel of the mighty state machine, aimed at a "great purge." The wave of repression overwhelmed the country. In 1937, 350,000 people were shot on the political sentences of "troikas," special conferences, and military tribunals alone, according to certain, clearly not exaggerated data. Many times more were arrested and died in the camps. A hysteria for exposing enemies was ignited in the country. Newspaper columns were full of corresponding articles. The mandatory topic of spies appeared in almost every movie, not even excepting comedies. In industrial enterprises, NKVD associates familiarized workers with the operating methods of foreign spies. Numerous publications glorified heroes of vigilance. "They come with statements on cases of sabotage, giving the names and last names of people, and demanding prompt investigation," a PRAVDA correspondent from Leningrad reported, for example. At the beginning of October, a USSR TsIK resolution was passed to increase the maximum period of imprisonment from 10 to 25 years. After a while, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum made Yezhov a candidate member of the Politburo. In December, on command from above, a ceremonial celebration of the 20th anniversary of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD was organized throughout the country. A.I. Mikoyan gave a report at the Bolshoy Theatre to a meeting of the Moscow aktiv: "Every worker of ours is part of the NKVD!" he stated.

Under conditions in which too many were "part of the NKVD," it was extremely difficult to oppose the repressions in any way. The slightest doubts of grounds for the arrests were immediately cut short. Nonetheless, attempts were made to influence the situation somehow, in only to bring individual people out from under the blow. Memory of this was preserved mainly in the memoirs that have reached us. Often, these memoirs are overgrown with unconvincing details, but their existence itself reflects, unquestionably, certain events that took place. As in the previous cases, we must repeat: For the time being, documents on such cases are inaccessible. However, it would be wrong to reject, on this basis alone, the reality of the speeches against the repressions made by a number of prominent leaders.

In principle, such speeches were possible even under conditions of universal state terror. One proof of this and, at the same time, an example of an attempt to oppose the repressions in the period of their maximum development, is an article by M. Suvinskiy, "Panic-Mongers" in IZVESTIYA, 26 August 1937. The author sharply criticized the leadership of Saratov Oblast and the local newspaper which, in order to justify the poor organization of the crop harvest, allowed a "monstrous story of the mass sabotage of the crop, incongruous with everything, to circulate about the land." In the article,

and this was its basic idea, warning was given openly, perhaps for the first time: the policy of repressions was actively supported, above all, by incompetent and indecent people, striving with its help to retain undeserved posts. "Why would not any unsuccessful leader," M. Suvinskiy wrote, "use such a convenient, all-explaining slogan to justify his personal inactivity and ignorance of how to work... What are the leaders doing? Inspired by the idea of the existence of sabotage, they 'expanded' the prosecution and dismissal from administrative work of dozens of kolkhoz chairmen, brigade leaders, agricultural council chairman, etc..." The main reason for failures in Saratov Oblast agriculture, the author asserted, was precisely the mass repressions, which disorganized the kolkhozes and deprived people of confidence and responsibility.

Suvinskiy's article differed so strikingly from other articles of that time that it was noticed immediately by the VKP(b) Central Committee. Organizational measures were taken promptly. By 1 September, IZVESTIYA already reported: "At the editorial office's fault, on 26 August IZVESTIYA printed a politically erroneous article by M. Suvinskiy, 'Panic-Mongers,' which is essentially an enemy sortie. The author of the article, having grossly distorted the facts and having made entirely incorrect and politically harmful conclusions in his speech, has been removed from work in the editorial office of IZVESTIYA."

Of course, there were relatively few cases like this. Far broader scales were acquired, so to speak, by the unconscious resistance to arbitrariness: the aspiration of people, under conditions of terror, to keep a human face. In 1937, as in other similar periods, it was significantly easier to act cynically and unconscionably, than to live by one's conscience. The most natural feelings and acts—sympathy, mutual aid, and trust in one's kin—were especially dangerous at that time. However, precisely these are, perhaps, the most serious obstacle to arbitrariness when the state flouts the law. Cases of saving and raising the children of the repressed are famous. The memories of many families preserve cases of material and moral support at a serious time. Such help was often cause for repression. In June 1937, for example, PRAVDA ran an article, "Political Blindness or Complicity with Enemies?" which expressed political distrust in M.I. Latsis, an old party member and director of the Institute of the National Economy imeni G.V. Plekhanov. According to the newspaper, he "tried in all possible ways to assist, both with fatherly concern, as well as material support" the exposed "enemies" and had dismissed people who attempted to expose "Trotskyite spies" in the institute's collective. Latsis was soon repressed.

The most widespread form of protest against the repressions were the written statements, with which the prisoners, their relatives, and friends or colleagues literally bombarded all the authorities. Some of these letters, especially P.L. Kapitsa's petition, are famous. Meanwhile, most of them are still hidden in archives.

An important question arises in evaluating the above and many other facts: how many such actions were a conscious resistance to the government's policy? To what extent did society believe in the guilt of the numerous "enemies" exposed by the NKVD? One of the most widespread stereotypes of historical awareness today is that people, unquestionably, believed in the rightness of the country's leadership, in the guilt of the "enemies of the people." To some extent, these claims are true. After all, the people of the 1930s had highly one-sided information at their disposal about the events that occurred. They learned to think over the years, but a new society does have many enemies, external as well as internal, and not all these claims were absolute myth. Hitler had come to power in Germany and an alarming situation had taken shape in the Far East. The Stalinist policy of terror constantly multiplied the number of malcontents, and then, of those embittered by the violence and injustice. By the beginning of 1937, there were about 1.5 million former party members alone, expelled from its ranks or who had quit mechanically since 1922. Of course, these people were not enemies of their own people, but unquestionably many of them hated, quite justly, the state system created by Stalin. Far from everyone could separate Stalin from the people and the lofty ideals. Therefore, the majority interpreted his enemies as "enemies of the people."

The particular receptivity of the generation of the 1930s to official propaganda is also explained by the fact that all doubts of its veracity were simply dangerous. In order to survive, one had to believe. Consciously or unconsciously, people drove seditious thoughts from their minds and preferred not to overload their awareness and conscience with meditation on the numerous incongruities of official ideology and life. Those who wrenched themselves out of this state nonetheless feared to voice their thoughts aloud. Thus, the official versions did not encounter substantial obstacles.

There is yet another circumstance that should be remembered. There really were many difficulties, glaring problems, and lawlessness in the country. The economic system that existed had engendered such inconceivable mismanagement, and the undemocratic state—such dense bureaucratism and abuse, that the masses, not over-burdened with culture and political experience, willingly believed the reality of widespread sabotage. Realizing this, the Stalinist leadership developed the 1937 repressions on the crest of a demagogic campaign of self-criticism and condemnation of bureaucratism and abuses by leading officials. A tremendous dissatisfaction had accumulated in the people with the severe living standards and crimes of previous years. Many of the leaders who lost their lives in 1937 were in fact "heroes" of dispossessing the kulaks, extorting bread from the dead countryside, persecuting dissidents, etc., which is why their arrests were often interpreted as deserved punishment.

All these and other circumstances intertwined, forming a complex picture in which reality and falsity, objective

problems and faulty methods for resolving them, fear and faith in leaders and Soviet power, were mixed together. It was not easy for someone of the 1930s to investigate all this. Nonetheless, a process of gradual insight enveloped certain strata of society. The shocking scale of the repressions, the most unbelievable accusations often leveled against illiterate people having no relation to politics whatsoever (after all, the versions, widespread today, that the repressions mainly affected leaders are absolutely untrue: for instance, at that time slightly over 30,000 leaders of all levels throughout the country had joined the Central Committee nomenclature) or, conversely, leaders who had only recently been idolized—all this sparked doubts and encouraged independent searches for answers to questions already officially explained.

Evidence of these moods is preserved in various forms. Many complaints and petitions were permeated with a categorical refusal to believe in the guilt of the repressed. In a number of letters to the country's leadership, the matter of repressions was raised sharply in general, and the actions of the NKVD were declared criminal. Diary notes from those years recently became accessible. Whereas the understanding of the wise Academician V.I. Vernadskiy can be perceived as fitting, the similar thoughts of Yuriy Baranov, a schoolchild from the small town of Buy (now in Kostroma Oblast), once again force us to think of the true moods in society at that time. Yuriy Baranov's diary is a document of great force. It was written by a pure person, deeply devoted to the Homeland, but not an unthinking slave to official truths. Like many of his coevals, Yuriy lost his father in 1937. On the subject of the arrest, he wrote: "A terrible misfortune has befallen our family. They arrested Papa on a most terrible charge—sabotage. I am certain, no, more than certain, that he does not deserve this, and even to the contrary..." A note after the trial: "As a result, that which we all feared and were afraid to even think about has happened—they sentenced Papa to be shot. This does not at all mean that I will refute my remarks about Papa, which I made in this diary. No. I could write a great deal about his trial, but I cannot do this, since I cannot write even remarks about it to this day."

In June 1937, a Komsomol reporting and election meeting was held at the Trekhgorniy Manufactory. The PRAVDA correspondent reported: "The debates... took place without the proper political sharpness. Trotskyites are active at the factory... Unhealthy moods exist among the youth. Finally, the prosecutions of foul Trotskyite-bourgeois spies, murderers and traitors, exposed by Soviet intelligence, remain in everyone's memory. Despite all this, the Komsomol members in their speeches almost never left the circle of everyday matters of intra-union work, which indicates an improper system for upbringing youth in the organization." Here, O.I. Nikitina, senior party member, weaver, could not restrain herself at the meeting and announced: "You say

they are all traitors. Was Lenin so blind, that he could not see the people who lived around him?" She received 10 years for this.

In general, we must say that many were arrested precisely because they openly disagreed with political terror. There is no method for determining the number of such people. However, they did exist and this is yet another piece of evidence to the fact that the claims of a society kept silent under the hypnosis of repressions are among those broad historical generalizations which, expressing a predominant tendency on the whole, artificially discard important aspects of historical reality. The materials of discussions of 19th Party Congress documents are included among the numerous facts that make it possible, to a certain extent, to reconstruct this reality, to evaluate public awareness in the late 1930s even somewhat. At the beginning of 1939, the newspapers published the theses of reports to the congress on the 3rd 5-Year Plan (speaker V.M. Molotov) and on changes to the party Statutes (speaker A.A. Zhdanov). They were later discussed in the party meetings, conferences, and the press. The VKP(b) Central Committee received many letters and suggestions concerning the theses, as did PRAVDA, which ran a special "Discussion Page" the day before the congress.

To assess these letters and proposals as a source, we must, above all, characterize the historical situation in which the pre-congress discussion occurred. It had changed somewhat compared to 1937. The mass repressions had disorganized society and undermined its viability. The economic situation had worsened sharply in connection with this. For example, the growth rates in the overall volume of industrial production, which was 28.8 percent in 1936, declined to 11.1 percent in 1937, and to 11.8 percent in 1938. All this forced the Stalinist leadership to maneuver. In January 1938, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum condemned the so-called "formal and indifferent bureaucratic attitude toward people, toward party members," which sparked hopes for a halt to arbitrary rule. However, this did not occur. In 1938, new prosecutions were organized and hundreds of thousands of people were shot. The 2 years of terror threatened universal disorder, and Stalin decided to retreat more reasonably. At the end of 1938, Beriia, who was instructed to slow the repressions and create an appearance of restoration of justice, took the post of people's commissar of internal affairs, instead of Yezhov. The number of arrests compared to 1937-1938 decreased sharply. Some were released from prison. However, society was ordered to forget about the millions of people who were shot or died in the camps. It was as though a line had been drawn around them, and those who remained free were promised in return that 1937 would no longer be repeated. The whole responsibility for the repressions was placed on Yezhov and his associates and, in order to erase the tracks, they were eliminated without extraneous fuss.

The 18th Party Congress was to play an important role in the ideological support of the "pacification" maneuver.

In general phrases, Zhdanov's report theses condemned cases of "a formal bureaucratic attitude" toward the fate of party members, and stigmatized slanderers and fear-mongers, who were given a significant share of the blame for the repressions. In the new Statutes, categories for acceptance into the party and its cleansing were changed, and the rights of communists were established. All this was expected to demonstrate the seriousness of the leadership's intentions to reject the practice of 1937. The decision of the broad preliminary discussion of the pre-congress report theses pursued these political goals.

The discussion campaign in most cases was formal in nature. All documents were basically "ardently approved." The slightest disagreement was viewed with suspicion and often evaluated as an enemy sortie. This threatened to wreck the planned measure, which is why the party leadership decided to moderate the vigilance of local officials. The conflict in the Frunzenskiy Rayon party organization of the city of Ivanovo was chosen as a cause. One of the delegates to the rayon conference, Nikolskiy, objected to a certain clause in the report theses for the 3rd 5-Year Plan and was rapidly expelled from the party. At the end of February 1939 the VKP(b) Central Committee passed a special resolution on this case. Nikolskiy was reinstated in the party, and the local party leaders were reprimanded: "The Central Committee clarifies that discussion does not exclude, but presumes a difference of opinions and reciprocal criticism..." This clarification, absurd at first glance, was more than appropriate. After all, it even happened that communists were held accountable for statements published in... the "Discussion Page" of PRAVDA.

Understandably, it was impossible to count on complete sincerity. All the same, the pre-congress discussion was, perhaps, the only official "referendum" held on the subject of policy in 1937-1938. The party leadership also treated this measure as a "referendum:" they compiled reviews of letters and suggestions, singling out the most typical attitudes and statements. It is hard to say what goals they pursued in this case. However, whereas it had been a question of revealing to what extent the years 1937-1938 had "taught" like-minded thinking, the results of the survey were not simple. Along with the numerous "we support..." the mail to PRAVDA and the VKP(b) Central Committee included many letters that were "not for the press."

In a number of cases, the theses of the report on the 3rd 5-Year Plan were criticized and the falsification of the results of fulfilling the 2nd 5-Year Plan was revealed. "All the comparisons made in Molotov's theses," A.M. Aladzhalov of Gorkiy wrote, "expressed in rubles, are unconvincing. What kind of comparison can there be, when the standard itself—the Soviet ruble—is falling steadily before everyone's eyes... We must halt inflation and introduce the gold standard." The author of material that appeared in PRAVDA under the signature of I. Gorshkov noted the "twisting" of the second calculation in taking gross production into account in the cost deduction. The manuscript contained recalculations,

from which it followed that instead of the anticipated population increase for the 2nd 5-year period from 165.7 to 180.7 million people, it decreased to 155-160 million (the author was silent about the causes, but they were obvious). VKP(b) member Pavlyuchenko of Achinsk, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, suggested that the congress resolution include a clause on "the elimination of influence, lines, and speculation."

Letters condemning the repression made up the most extensive mail. Above all, most correspondence directly or indirectly criticized the situation existing in the party and the country as a result of the 2-year terror. M. Pakhomov of Moscow, in a letter to Stalin, arguing the position that the cadre purge had led to the failures of the national economy, wrote: "The atmosphere of distrust and excessive suspicion, which exists in interrelations among people and at work, can be justified in no way and by nothing... This atmosphere and the excessive suspicion are narrowing the scopes of work, hampering the initiative and energy of the workers, and having an extraordinarily harmful effect on all work... I believe it necessary to direct Your attention to the entirely informal position of old party members, members of underground organizations, and especially of party members from 1917-1920, who were active participants in the revolution and civil war. In the leadership work of old party members, one can find figures... We cannot trust them now, they say... I disagree with this practice..."

A significant number of letters demanded severe punishment of the so-called denouncers who had slandered honest people. Official propaganda had declared precisely the activity of slanderers, along with the machinations of enemies, fear-mongers, and careerists, to be one of the main causes of lawlessness. Of course, slanderers and careerists really existed, but they were only one of the cogs in the mighty mechanism of repression launched by the government. The facts indicate that many understood this. However, it was fatally dangerous to speak of a direct tie between the denouncers and authority, and therefore criticism of denouncers was often linked secretly to indignation both with fellow countrymen who had taken the path of denunciation, as well as with the authorities who had called this forth. The letters contained demands to hold not just the slanderers accountable, but also the party organization leaders who had permitted expulsion from the party based on slanderous claims. Leningrader S. Severov even criticized the VKP(b) Central Committee for delaying the correction of mistakes which, in his opinion, led to a too broad spread of arbitrariness.

Several participants in the discussion of pre-congress documents were concerned about creating some kind of

mechanism to prevent repressions. At that time, many had been expelled from the party on intentional, slanderous accusations. In most cases, sooner or later a night-time knock on the door followed expulsion. So, the intense interest in the positions of the new Statutes on the rights of party members is understandable. Demands to maximally democratize the procedure for expulsion from the party were advanced most decisively. Many criticized the streamlined formulation proposed by the VKP(b) leadership concerning the right of a party member to demand personal participation in examination of his personal case, and suggested formulating this point clearly and definitively: a party member has the right to participate in meetings which consider his personal case. Taking the real practice of expulsions into account, in which the frightened participants of meetings unanimously raised their hands, many suggestions were received for secret voting when deciding a communist's fate.

The discussion of pre-congress documents revealed the dissatisfaction with the practice asserted in the country and the party of distinguishing people by social origin, compiling various surveys, and keeping a file on past activity. Everyone knew that in the period of mass repressions precisely these materials often served as cause for arrest. Anyone who had even once in his life criticized the policy of the country's leadership, or had met with people who had fallen into the category of "enemies of the people," or had made statements about the party line, etc., could, with full grounds, fear arrest at any moment. In order to break this system, the authors of many letters proposed stopping the compilation of secret cases against communists, not putting information in documents about statements if they had been changed or deemed groundless later, and eliminating the practice existing in party organizations of dividing communists into types: proven or suspicious.

The results of discussion of the new party Statutes in its own way indicated that dissatisfaction with arbitrary rule existed in society, and that people were seeking guarantees against a repetition of repressions. Later, with time, this dissatisfaction intensified and became freer, capable of frankly exposing the true causes and culprits of "1937." This, in turn, strengthened the potential force of opposition to repressions, of the guarantee of a democratic path for our development. After all, genuine democracy is not simply a parliament and a constitution. It is, above all, society's democratic culture, the most important element of which is the ability of each to oppose arbitrariness.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Man in a Humanistic Dimension

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[Review by P. Gaydenko, doctor of philosophical sciences, and V. Stepin, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, of a book by I.T. Frolov, "*O Che-loveke i Gumanizme. Raboty Raznykh Let*" [On Man and Humanism. Works from Different Years]. Moscow, Politizdat, 1989, 559 pp]

[Text] Man and humanism... These concepts have entered the language of present-day sociopolitical journalism and political discussions everywhere. They are not simply spoken, but used to defend democratic decisions in the struggle against old, dogmatic thinking. The search for a solution to the era's crisis situation, an attempt to halt the devaluation of moral values and erosion of spirituality, and a desire to acquire anew humanistic world-outlook guidelines, lie behind all this. Yet, the aspiration to find genuinely human approaches to reality not only characterizes socialist society, undergoing a stage of radical renovation, but also the world on the whole, which, at the border of two centuries, is entering a new phase of civilized development.

The restructuring that is gaining strength in our country is handling a tremendous task: revealing the progressive essence of socialism, not in words, but in work, through the profound democratization of all aspects of society's life. That is why a philosophical world-outlook analysis of the multidimensional problems of man and humanism acquires special significance today, and research revealing its new aspects and unexpected angles evoke entirely natural interest. Academician I.T. Frolov's book, "*On Man and Humanism. Works from Different Years*," published by the Political Literature Publishing House, relates to such studies. It can be considered the unique result of summarizing and developing numerous works of scientists, devoted to a comprehensive sociophilosophical interpretation of the topical problem of social practice.

In studying a broad range of contemporary man's problems, the author also turns to the history of formulating the problem. A far from trivial thought is convincingly supported: it is the core for the theoretical comprehension of the world throughout the entire course of philosophy's development. No matter what the philosophers of past centuries, of ancient China, India, Egypt, Ancient Greece, or of the modern era, thought about, one way or another, man, his life and fate, his place in nature, in society, and in history, always remains the driving motive. I.T. Frolov defines this dominant of philosophical thinking as its "anthropological orientation." The development of this anthropological dominant has gone from Socrates, who set the requirement "know thyself" in the center of his quest, to Kant, who treated the question "what is man?" as the crown of the multi-story

building of his philosophical system. In the final account, the anthropological dominant will be fully realized. Thus revealing the unity of world philosophical thought, in all the diversity of its historical forms addressing the enigma of man, the book's author traces the most important modifications and shifts in the understanding of man and the meaning of his existence across over 2 millennia of the history of knowledge.

The eternal problem for philosophy is acquiring new meaning in the contemporary stage of civilization's development. In our time, we are considering it within the context of global problems, such as survival in the atomic age and the increasing danger of ecological catastrophe, in the context of shaping the personality in a rapidly changing social environment, the need to overcome the technocratically manipulative attitude toward man, granting a humanistic orientation to scientific and technical progress, restructuring the system of education and upbringing under conditions of increasing social dynamism and dialogue among different cultures.

All these problems were developed intensively in our country, beginning in the 1970s. I.T. Frolov's works were of priority here. The author continues to develop this problem in his new book. In particular, an extraordinarily great deal of attention is devoted to the problem that, in the course of scientific and technical progress and the ever-expanding consumption of its results by society, the number of factors contributing to mankind's biological disadaptation is increasing. Man's future is threatened. Studying these processes, the author stresses: he refers not only to physical, but also psychological factors, related to pollution of our habitat and an increase in nervous and psychological loads during the process of work and interaction with people, which lead to stress conditions and a whole range of so-called "diseases of civilization" (cardiovascular diseases, mental disorders, cancer and many others). However, in addition, for the first time in history mankind is obtaining an opportunity, using medical genetics, to reduce the burden of pathological heredity accumulated in the process of evolution.

The basis of the thesis that man is a biosocial entity opens a possibility for a constructive approach to one of the most topical problems not only in a theoretical, but, above all, in the practical plane: the problem of "man and nature." Not long ago, vulgar sociology hindered its philosophical interpretation, although many unbiased scientists recognized the ecological danger hanging over mankind. Today, the topic of "man and nature" never leaves the pages of journals and newspapers, which is cause to rejoice. However, we must remember those who, like I.T. Frolov, first raised it in the fundamental, philosophical aspect in years that were hard for us, when these questions were silenced or had only just begun to be discussed seriously as urgent and vitally important.

Among the most brilliant parts of the book are those in which he examines the ecological situation, formed as a result of dehumanizing scientific and technical progress

and of the arbitrary, uncontrolled growth of world industrial production. It is a question of a threat to the mankind's normal life, since the body of man, in the broadest philosophical meaning of the term, the meaning by which, in Marx's interpretation, the "body of man" is nature on the whole, is endangered. These contradictions in the development of man-caused civilization in its interaction with nature are also a special topic for scrupulous philosophical analysis in the book. The point here is not only that pollution of the natural environment threatens the health of people now living and of future generations, deforming the human body. The point is also that, as the author convincingly shows, the extermination of living nature, of entire species in the plant and animal worlds, and a barbaric attitude toward them are deforming the human spirit itself, man's morality, turning him into a cruel and egotistical, non-spiritual entity, indifferent to the fate of his "little brothers," which means to his own fate as well.

Some readers, perhaps, may have doubts: Is the subject being discussed strictly philosophical? Is the author of the book addressing questions too "commonplace" for a philosopher? However, there are no "commonplace" problems in philosophy! Since the day it appeared, true thinkers have always turned, in one form or another, to the most vitally important, most burning topics and phenomena. Is there a more disturbing or more topical question today, than "for mankind to be or not to be?" Our era, with its tremendous technical potential, has made a terrible "discovery" for the first time: the possibility of destruction, not simply of one individual, but of the whole human race. Is this not a subject for philosophical meditation!

The book interprets problems which truly worry the people of our planet. It lacks the reassuring self-deception that is so typical of many philosophical works from the period of stagnation and is the consequence of the method of not discussing that which is really happening in society, but that which is prescribed "from above," not that which is, but that which ought to be, in the opinion of the adherents of "social progress." It is precisely realism, growing out of humanism, out of convictions that "man is the 'measure of all things,'" that has become the key to solving the problems under discussion. One thing is surprising: reading the book, which truthfully relates the dangers entailed by an industrial and technical civilization, does not engender a feeling of helplessness and depression in the reader. This is not just because the author strives to show the prospects for overcoming difficulties. It is something else, it seems: truth is a great force. It makes us more active, mobilizes our will and thought, and encourages us to find a solution. In short, it turns a person into a morally responsible, active personality.

Besides the problem of "man and nature," an equally complex question holds the center of the author's attention: "Man and science." The book examines these themes in organic unity.

Everyone knows that the scientific and philosophical literature of many countries, which survived the period of the sui generis "anthropological boom," were literally crammed with pessimistic judgments for the present and future of man and mankind, especially with regard to the progress of contemporary natural science. Such conclusions often rely on the traditional concept of man as a "creation of nature," an unsuccessful one at that, and of science as a capricious "demon," not making things at all better, more reasonable, or more humane. There are also opposing, so to speak, optimistic conclusions which, however, also absolutize man's "natural nature" and, therefore, lead to one-sided conclusions regarding his prospects. Thus, there is an obvious need for a more precise and multi-faceted definition of the program for man's scientific knowledge and of its social and humanistic parameters.

The book outlines the basic trends of research in this area. It stresses that "the logic, methodology and philosophy of science have now entered a new phase in their development, in which studies of the laws of science as a phenomenon of human culture lead us to the problems of higher humanistic values" (p 205). Once again, we are faced not only with a complex theoretical problem, but also a topical, practical dilemma: how to exist in situations, in which the results of scientific knowledge contradict human values, threatening people's security and lives? "...The question arises not only of the value of truth, but also of its *price*, and here man and his happiness acts as the 'zero point'... Precisely now, as, most likely, never before, the question is raised sharply of the price that mankind should (or should not) pay for one truth or another discovered, in particular, in nuclear physics, molecular biology, or other basic sciences" (p 215). In other words, we are faced with a difficult philosophical problem of nature and the hierarchy of values, which requires well-founded interpretation. After all, since science strives for the truth, it is one of mankind's most valuable achievements. However, can values conflict among themselves, can truth end up being the opposite of good? To what extent, from this viewpoint, does something have the right to claim the name of "truth" for itself?

The book resolves this dilemma from the positions of consistent and uncompromising humanism. No relativism whatsoever is allowed here, since the latter undermines the basis itself for humanistic ethics. Recognition of the fact that there is no simple connection between science and morality, as philosophers of the Enlightenment once imagined, and that certain contradictions among them are possible, leads the readers to conclude the real need for a clear definition of the borders between the permitted and the not permitted, especially in cases where it is a question of the fate of future generations. "...We must establish tolerable limits to manipulating the basic genetic material of man as a biological species, to any influence on his individual qualities in general" (p 244).

As we seen, the moral and humanistic approach is the guiding principle in the research that was done. Here, the author's "*sui generis philosophical* position is manifest: moral comprehension of the world and love of man act as the higher value. Therefore, when evaluating studies of man by scientific means, the priority should be to "preserve human individuality, the freedoms and rights of man. This in particular concerns any manipulation of man's brain and psyche, of his consciousness and behavior, which might lead to a 'crisis of identity,' i.e., to man's loss of a concept of his place in society, of the self-value of the individual personality" (pp 246-247).

Of course, the progress of science is not questioned in this regard. Its role in contemporary society is tremendous and, we should think, will be even greater in the future. However, to use the author's aphorism, admiration for an experiment should not outstrip our moral imagination. If this condition is fulfilled, if science and conscience, technology and ethics go hand-in-hand, the threat to mankind will be averted. "Be careful, man!" This is the leitmotif of the book, humanistic in spirit.

It is impossible to do a comprehensive study of the problem of man without touching on a theme that not a single great philosopher has overlooked. I refer to the fundamental question of *the meaning of life, death and immortality*. I.T. Frolov's book devotes a special chapter to this philosophical examination, since "honest service to philosophy in its moral and humanistic searches obliges one to think courageously about death, and these thoughts are an ancient and constantly renewing tradition of human culture, from the moment of its birth to our time" (p 496). In his theoretical searches and uncertainties, the author turns to world and, above all, domestic thought: philosophy, literature, and poetry. After all, the tormented desire to comprehend the meaning of life and death is a characteristic of Russian spiritual culture. Along with A.S. Pushkin, F.M. Dostoyevskiy, V.S. Solovyev, L.N. Tolstoy, and M.M. Prishvin, the researcher is trying to understand the secret phenomenon, full of drama, that we call death. For him, as well as for our great compatriots, death is not merely the cessation of a biological organism's life. It is mainly a spiritual and moral problem, the interpretation of which is very important to every individual: it comprises one of the basic elements forming our secret, inner world.

Domestic science has not overlooked the problem of death either. Following the natural experimenters I.I. Mechnikov, I.I. Shmalgauzen, and especially V.I. Vernadskiy, who rejected all supernatural explanations of the world and considered man a planetary, cosmic entity, the author seeks a universal justification for human life, its immortality in openness to other human entities, to nature, to the world, in serving good, truth and beauty. He sees the token of the undying man in turning to "mercy and memory, honor and conscience, love and wisdom in the face of death" (p 529).

Penetrating the essence of historical reality (after all, man is his history) presumes restoring the connection of

time. In analyzing the contemporary condition of man and mankind, his problems and difficulties, fears and hopes, the author tries to *connect* the living threads of historical fabric, so that it appears whole at a glance. Yet, the vision of the whole is also a realistic basis for genuine humanism.

The book, as the author cautions his readers, does not definitively answer all the problems on which it touches. Each era raises the problem anew and strives to solve it, turning to various spheres of spiritual culture. Philosophy designates the general direction of the search, asserting a love of wisdom and man as its medium, and is in this way a unique "integrator" of knowledge about it. The book's unquestionable merit lies in its multifaceted approach to man and his life in nature and in the social world, in the successful attempt to reveal the full complexity of the problem of humanism in the contemporary stage of civilization's development, to examine it as the cardinal world-outlook problem of renewing socialism. The author has gathered and interpreted rich material from the position of the new philosophical and political thinking. The scientist acquaints us not only with contemporary viewpoints on the problems under discussion, but also relates the complex history of the establishment of the integral view of man in non-Marxist and Marxist literature and traces the basic ideas of sharp debates of past years. As a result, the Marxist world outlook is represented not in simplified form, not as something recklessly optimistic, but as a system of profoundly scientific concepts, constantly being developed and augmented with ever newer features. The author shows: Marxism's views on man are not a priori with regard to the changing reality and the results of tempestuously developing science. They are open to new ideas and generalizations, which demands stressed explorations and research efforts of Marxist philosophers.

The time of revolutionary restructuring of society and of ourselves, our thinking and consciousness, creates real prerequisites for humanistic renovation, for a genuine Renaissance of man and the science of man. The highest destiny of philosophy is to make the utmost contribution to achieving this noble goal.

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Summarizing the Experience of Economic Reforms

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Dec 89 (signed to press 4 Dec 89) pp 113-116

[Review by A. Morozov, candidate of economic sciences, of the books: "*KNR Na Putyakh Reform (Teoriya i Praktika Ekonomicheskoy Reformy)*" [PRC on the Path of Reform (Theory and Practice of Economic Reform)], Nauka, Moscow, 1989, 343 pp (I); and "*Reforma Khozyaystvennoy Sistemy v KNR*" [Reform of the Economic System in the PRC], Ekonomika, Moscow, 1989, 351 pp (II)]

[Text] The third plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 11th Convocation, held in December 1978, started a broad-scale reform of the economic system, which is justly characterized as the "second revolution" in the PRC for the depth and scope of the changes it evokes. It has lasted almost 11 years, a period entirely adequate for summing up results, reviewing the achievements and problems of further development of the reform, and for serious scientific and practical conclusions and generalizations.

This year Nauka and Ekonomika have released two books (a collection of articles and monographs), giving the Soviet reader a broad opportunity to acquaint himself with the views of leading Chinese economists on the theory and practice of economic reform.

Of course, it is hard to reflect the full content of both books in a review, but I would like to dwell on several elements. As noted in the article by Lio Guoguang, vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, candidate member of the Chinese CP Central Committee, the theory of economic reform "from the very start ran into the problem of reinterpreting socialism," and it became clear that it is impossible, in the framework of old concepts and categories, to describe and explain the full entirety of the true reality of socialism (I, pp 5-6). In connection with this, two concepts were advanced by Chinese scientists, forming the cornerstone of the theory of reform in China: the initial stage of socialism and a socialist commodity economy (for a detailed review of Lio Guoguang's article see KOMMUNIST, No 6, 1989, pp 106-113).

According to these concepts, socialism in the initial stage of its development is a society with a multi-structure economy with the leading role of the social sector, socialist production is commodity in nature, and commodity-monetary relations are a necessary and important element of the foundation. In the framework of socialism's initial stage, nonsocialist forms and economic structures, hired labor, etc., are allowed to exist. Therefore, restructuring the socioeconomic structure of society in conformity with this concept involves the entire system of production relations and requires the creation of a fundamentally new mechanism for regulating the economy, which is quite laconically and succinctly expressed in the formula: "The state regulates the market, and the market orients the enterprises" (I, p 17).

In speaking of the basic directions of the reform of the economic system, Yuan Mu (II, pp 10-18), Ma Hong (II, pp 18-39), Dong Fureng (I, pp 40-55), Wu Jinglian (I, pp 263-293) and others single out the following:

1. Transformations of property relations, which simultaneously call for the development of state, cooperative, private and mixed forms of economic management.

Reform also signifies changes in the social ownership of means of production. The following measures are the most significant:

The division and transfer of public lands into long-term (up to 50 years) utilization by peasant courts, and sale of agricultural equipment to peasants;

The predominant development of cooperative forms of economic management by creating cooperative enterprises in the city and countryside, as well as by a broad transfer to the lease, contract, or sale of small state enterprises to collectives of working people;

The utilization of joint stock forms of organizing enterprises.

The indicated changes were related to the introduction of cost-accounting, self-financing, and democratization of management on the basis of the contract form of labor organization. The purpose of this is to enhance the human factor and more harmoniously combine the material interests of the state, enterprises, and individual workers.

2. Expanding the sphere of influence of commodity-monetary relations, in the framework of which the following is stipulated:

Strengthening the viability of large- and medium-size state enterprises and turning them into independent commodity producers by introducing different forms of production responsibility on the basis of separating the right of state ownership from the right of economic management of enterprises. Both direct economic ties, as well as competition among enterprises are encouraged;

The gradual assertion of a predominantly market system of price-setting, which stipulates the future rejection of centralized price-setting for most types of commodity production and the conversion basically to indirect price control by way of competitive contract purchases, regulation of supply and demand at the expense of using state commodity reserves, and control over monetary issue;

The formation of a unified nation-wide market, including the consumer goods market, trade of basic production means, and the market for monetary resources, securities, scientific and technical achievements, information and, in part, for manpower;

The conversion from budget financing to crediting the investment sphere, which presumes a radical change in the role of banks in the system of financial relations;

Strengthening the stimulating and regulating role of the law of cost by way of a decisive shift in favor of guiding planning in counterbalance to directive planning.

3. Implementing an "open policy" in the realm of foreign economic ties, aimed at the active utilization of foreign factors for purposes of creating addition impetuses for developing the Chinese economy. A key link of the "open policy" is the attraction of foreign capital, which is called on to play an important role in expanding China's export possibilities, to make up for the shortage of financial resources and the backwardness of domestic equipment and technology and, in this manner, promote

a qualitative increase in the level of development of production forces (including the training of skilled cadres).

The formulation of Wu Jinglian, board member of the research center, State Council on Problems of Technical, Economic and Social Development, of the question of two forms for implementing reform (I, pp 276-277), is of interest to our reader. The first ("in one pass") calls for the simultaneous transformation of all basic links of the economic system, while the second proceeds from a need for the consistent reform of each of them. Most economists, Wu Jinglian believes, support implementing reform "in one pass," since all links of the economic mechanism are inseparably related and depend on each other, and only thus is it possible to ensure the "steady, calm and efficient conversion to a new system." However, the reform in China is proceeding according to the second variant, which leads to the mixing of "two systems" and "two rules of movement," causing lack of coordination, a multiplicity of prices for one and the same items, speculation, corruption, etc. All this requires the use of diverse and effective measures to strengthen control over the economy at the macro-level.

An important element of both books is not only the description of the reform's successes, but also a clear formulation of its shortcomings and problems. The authors' analysis of the socioeconomic development of the People's Republic of China attests that the reform is a complex, often contradictory influence on the country's economic and sociopolitical situation. However, the results of the reform on the whole are highly impressive: qualitative changes have occurred in the economic structure, related to a growth in the share of sectors producing final products for consumption (agriculture, light industry), and a weakening of the most acute economic disproportions. Labor productivity has increased, especially in agriculture, which became a material basis for increasing its commodity nature and for profound, progressive social shifts. To a significant degree, the problem of employment in cities has been solved and the standard of living for working people has increased noticeably. In addition, as many assessments made in both books attest, the economic reform in the PRC is being implemented with tension, encountering obstacles of an objective and subjective order.

For example, in his article, "Contract System and New Development of the Cooperative Economy in the Countryside," Du Runsheng, member of the Chinese CP Central Committee Commission of Advisors, notes (I, pp 208-225): the assumption that, having obtained land, a peasant will put all his efforts and resources into it, is not always confirmed in agriculture. Practice shows that peasants are concerned, above all, about their own closest vital interests: food, clothing and housing. This leads to a reduction of capital investments in production, exhaustion of the land, destruction of irrigation installations, and worsening of the ecological situation. The question of social differentiation in the countryside is acute.

The situation that has formed is a topic of broad discussion in the country. In this regard, several Chinese economists see the solution in "eroding" weak farms and concentrating land in the hands of "capable" peasants. Others believe that prospects for developing the countryside and solving its social problems lie in the cooperation of peasant courts within a framework of joint production, supply, and sale.

The basic part of the transformations being implemented in industry affect enterprises in the collective and individual sector. Precisely here, the recommendations of Chinese scientists on the need for enterprise responsibility for profits and losses, the need to implement a law on bankruptcy in practice, and to develop guiding planning and joint stock forms of organizing enterprises, are tested. The state sector is the least involved in the reform. Large state enterprises still do not have a sufficient economic independence and retain their strong dependence on higher organizations. As before, a large number of plan indicators is in effect, including the number of employees, general wage fund, assortment plan, delivery of funded production, energy raw materials, and so forth. State enterprises are often in no condition to implement the legal rights, which they obtained in the course of the economic reform, for instance, the right to free implementation of beyond-the-plan production at commission prices, the free purchase of production means with the balance of profits, etc.

As noted in both books, practice has shown that the concept of "separating the rights of ownership and the rights of economic management" does not ensure the conversion of medium and large state enterprises into independent commodity producers. The existence of the right of economic management creates an interest in profit on the part of the enterprises, but the absence of the right to ownership removes responsibility from it for ensuring basic social interests, related to strengthening and developing the property itself (I, pp 244-262; II, pp 79-83). One could say that, for the time being, a definitive solution has not been found in China for this aspect of reform, which is of great significance to us. The necessary experience continues to accumulate in the course of economic experiments.

In the opinion of Chinese scientists, the question of the forms and methods for planned regulation of the national economy in the sectorial and territorial contexts also remains unresolved. The attempt to coordinate planning at the macro-level with market development of production on the micro-level, to implement a gradual conversion from direct forms of management to indirect as the main form of control has not been augmented in a timely manner by conversions in the system of planning, material and technical supply, finances, labor and wages, and price-setting. Increasing the economic independence of enterprises and local bodies of power, not backed by a real system of economic levers for control and regulation, has strengthened spontaneous tendencies in the economy.

The broad spread of investment crediting without sufficient material and technical support, the irrational utilization of both private, as well as borrowed resources, crediting insolvent debtors, etc., has become a manifestation of this. An "overheating" of the economy appeared in the mid-1980s, and the scales of economic activity actually broke away from planned indicators aimed at reasonably slowing the paces of economic growth and investment dynamics, which led to a strengthening of inflationary tendencies and an overall slowing of the increase in the efficiency of social production. In response to this, active state interference in economic processes is periodically renewed, which to a certain extent returns the economic mechanism to predominantly administrative methods of regulation.

The price-setting system is named in the books as one of the weak links of the reform. Essentially, the problem of inflation became a permanent satellite of the economic reform.

The presence of two forms of prices—state and market—for means of production complicates the situation. Both the former and the latter are increasing, but the market prices for one and the same items, depending on scarcity, are higher than state prices by a factor of 2-4. This creates difficulties in the work of enterprises, distorts the objective evaluation of their activity, and creates fertile ground for speculation, accumulation of scarce materials, and the diktat of monopoly producers on one product or another.

Presently, there is no unified opinion among Chinese specialists on how to overcome the shortcomings in price-setting. Some believe it necessary to convert gradually to standardized prices, and others, conversely, see the solution in an "open policy" on price setting for all commodities (see I, pp 301-320; II, pp 89-99).

A large set of problems in the economic reform relates to its social consequences.

What do the Chinese authors see as the objective grounds for the negative phenomena which are appearing in the course of the reform? In our opinion, associates of the Chinese CP Central Committee TsPSH Wang Jue, Hang Kan and Lu Zhunyuan gave the most successful answer, having declared that the reasons "must be sought in the contradictions of the present-day partial market, taking into account that a planned market system is effective only when it is integral. A socialist planned market should be an entirely open, unobstructedly and harmoniously functioning system" (I, p 175).

The most important aspect of studying the works of the Chinese authors is the extraction of both positive, as well as negative reform experience from them. The first conclusion here is that the implementation of economic reform has once again shown: no socialist state can prepare an economic mechanism for application in

another country. In addition, the similarity of the problems being solved in the USSR and China opens broad possibilities for mutual exchange of experience.

The experience of the PRC, thoroughly disclosed in the monographs under consideration, contains rich material for a specific study of the laws and ways of building socialism and can be useful in developing concepts for economic reform.

For instance, it can be considered proven that in order to create a new economic mechanism in an economy, one needs a sufficiently profound structural reorganization of the entire system of production relations (right up to property relations), the goal of which, in particular, lies in destroying the monopolization (which has gone too far) of production and in managing it at both the state-wide, as well as especially at the sectorial level, without which it is impossible to "include" a market mechanism for regulating the national economy.

Familiarity with the theory and practice of reform in the PRC makes it possible to refine concepts on the limits to the development of commodity-monetary relations under socialism, on the correlation of plan and market principles in the national economy, and on forms and methods for indirect regulation of the economy. The mechanisms for establishing and maintaining fixed plan assignments over a number of years, leading to a restriction of the overall volume of resources included in the sphere of directive planning and funding, is of interest to us in industry. In this regard, beyond-the-plan production is implemented through market channels at free or floating prices. Thus, in the initial stage of reform it is already possible to create a multi-channel sphere of interaction, including a mechanism for wholesale trade. In agriculture, the experiments in converting to the contract form for purchasing production and in using this lever to regulate the structure and volumes of agricultural production and commodity prices may have practical significance. For us, the significance of the PRC's experience in agricultural reform lies in the fact that it convincingly confirmed the tremendous possibilities for accelerated development of agriculture by reinforcing personal interest and the supports for economic methods of management.

The experience of the PRC has also shown that the success of any economic reform depends to a decisive extent on enhancement of the human factor and the consistent reinforcement of the working people's material interests in the final results of labor.

The forms being practiced in the PRC for attracting foreign capital and for its operation in the framework of a socialist economy are also of practical interest. The circumstance that, like the Soviet Union, China has an extensive territory and tremendous economic scales with considerable differences in the development of separate sectors and regions, enables us to utilize several principles and methods of the economic and organizational-legal mechanism for attracting foreign investments in the

PRC. For example, the conclusion that the efficiency of utilizing foreign resources, as well as the degree of interest on the part of national enterprises in international cooperation depends not only on "opening on the outside," but also on the distribution of a number of "open policy" principles in internal economic activity, is highly topical and important.

Finally, an important lesson that could be drawn from the reforms in the PRC lies in the fact that a successful conversion to predominantly economic methods of managing the national economy requires large changes in cadre policy, structural political reforms, and the extensive democratization of society.

In a review, it is impossible to list all the applied aspects of the experience of the Chinese reform as applied to our economic problems. It seems, both the multi-plan and comprehensive works by the Chinese scientists will be of interest to the reader.

In conclusion, I would like to note the great deal of work done by the collective of sinologists, from doctors of sciences to graduate students, who, thanks to their high professional and linguistic training, have given a broad circle of Soviet specialists the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the experience of economic reform in the PRC.

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Is Imperialism Contemporary?

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[Review by E. Pletnev, doctor of economic sciences, of the book "Sovremennyy Imperializm: Tendentsii i Protivorechiya" [Contemporary Imperialism: Trends and Contradictions]. USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO; edited by Ye.M. Primakov and V.A. Martynov. Mysl, Moscow, 1988, 686 pp]

[Text] As a rule, the fate of theoretical concepts and categories in the social sciences is noteworthy, for behind each term we see the interpretation of sharp turns in the life of classes and nations. For example, the concept of "imperialism" is applied to a rather complex and variable condition of the capitalist order which, in the eyes of an entire generation of people, has undergone various changes. It was hidden behind the "society of prosperity" or "the postindustrial" or else the "information" society, or even presented as "worker-trade union socialism." For that reason, the authors of the new book dedicated to the study of contemporary capitalism were faced with a difficult task. They were asked not only thoroughly to explain the processes occurring within capitalist reality but also to equip their readers with a new conceptual vision of the future of the nonsocialist world.

I believe that, as a whole, they were able to achieve this objective, and to abandon stereotypes which still largely exist in specialized publications and textbooks, the authors of which have deemed it their task, above all, to provide empirical quantitative descriptions and additional illustrations to the Leninist theory of imperialism. One of the features of this book is that, having chosen as their topic contemporary imperialism, the authors have gone beyond the strict consideration of its five classical features.

The system of coordinates within which the scientists from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations have conducted their analysis includes the most important processes which constitute the nature of the new stage in the development of the scientific and technical revolution, the characteristics of the structural reorganization of the economy and the cyclical dynamics of the production process, the main trends in the transformation of the economic structure of state monopoly capitalism, the world capitalist economy and interimperialist contradictions, the fate of hired labor, the status and the struggle of the working people, the correlation between contemporary capitalism and the developing countries, and the reflection of the complex realities of our time in the foreign policies of the imperialist countries.

A special feature of the book is also the fact that it systematically promotes the fruitful idea according to which the development of state monopoly capitalism is not merely the latest modification of bourgeois society since the time of free competition but is a consistent form of capitalist production in general, which preserves the possibility of providing adequate scope for the development of the scientific and technical revolution and for the growth of production forces as a whole. As a result of this approach, the reader can see a picture of a certain turning point in capitalist development and the appearance of qualitatively new features within it.

Nonetheless, as is convincingly argued by the authors, the significance of the Leninist theory and methodology applied in the study of the processes of the establishment of the new social quality under the conditions of capitalism is not reduced in the least but, conversely, becomes more important, for capitalism, as it changes, without exhausting its possibility of adapting to the challenges of the age and providing various options for the solution of its contradictions, preserves both its continuity and identity in the main aspect which was first scientifically analyzed in Lenin's theory: capitalism remains monopolistic.

It is this most important feature of capitalism that has been studied in detail in the book. Unlike the stereotyped interpretation of capitalist monopoly as merely a "large" enterprise, which controls a "major" or "significant" share of output, the authors consider this phenomenon as the "vertical" multiplication of superimposed qualitative advantages in terms of the production and appropriation of the absolute and relative added

value, compared with capitalism of the age of free competition. The authors also note the drastic change in the appearance of monopoly associations: from sectorial, as they were at the turn of the century, they have now become primarily multisectorial.

Another merit of this research collective is the detection and clear follow-up of an aspect inseparable from contemporary capitalist monopoly: a sharp aggravation and, at the same time, worsening of competition. "The intensification of competition can be noted on all levels. It is characterized by clashes among multinational corporations of the main imperialist countries on virtually all capitalist markets, for their new redivision and for settling in new important "niches" in the market structure by medium-sized and small enterprises, which have displayed flexibility and readiness for risk in the use of technical innovations" (p 6). The identification, along with the trend toward monopoly, of the strengthening opposite features—the "demonopolizing" principle, which appears in the growth of oligopolic structures, intersectorial investments, production differentiations, increased multinational operations, strengthening the forms of market control and limiting control by the state, and so on, has enabled the researchers to avoid a one-sided assessment of the economic foundations of contemporary capitalism.

This was manifested in particular in the study of the profoundly conflicting nature of recent conservative policies and practices, which have been based on the revival of market principles. As indicated in the monograph, this is unquestionably a policy and a practice which reflect the interests of the ruling class and which objectively contribute to strengthening the positions of monopoly business. However, this is only one aspect of the matter on which, so far, our researchers had focused their main attention. Equally important is the fact that both the theory and political practices of conservatism are consistent, to a certain extent, with the overall requirements of the contemporary stage in the development of capitalist production.

By a tradition which can be traced back to Lenin's works on imperialism, the latter is considered in close connection with global economic processes. This is a very productive method. However, while backing their views on the inadmissibility of reducing the global economy to international economic relations, the authors of the respective parts in the monograph develop a view on its economic structure and motive forces which, conversely, essentially leads to the identification of the global economic area with imperialism itself (see pp 331-335).

Generally speaking, the authors have paid less attention to the study of the dialectically complex correlation between primary (national economic) and secondary (global economic) relations, compared to what should be expected of experts in international affairs. As a result, international economic relations are occasionally depicted somewhat one-sidedly and as being excessively passive and "too" secondary. The authors emphasize

that "in terms of their complexity, intensiveness and interwoven nature, foreign economic relations are gradually rising to the level of domestic relations. In the language of political economy, the levels of the international and internal socialization of production are coming increasingly closer to each other. This objectively dictates the need to bring economic management methods closer to each other" (p 476). I believe that this conclusion on the nature of the interaction between national and international aspects in capitalist economic relations, albeit accurate as a whole, is insufficient. The realities of contemporary imperialism are such that the international level of socialization in the economy frequently outstrips the "level" reached by this process within the national economies. These are the roots of the new flexible tangle of contradictions between multinational corporations, which frequently ignore national boundaries in their activities, and the nationally established systems of state monopoly capitalism.

Obviously, today this also constitutes one of the main features of the capitalist economic system within which it is precisely on the international level that the essential features of monopoly capital are developing on a global basis.

Nonetheless, is imperialism a contemporary phenomenon? Is this concept merely synonymous with contemporary capitalism or else does it include another, a broader or narrower, meaning? This is not a rhetorical question but a question which has been raised by the very course of development of civilization as it approaches the 21st century and, one would like to hope, its new and peaceful stage. The very development of the oneness of the contemporary world directly depends on whether the forces of social progress will be able to block manifestations of the narrow-class nature of imperialism, such as aggressiveness, hegemonism, increased militarism, violation of the sovereignty of countries and nations, and encroachments on the freedom of their social choice. If, as the authors arguably emphasize, despite the tremendously increased economic power of capitalism, it can no longer, i.e., in an imperialist fashion, solve problems of global development, does this not mean that imperialism, as a specific historical stage of the bourgeois system, has clearly outlived its time?

A great deal in the answers to such questions depends today on the scientists and on their ability to achieve a substantial increase in the specific knowledge of what V.I. Lenin described as the "direct development, expansion and extension of the most profound and basic trends of capitalism and of commodity production in general." On the one hand, huge empirical data confirm the accuracy of the classical Marxist logic of interpretation of the highest stage of the capitalist system; the features of imperialism are retained in the entire variety of "activities" of the capitalist economy as its essential features. On the other hand, many phenomena (particularly where politics and economics cross) it no longer fits their framework and requires, for the sake of its interpretation, a major breakthrough along the entire front of

the political economic theory of the capitalist production method. I believe that the work done by these authors is an encouraging proof of the fact that Marxist scientific thinking is pursuing this trend.

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Short Book Review

905B0013N Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 18, Dec 89 (signed to press 4 Dec 89) pp 119-120

[Text] O. Volobuyev and S. Kuleshov, "Ochishcheniye. Istoriya i Perestroyka. Publitsisticheskiye Zametki" [Cleansing. History and Restructuring. Journalistic Notes]. Izdatelstvo Agentsvo Pechat Novosti, Moscow, 1989, 288 pages. Reviewed by A. Zevelev, doctor of historical sciences.

Today scientists and publicists are asking the question: "How could this be?" of our history from the 1920s to 1970s, full of both heroism, as well as tragedy, while striving to read it anew from positions of historical truth. Here we are faced with yet another work, the journalistic notes of O. Volobuyev and S. Kuleshov, devoted mainly to the political history of the USSR in a broad time framework.

Since political history is, above all, the events created by people and often mythologized later, the authors considered it necessary to preface the basic content of the book with thoughts on historical consciousness. In their opinion, interpretation of the past presumes not only research, but also an emotional approach to history as a human drama. The combination of these bases is the principle that they have attempted to embody, in our opinion, quite successfully, in their work.

The basic section of the book opens with an outline of the political testament of V.I. Lenin, which helps us understand: the construction of a new society in our country in past years has developed far from according to his "blueprints." That which was implemented under the motto of the "Leninist plan for building socialism," was in fact the far from triumphal result of the Stalinist "great leap," which was accompanied by violence against the people and the economy. Capably combining the persuasiveness of fact and the emotional force of words, the authors show: Stalinism, if considered beyond a revolutionary phraseology, was essentially a break with the humanistic essence of the socialist ideal.

In speaking of the ideological struggle of the 1920s, which was closely intertwined with the struggle for personal leadership, O. Volobuyev and S. Kuleshov justifiably note that "different opposition groups objectively made mistakes and errors, but there were also many correct opinions, revealing the negative processes of the reality of that time" (p 49). As shown in the book, many opposition members, despite being expelled from the party, continued to consider themselves bolsheviks, worried over the fate of the country and its socialist

future, and constantly returned in their troubled thoughts to Lenin and his basic ideas.

The section includes a chapter which studies the views of historians on the problem of the alternative in the historical process. The authors themselves believe that the choice of developmental paths is not fatally predetermined, but a result of political struggle. The questions of alternatives are examined in the book mainly in the examples of the "great crisis" at the end of the 1920s (was there a real NEP alternative?), the struggle for leadership in the party (was there a "good parry" against Stalin?), and the opposition of reform and conservative tendencies in the history of the Soviet society in the 1950s to early 1980s. In the authors' opinion, precisely the assertion of the latter in the mid-1960s led the country to a crisis condition in the future.

Another section was devoted to the questions of cleansing of the negative deposits and deformations of the history of Soviet society. The thoughts that "the historical path and crossroads of a multi-ethnic country are the trails of time, crossed by its peoples not in isolation, not in an ethnic vacuum, but in the most diverse context with each other" (p 242), are highly topical. It is impossible to solve the questions of historical memory, the book emphasizes, from positions of ethnic exclusiveness. In interethnic relations, we must master the complex political "art of ikebana:" knowing how to arrange a bouquet so that each flower does not lose its primitive nature, its natural beauty. The debates on what kind of socialism we have built are also interesting. This problem, in the authors' opinion, has several aspects: stage-wise, typological, or of the conversion from one model of the new society to another. In the stage-wise aspect, they assume, it can only be a question of the history of development of the USSR as applied to previous forms of socialism. However, this is only one possible answer to the question under consideration and not, in our opinion, the optimum answer in this regard. The work has inaccuracies of a chronological and personality nature.

Although O. Volobuyev and S. Kuleshov also caution the reader that these are journalistic notes, their book is in fact a highly serious research work. It is, above all, historiographic, analyzing different viewpoints which go back both to the Stalinist "Short Course," as well as to the restructuring processes in current historical science. It remains only to regret that references to the literature being used are incomplete and fragmented. The genre nature of the publication, it seems, nonetheless does not warrant the absence in it of a sound scientific structure.

V. Naumov's article, "Restoring the Leninist Tradition," is a sort of postscript to the book, ending with the conclusion: the book, unquestionably, serves the matter defined by a word expressed in its title—restructuring. While sharing this assessment, I would like only to add: cleansing history of deposits, myths, and dogma incorporates an important constructive principle, advancing

creative thought toward a more profound understanding of the interrelations of the past, present and future.

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[Text] "Topical Questions on the Participation of Working People in Social Life and Democratization of the Political System:" this was the theme of the round-table conference of the journals of the CPSU Central Committee KOMMUNIST and the CZCP Central Committee NOVA MYSL, held in Moscow. The meeting participants, scientists and journalists from both countries, considered a broad range of problems related to the development of the political system of socialist society and its further democratization at the contemporary stage, to improving the state mechanism of power, to the correlation between a civil society and the state as an important condition for the active and free participation of the working people in political life, to the new role of social organizations and labor collectives, to the functioning of the legal system under the conditions of restructuring and democratization of society, and to the fuller implementation of human rights.

During the discussion, different viewpoints and opinions were expressed, not always coinciding, which reflected the condition of practice in the USSR and Czechoslovakia and the present level of its theoretical interpretation.

Meetings were held between representatives of the editorial office with propagandists from Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast, and from Moscow's Leninskiy Rayon, as well as with students and teachers from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. In addition to discussing the journal's work to illuminate the internal and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state,

great attention was devoted to the tasks facing KOMMUNIST in promoting the ideological activity of the party at the contemporary stage of restructuring. The participants in the meeting made specific remarks and suggestions on the journal's work and on expanding and intensifying its ties with readers.

A meeting in the editorial office with party employees of oblast and municipal committees of the Bulgarian Communist Party discussed the topical questions, representing mutual interest, of economic reform, restructuring of party work, the further democratization of party and society, the creation of a law-governed socialist state, and the role of the press in solving the problems of restructuring.

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